Thesis (M.A.)--Wheaton College Graduate School, Wheaton, IL, 2000. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 99-100).

This thesis argues that the pertinent intellectual context for understanding Thomas F. Torrance's reconstruction of natural theology is the synthesis of the rational structure of knowledge and the material content of knowledge. The bridge between the synthesis of (i) rational structure and material content, and (ii) natural theology is the analogous relation Torrance set between the relation of natural theology and revealed theology and the relation of practical geometry and physics, which is constituted by the same formal relation of rational structure and material content. By examining Torrance's work on natural theology in this connection it is apparent that the germane methodological issue at stake is the manner of the relation between the rational structure of human understanding and the material content of God's self-revelation in theological cognition. Torrance's criticism of natural theology concerns its autonomous formulations in which theistic argumentation is established as an antecedent rational sub-structure, from which revealed theology is interpreted and cognized within an anthropocentric correlate system. Accordingly, Torrance's reconstruction of natural theology is the reconfiguration of the relation of rational structure and material content within theological rationality. Applied to the classical loci of natural theology, this takes the form of a reconceptualisation of the cosmological argument and ontological argument, such that the rational structure of theistic argumentation is determined through its connection to revelation at key points. The significance of this inversion of the relation of rational structure and material content extends outwards into Torrance's broader dogmatics, where natural theology is identified as the rational intra-structure of theology, which, in conjunction with revealed theology as material content, constitutes theological science. The result is a theological approach that sets itself as a development beyond Karl Barth's rejection of natural theology, which conceives of natural theology as the necessary but insufficient condition of theology, under the determination of God's self-revelation.

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This dissertation investigates the evangelical ethics of Prof. Oliver O’Donovan in order to explore the implications of his “evangelical realism” for theological anthropology, moral knowledge and the concept of moral order. The Barth-Brunner debate regarding natural theology provides a lens onto these issues. Theological case studies are used to test our findings. Chapter 1 provides an overture to these issues, paying attention to current ideas about human nature and morality, and the growing influence of neuroscience and evolutionary psychology. Chapter 2 focuses on Resurrection and Moral Order, elucidating the salient factors in its outline for evangelical ethics. Chapter 3 diagnoses the challenges which a dialectical epistemology presents to the development of a doctrine of evangelical ethics. Chapter 4 delves into O’Donovan’s treatment of the Barth-Brunner debate over natural theology, and discovers therein an illuminating correspondence between O’Donovan’s ethics and the concept of a human “capacity for revelation” (Offenbarungsmächtigkeit), which became a hinge issue in the debate. This provides a helpful lens onto O’Donovan’s concept of moral order. Chapter 5 examines the intrinsic connection between the concept of moral order and the epistemic role of faith. Kierkegaard’s treatment of the paradoxical aspects of faith as an event of epistemic access figures prominently in this analysis. Chapter 6 brings together the results of our analysis and applies them to the thesis that: the transformation of persons lies at the heart of evangelical ethics. The cosmology of faith emerges as a critical hermeneutical factor in the development of a doctrine of evangelical ethics. We explore here the doctrinal implications for Trinitarian theology. Chapter 7 draws out practical implications of our thesis. We see the central place of prayer and worship in evangelical ethics, and point out implications for teaching. Lastly, we show practical applications of our thesis by examining the bio-ethical issues of human reproductive technologies, with special attention to O’Donovan’s work, Begotten or Made?

This dissertation constructively explores the implications for natural theology of (especially) John McDowell’s anti-Cartesian philosophy of mind and perception. Traditionally, an important element within natural theology is the idea that nature testifies to its creator, thereby making knowledge of a creator available to humans. In traditional accounts, the relevant knowledge is usually conceived as inferential. From observations of “the things that have been made” (Rom 1: 20), we may reason our way to the existence of a creator. The dissertation presents an alternative construal of creation’s testimony. It argues that biological nature may have expressive properties of a similar kind as human behaviour and art seem to have. We may be able to perceive nature as creation, i.e., as expressive of the mind of a creator. The knowledge of a creator acquired from nature is, according to this construal, perceptual rather than inferential. The viability of the dissertation’s suggestion depends, however, on the rejection of certain common and fundamental assumptions about the nature of mind and perception – assumptions that may rightly be called “Cartesian.” In chapters 1-3, a radically anti-Cartesian outlook on mind and perception, drawn mainly from McDowell’s work, is presented. The outlook (labelled “open-mindedness”) conceives the mind as a system of essentially world-involving capacities. One such capacity is perception, which is portrayed as (when all goes well) a direct, cognitive openness to the world. Chapter 4 argues that open-mindedness makes an attractive construal of our knowledge of “other minds” available. Human behaviour may, as McDowell suggests, be construed as having expressive properties, i.e., perceivable properties the instantiation of which logically entails the instantiation of certain mental properties. The main problem confronting this idea is the so-called “argument from pretence” – a version of the more general “argument from illusion.” The fact that behaviour that is the result of pretence can be indistinguishable, for an observer, from behaviour that is genuinely expressive of the mental property pain, can seem to entail that it is impossible to perceive that somebody else is in pain. It is argued that accepting the outlook of open-mindedness and the view of perception it includes dissolves this problem and makes it possible to construe (some of) our knowledge of the mental states of other people as perceptual rather than inferential knowledge. Chapter 5 argues that the same philosophical moves that dissolve the “problem of other minds” also can be used to overcome the problems confronting the (from a Christian perspective) attractive idea that nature may be perceptibly expressive of the mind of a creator. It is argued that the idea that other phenomena than human behaviour can be genuinely expressive of mind is not at all counter-intuitive. Artworks have, for instance, (according to a common view) expressive properties that make something of the mental life of the artist available to others. Furthermore, many people seem to have experiences in which natural structures appear to them as intentionally created. Even atheists report that biological organisms strike them as “designed.” Experiences in which natural phenomena appear to the subject as intentionally created or “designed” are candidates for being veridical perceptions of expressive properties in nature. It is argued that the suggested construal of biological nature as expressive of the mind of a creator is completely compatible with the fact that biological species have evolved by natural selection. Chapter 6 briefly reflects on the consequences of the dissertation’s argument for Christian theology.

