Thesis--Zürich.

Thesis--Zürich.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1996. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [288]-302).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1969. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Bibliography: leaves 157-159.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Education, August, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis--Freiburg im Breisgau. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 166-176).

The present essay includes six thematically connected papers on negation in the areas of the philosophy of logic, philosophical logic and metaphysics. Each of the chapters besides the first, which puts each the chapters to follow into context, highlights a central problem negation poses to a certain area of philosophy. Chapter 2 discusses the problem of logical revisionism and whether there is any room for genuine disagreement, and hence shared meaning, between the classicist and deviant's respective uses of 'not'. If there is not, revision is impossible. I argue that revision is indeed possible and provide an account of negation as contradictoriness according to which a number of alleged negations are declared genuine. Among them are the negations of FDE (First-Degree Entailment) and a wide family of other relevant logics, LP (Priest's dialetheic "Logic of Paradox"), Kleene weak and strong 3-valued logics with either "exclusion" or "choice" negation, and intuitionistic logic. Chapter 3 discusses the problem of furnishing intuitionistic logic with an empirical negation for adequately expressing claims of the form 'A is undecided at present' or 'A may never be decided' the latter of which has been argued to be intuitionistically inconsistent. Chapter 4 highlights the importance of various notions of consequence-as-s-preservation where s may be falsity (versus untruth), indeterminacy or some other semantic (or "algebraic") value, in formulating rationality constraints on speech acts and propositional attitudes such as rejection, denial and dubitability. Chapter 5 provides an account of the nature of truth values regarded as objects. It is argued that only truth exists as the maximal truthmaker. The consequences this has for semantics representationally construed are considered and it is argued that every logic, from classical to non-classical, is gappy. Moreover, a truthmaker theory is developed whereby only positive truths, an account of which is also developed therein, have truthmakers. Chapter 6 investigates the definability of negation as "absolute" impossibility, i.e. where the notion of necessity or possibility in question corresponds to the global modality. The modality is not readily definable in the usual Kripkean languages and so neither is impossibility taken in the broadest sense. The languages considered here include one with counterfactual operators and propositional quantification and another bimodal language with a modality and its complementary. Among the definability results we give some preservation and translation results as well.

No description available.

The logic of natural language negation (e.g. no) is prima facie at odds with an exclusively CLASSICAL LOGIC based on SET THEORY. The negation of classical logic obeys the LAW OF NON-CONTRADICTION (according to which an element cannot be both in and not in a set) and the LAW OF EXCLUDED MIDDLE (according to which an element either is or is not in a set). In contrast, natural language negation tolerates APPARENT CONTRADICTIONS (as in, Do you like your supper?---Yes and no) and UNEXCLUDED MIDDLES (as in, Do you love your supper?--- No; Do you hate your supper?---No). These prima facie non-classical phenomena relate to non-set theoretic INTERPRETIVE STRUCTURES, particularly OBJECT STRUCTURE, i.e. that objects may possess properties in part but not in whole (e.g. one might love one part of a supper but hate another), and PREDICATE DIMENSIONALITY , i.e. that properties may have mid-range values (e.g. one might evaluate the supper as a whole as an average between the two extremes). I describe several experiments exploring adults' and children's grasp of object structure and predicate dimensionality and their relation to natural language negation, using two different reasoning tasks: the ability to resolve apparent contradictions and the ability to draw inferences about unexcluded middles. Results suggest that even the negation of children as young as age three is not exclusively classical and set theoretic, but rather reflects a principled grasp of object structure and predicate dimensionality. I argue that children's grasp of natural language negation is guided by sophisticated LOGICAL RESOURCES that relate to the NATURAL LOGIC of common objects and their properties, particularly object structure and predicate dimensionality.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duquesne University, 2009. / Title from document title page. Abstract included in electronic submission form. Includes bibliographical references (p. 297-314) and index.