While classic models for the emergence of pastoral groups in Inner Asia describe mounted, horse-borne herders sweeping across the Eurasian Steppes during the Early or Middle Bronze Age (ca. 3000–1500 BCE), the actual economic basis of many early pastoral societies in the region is poorly characterized. In this paper, we use collagen mass fingerprinting and ancient DNA analysis of some of the first stratified and directly dated archaeofaunal assemblages from Mongolia’s early pastoral cultures to undertake species identifications of this rare and highly fragmented material. Our results provide evidence for livestock-based, herding subsistence in Mongolia during the late 3rd and early 2nd millennia BCE. We observe no evidence for dietary exploitation of horses prior to the late Bronze Age, ca. 1200 BCE – at which point horses come to dominate ritual assemblages, play a key role in pastoral diets, and greatly influence pastoral mobility. In combination with the broader archaeofaunal record of Inner Asia, our analysis supports models for widespread changes in herding ecology linked to the innovation of horseback riding in Central Asia in the final 2nd millennium BCE. Such a framework can explain key broad-scale patterns in the movement of people, ideas, and material culture in Eurasian prehistory.

This Article contains a typographical error in the Introduction section under subheading ‘Understanding Early Horse Domestication and Transport’ where, “Historical records refer to horse-mounted warriors in western Asia by the 8th century BCE, while archaeological finds from localities like Arzhan 2 in southern Tuva show specialized horse equipment (bronze snaffle bits) and equine vertebral pathologies linked with mounted riding in Central Asia by the late 9th century BCE31.” should read: “Historical records refer to horse-mounted warriors in western Asia by the 8th century BCE, while archaeological finds from localities like Arzhan in southern Tuva show specialized horse equipment (bronze snaffle bits) and equine vertebral pathologies linked with mounted riding in Central Asia by the late 9th century BCE31.”.

In this article, we consider the phenomenon of message crimes involving harm to wildlife from a sociological and criminological perspective. Using a case study of dissident Nordic hunters killing protected wolves to send a message to the state agencies responsible for their conservation, we engage philosophically with the question of wildlife victimhood and why interspecies violence is unjustifiable as a mode of political dissent. As an alternative to the species justice perspective in green criminology, we examine how the acts disrespect animals as moral subjects of public communication and frustrate dialogue regarding what is owed to them in terms of political justice.

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Agents are enkratic when they intend to do what they believe they should. That rationality requires you to be enkratic is uncontroversial, yet you may be enkratic in a way that does not exhibit any rationality on your part. Thus, what I call the enkratic requirement demands that you be enkratic in the right way. In particular, I will argue that it demands that you base your belief about what you should do and your intention to do it on the same considerations. The idea is that, if you base your belief and your intention on different considerations, then you are inconsistent in your treatment of those considerations as reasons. The enkratic requirement demands that you be enkratic by treating considerations consistently as reasons.

Agents are enkratic when they intend to do what they believe they should. That rationality requires you to be enkratic is uncontroversial, yet you may be enkratic in a way that does not exhibit any rationality on your part. Thus, what I call the enkratic requirement demands that you be enkratic in the right way. In particular, I will argue that it demands that you base your belief about what you should do and your intention to do it on the same considerations. The idea is that, if you base your belief and your intention on different considerations, then you are inconsistent in your treatment of those considerations as reasons. The enkratic requirement demands that you be enkratic by treating considerations consistently as reasons.

In this article, we develop a republican framework for relational animal ethics, recently popularized in Donaldson and Kymlicka's Zoopolis. This republican framework departs from the focus on negative rights that dominate liberal animal rights theories, especially as concerns our relations to wild animals. Our proposed framework appeals to a republican standard of non-arbitrariness, or non-domination, for human interferences with such animals. This legitimation framework is more attentive to relations of care and of dependency between the species, which we contend fi ts the growing fi eld of relational animal ethics. At the same time, it requires rigorous criteria be met to legitimate relations as non-dominating. We apply this framework to the morality of the supplementary feeding of wildlife, using a case study of wild boars as fed by hunters. Weakening of the concept of domination to fi t the predicament of boars, we show how the republican framework can provide a principled justification for legitimate interference with a wild animal population.

In this article, I defend the justifiability of both concealed uses of executive prerogative as consistent with the end of self-preservation for which government is constituted by the people and its disobedient disclosure as consistent with the rational interest of the citizens of the constitutional state in non-subordination. Indeed, I argue both prerogative and disclosure are justifiable, despite the latter clearly operating at cross-purposes with the former. I also contend that disobedient disclosure aligns more closely with the justificatory conditions of executive prerogative than more traditions forms of civil disobedience. My discussion is limited to the question of justification, highlighting the normative stakes of delegitimizing either mode of extra-legal discretionary judgment by executive or disclosers respectively.

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