Zugl.: Regensburg, Universiẗat, Diss., 2007. / Literaturverz.

This research is a historical-exegetical analysis of Hegel’s reformulation of Kant’s regulative principle of teleology into a constitutive principle. Kant ascribes teleology to the faculty of reflective judgment where it is employed as a guide to regulate inquiry, but does not constitute actual knowledge. Hegel argues that if Kant made teleology into a constitutive principle then it would be a much more comprehensive theory capable of overcoming contingency in natural science, and hence, bridging the gap between natural science and theology. In this paper I argue that Hegel’s defense of the transition from natural science to theology is ultimately unsuccessful because it is built upon on an instinct of reason, which is the instinctive feature of human rationality to transition beyond the contingency remaining in our empirical understanding of nature, to a theological understanding of nature, in which all aspects of nature are necessarily related.

Scholars have become increasingly aware of the need to understand the religious context of early modern natural philosophy. Despite some great strides in relating certain areas of Christian doctrine to the study of the natural world, the category ‘natural theology’ has often been subject to anachronism and misunderstanding. The term itself is difficult to define; it is most fruitful to think of natural theology as the answer to the question, ‘what can be known about God and religion from the contemplation of the natural world?’ There have been several erroneous assumptions about natural theology – in particular that it only consisted of rational proofs for the existence of God, that it was ecumenical in outlook, and that it was defined as strictly separate from Scriptural revelation. These assumptions are shown to be uncharacteristic of the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth century. The study of natural theology needs to be better integrated into three contexts – the doctrinal, confessional, and chronological. Doctrinally, natural theology does not stand alone but needs to be understood within the context of the theology of revelation, justification, and the effects of the Fall. These doctrines make such a material difference that scholars always ought to delineate clearly between the threefold state of man (original innocence, state of sin, state of grace) when approaching the topic of ‘natural’ knowledge of God. Confessionally, scholars need to recognise that the doctrine of natural theology received different treatments on either side of the sectarian divide. In Catholicism, for instance, there were considerable spiritual benefits of natural theology for the non-Christian, while in Protestantism its benefits were restricted to those saved Christians who possessed Scriptural insight. Chronologically, natural theology does not remain uniform throughout the history of Christian theology but, being subject to changes occasioned by philosophical and theological faddism and development, needs to be considered within a particular locus. Research here focuses on late sixteenth-century orthodoxy as defined in confessional and catechismal literature (which has been generally understudied), and demonstrates its application in a number of case-studies. This thesis begins the work of putting natural theology into these three contexts. An improved understanding of natural theology, with more rigorous and accurate terminology and better nuanced appreciation of confessional differences, makes for a better framework in which to consider the theological context of early modern natural philosophy.

The plurality of worlds has had a long history in England, which has not gone unnoticed by scholars. Historians have tended to view this English pluralist tradition as similar to those found on the continent, and in doing so have failed to fully understand the religious significance that the plurality of worlds had on English thought and society. This religious significance is discovered through a thorough investigation of plurality as presented by English natural philosophers and theologians, and in so doing reveals much about England in the seventeenth century. As natural philosophers incorporated plurality within the larger framework of natural theology, it became a weapon of science and reason to be used against the unreasonable atheists of late seventeenth-century England.

Chapter one: A perennial (if controversial) concern in both theology and philosophy of religion is whether religious belief is ‘reasonable’. Austin Farrer (1904-1968) is widely thought to affirm a positive answer to this concern. Chapter One surveys three interpretations of Farrer on ‘the believer’s reasons’ and thus sets the stage for our investigation into the development of his religious epistemology. Chapter two: The disputed question of whether Farrer became ‘a sort of fideist’ is complicated by the many definitions of fideism. Chapter two thus sorts through these issues so that when ‘fideism’ appears in subsequent chapters a precise range of meanings can be given to it, and the ‘sort of fideist’ Farrer may have become can be determined more accurately. Chapter three: Although Farrer’s constant goal was to develop ‘a viable and sophisticated natural theology,’ an early moment of philosophical illumination involved recognising the limits of reason. Chapter three begins with a sketch of Farrer’s life, looks at his undergraduate correspondence where some ‘fideistic’ themes are first articulated, and then focuses on his classic text of ‘rational theology,’ *Finite and Infinite* (1943). Chapter four: In subsequent years, Farrer became increasingly open to placing a greater emphasis on faith. And yet, he continued to press the question: ‘Can reasonable minds still think theologically?’ Chapter four argues that, stimulated by Diogenes Allen’s doctoral dissertation and citing it explicitly, Farrer’s *Faith and Speculation* (1967) attempts to blend Allen’s more fideistic position with a continuing concern for legitimate philosophical critique. Chapter five: The fifth chapter evaluates the significance of Farrer’s final position in the context of contemporary religious epistemology and the current wide-spread interest in spirituality. In conclusion, Farrer finally seems to locate theistic evidence not primarily in nature or reason, but in holy lives and our own attempts to live by faith: ‘It is solved by sacrifice’.