In recent years, hunting and agrarian communities have increasingly risen in opposition to nature conservation policy that is perceived to infringe on their traditional ways of life. They charge ‘conservationists’ with having a disproportionate influence on policy and maintain that the state system now disenfranchises their needs and interests. In this paper, we suggest this particular brand of resistance can be illuminated by neo-Marxist social movement framework (Cox and Nilsen, 2014) on the dialectic of movements-from-below and movements-from-above, competing for hegemony in the context of an organic crisis of the system. Our paper examines the role of Swedish hunters’ activation of a counter-hegemonic ‘good sense’ to oppose the hegemonic common sense established by wolf conservationists in the state system. The case of Swedish hunters rising in resistance toward the newfound hegemony of wolf conservation is hence resolved as the rise of a right-wing movement from below, mobilized on the basis of defensive, conservative and agrarian values. The novel contribution of this paper lies in its examination of the (often) self-professed limits of hunters’ distinctively agrarian good sense, in light of their own reluctance as an oppositional social movement from below. Not only do hunters exhibit considerable reluctance in regard to their own ‘movement’ identity and ambivalence in regard to hegemony. But we argue that from a conceptual perspective the empowerment of a counter-hegemonic good sense as in traditional resistance studies can, at best, result in a dialectical reversal of movement positions with conservationists, without appropriate mediation or compromise. This leads us to some brief recommendations from democratic theory to mediate between the below and above movements of hunters and conservationists.

‘Care’ is a term that hunters increasingly apply to diverse practices pertaining to their interactions with wildlife. In this article, we investigated the extent and durability of hunters’ use of care language, including appeals made to sentiment, relation, compassion, embodiedness and situated morality. After establishing the use of such language in contemporary hunting media, we discuss two case studies of contemporary sport hunting that tease out dimensions of care. These case studies show how hunters’ appeal to care is deeply problematic and oppositely, how these hunting forms bring out new relations and scopes of care with wildlife unanticipated by critics. Without discounting hunters’ sincerity, we note that hunters may use this language opportunistically rather than with consistent philosophical appeal. We conclude by discussing the possible role of hunters’ appeal to care language in mediating public acceptance of hunting.

‘Care’ is a term that hunters increasingly apply to diverse practices pertaining to their interactions with wildlife. In this article, we investigated the extent and durability of hunters’ use of care language, including appeals made to sentiment, relation, compassion, embodiedness and situated morality. After establishing the use of such language in contemporary hunting media, we discuss two case studies of contemporary sport hunting that tease out dimensions of care. These case studies show how hunters’ appeal to care is deeply problematic and oppositely, how these hunting forms bring out new relations and scopes of care with wildlife unanticipated by critics. Without discounting hunters’ sincerity, we note that hunters may use this language opportunistically rather than with consistent philosophical appeal. We conclude by discussing the possible role of hunters’ appeal to care language in mediating public acceptance of hunting.

Swedish hunters sometimes appeal to an inviolate ‘right to exist’ for wolves, apparently rejecting NIMBY. Nevertheless, the conditions existence hunters impose on wolves in practice fundamentally contradict their use of right to exist language. Hunters appeal to this language hoping to gain uptake in a conservation and management discourse demanding appropriately objective ecological language. However, their contradictory use of ‘right to exist' opens them up to the charge that they are being deceptive–indeed, right to exist is a 'disguised NIMBY!' We address this situation by distinguishing hunters’ criticisms of wolves from the procedures for reaching objective policy decisions.

In clear and lively prose that avoids jargon, the author carefully and systematically examines the many kinds of subtly nuanced words or word-pairs of everyday discourse such as 'and'-'but', 'before'-'ere', 'Chinese'-'Chink', and 'sweat'-'perspiration', that have proven resistant to truth-conditional explanations of meaning. / https://dc.etsu.edu/etsu_books/1108/thumbnail.jpg

For decades, cigarette companies helped to promote the impression that there was no scientific consensus concerning the safety of their product. The appearance of controversy, however, was misleading, designed to confuse the public and to protect industry interests. Created scientific controversies emerge when expert communities are in broad agreement but the public perception is one of profound scientific uncertainty and doubt. In the first book-length analysis of the concept of a created scientific controversy, David Harker explores issues including climate change, Creation science, the anti-vaccine movement and genetically modified crops. Drawing on work in cognitive psychology, social epistemology, critical thinking and philosophy of science, he shows readers how to better understand, evaluate, and respond to the appearance of scientific controversy. His book will be a valuable resource for students of philosophy of science, environmental and health sciences, and social and natural sciences. / https://dc.etsu.edu/etsu_books/1017/thumbnail.jpg

This essay explores the phenomenological features of the passional response to evil that Aquinas calls 'hatred of sin' in Summa Thelogiae II-II Q34 A3 and I-II Q23 A1, among other places. Social justice concerns and philosophical objections, however, challenge the notion that one can feel hatred toward an agent's vice or sin without it being the agent who is hated. I argue that a careful, contextual reading of these texts shows that Aquinas cannot be read as commending 'hate' in any form. The texts under consideration offer no comfort to those who appeal to hatred of sin or vice to legitimate sentiments or actions that can be reasonably taken to express hatred of persons.

This essay explores the phenomenological features of the passional response to evil that Aquinas calls 'hatred of sin' in Summa Thelogiae II-II Q34 A3 and I-II Q23 A1, among other places. Social justice concerns and philosophical objections, however, challenge the notion that one can feel hatred toward an agent's vice or sin without it being the agent who is hated. I argue that a careful, contextual reading of these texts shows that Aquinas cannot be read as commending 'hate' in any form. The texts under consideration offer no comfort to those who appeal to hatred of sin or vice to legitimate sentiments or actions that can be reasonably taken to express hatred of persons.

Inferences from scientific success to the approximate truth of successful theories remain central to the most influential arguments for scientific realism. Challenges to such inferences, however, based on radical discontinuities within the history of science, have motivated a distinctive style of revision to the original argument. Conceding the historical claim, selective realists argue that accompanying even the most revolutionary change is the retention of significant parts of replaced theories, and that a realist attitude towards the systematically retained constituents of our scientific theories can still be defended. Selective realists thereby hope to secure the argument from success against apparent historical counterexamples. Independently of that objective, historical considerations have inspired a further argument for selective realism, where evidence for the retention of parts of theories is itself offered as justification for adopting a realist attitude towards them. Given the nature of these arguments from success and from retention, a reasonable expectation is that they would complement and reinforce one another, but although several theses purport to provide such a synthesis the results are often unconvincing. In this paper I reconsider the realist's favoured type of scientific success, novel success, offer a revised interpretation of the concept, and argue that a significant consequence of reconfiguring the realist's argument from success accordingly is a greater potential for its unification with the argument from retention.

In this article, I offer not only an alternative but also a superior account of how we might reconcile Gandhi’s perpetrator and victimhood perspectives on violence (himsa). Appealing to both critical social studies and philosophy, I emphasize both the intersections of these two perspectives and their intersection with his metaphysics. I reject the standard approaches to reconciling Gandhi’s commitment to nonviolence with his remarks on the occasional necessity and unavoidability of violence. Instead, I focus on how truth-seekers use their political freedom to ‘pass over,’ or cross and join, many different social viewpoints to gain knowledge and insight concerning the minimum of violence compatible with keeping everyone a path to ahimsa (nonviolence), truth and transcendence. Further, I contend my account of the intersections of nonviolence, violence, truth, and transcendence helps clarify a Gandhian contribution to UNESCO’s vision of knowledge societies through highlighting the kinds of knowledge required for such a path.