This thesis takes as its focus R. v. Guerin, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 and seeks to assess its possibilities as the source of a legal principle to guide the constitutional review of the aboriginal and treaty rights protected by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.<p>In Chapter 1, the decision and the commentary to which it gave rise is discussed. Chapter 2 reviews the history of the law of aboriginal rights with a particular focus on the Indian law of the United States. Chapter 3 reviews Canadian Native law with a particular stress on the trust obligation. In Chapter 4 the language of trusts is reviewed and the influence of International law is canvassed. After a brief discussion of fiduciary law, the chapter closes with a suggested basis for a constitutional fiduciary principle. Chapter 5 opens with a discussion of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The theory is then proposed.<p>The theory would find its origin in the common law recognition of the precontact sovereignty of the aboriginal peoples and its denial by the colonizing nation at the time of colonization. The assumption of legislative power by the Crown came with an obligation, acknowledged by the Crown, that it must use its legislative power so as to protect and promote the interests of the aboriginal peoples in order to assist them through the process of colonization. It is suggested that s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 may have made that obligation justiciable and may require the courts to check the exercise of its legislative power to make certain that any negative effect on the aboriginal peoples is justified. The standard, being a fiduciary one, would be high.<p>The thesis closes with an application of the theory to some past and present issues in Native law.

This thesis takes as its focus R. v. Guerin, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 and seeks to assess its possibilities as the source of a legal principle to guide the constitutional review of the aboriginal and treaty rights protected by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.<p>In Chapter 1, the decision and the commentary to which it gave rise is discussed. Chapter 2 reviews the history of the law of aboriginal rights with a particular focus on the Indian law of the United States. Chapter 3 reviews Canadian Native law with a particular stress on the trust obligation. In Chapter 4 the language of trusts is reviewed and the influence of International law is canvassed. After a brief discussion of fiduciary law, the chapter closes with a suggested basis for a constitutional fiduciary principle. Chapter 5 opens with a discussion of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The theory is then proposed.<p>The theory would find its origin in the common law recognition of the precontact sovereignty of the aboriginal peoples and its denial by the colonizing nation at the time of colonization. The assumption of legislative power by the Crown came with an obligation, acknowledged by the Crown, that it must use its legislative power so as to protect and promote the interests of the aboriginal peoples in order to assist them through the process of colonization. It is suggested that s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 may have made that obligation justiciable and may require the courts to check the exercise of its legislative power to make certain that any negative effect on the aboriginal peoples is justified. The standard, being a fiduciary one, would be high.<p>The thesis closes with an application of the theory to some past and present issues in Native law.

Magister Artium - MA / Both Am-Xhosa and the European farmers, being pastoralists "the search for land and grass was (their) first principle", notes Walker (1928). When they met, they differed fundamentally on the "vital matter oflandholding" . So different were their perspectives, that Lekhehla (1955) suggested, as far as the treaties were concerned: "The Native Chiefs either did not understand the implications of the border treaties, or if they did, never intended to respect such treaties" (p.2 1). Hopper (1980) says the tension between the Europeans and the Africans on the land issue emanated from the fact that "Xhosa expansion" and "colonial expansion" processes were entirely different. While Am-Xhosa expanded in order to "preserve their political integrity" colonists were driven by an economic dynamic they expanded because land was necessary to accommodate growth (1980:261).

L'administration coloniale a pris de nombreuses formes au fil des siècles, et l'Indirect rule est l'une des plus représentatives de la colonisation britannique. A ce titre, il convient de s'intéresser aux causes et aux conséquences de ce système de gouvernement, ainsi qu'aux spécificités qui y sont liées en pratique. Cette analyse portera donc essentiellement sur sa mise en application au Nigeria, ainsi que sa diffusion dans l'empire colonial britannique d'Afrique. Afin d'approfondir cette étude, l'Indirect rule sera également abordé d'un point de vue plus théorique, notamment concernant l'évolution de sa perception par les historiens du droit. De même, sa spécificité sera questionnée, notamment en la comparant à d'autres systèmes de gouvernement coloniaux européens. / Colonial administration evolved a lot through centuries, and Indirect rule is one of the most representative of the British one. As such, it is interesting to look at the reasons and the issues of the particular system of government, as well as the particularities linked to Indirect rule in the facts. This analysis will be more specifically about how Indirect rule worked in Nigeria, as well as its diffusion through the British colonial empire in Africa. In order to complete the study, Indirect rule will also broached from a theoretical point of view, in particular regarding the evolution of how historians of law considered it. Moreover, its specificities will be observed, in particular by comparing indirect rule with other Europeans colonial governments.