Proefschrift--Leiden. / "Bibliografie": p. [247]-249.

The dissolved air flotation process experiences process stability problems that are attributed to a poor understanding of the fundamental mechanisms. A detailed review of the literature revealed that the mechanisms of flotation are fairly well understood in mineral flotation application but that the transfer of knowledge to water treatment application is poor, particularly regarding the differences between particle and floc flotation.

No description available.

Thesis--Tampere. / Fi. Extra t.p. with thesis statement inserted. Summary in English. Includes bibliographical references (p. 348-359).

This dissertation explores and defends a form of perfectionism, which I call ‘public value perfectionism’. It is an approach that emerges from Sen’s capability critique of Rawls’s doctrine of primary goods and I argue that this form of perfectionism is not only compatible with, but also demanded by, a general defence of liberal neutrality. It is designed to fulfill a demand of justice that is beyond the reach of neutralist tools, yet it belongs within a larger neutralist framework in virtue of being justified by the same types of reasons that support neutralism. One of the main justifications for state neutrality is that it can serve as a means to remove or reduce disadvantage imposed on vulnerable groups. I will argue that in the case of disability limited state perfectionism can serve as a means toward that same goal. The series of arguments that I make to defend public value perfectionism concern issues relevant to debates about neutrality and perfectionism, the metric of advantage, justice and disability, and health resource rationing. These issues each play a role in the argument I develop, which states, simplifying somewhat, that in order for society to make defensible rationing decisions about social spending that aims to reduce disability, we need an approach to advantage—i.e., public value perfectionism—that contains important elements of perfectionism and yet is grounded on neutralist considerations. / Thesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2009-07-21 10:11:07.921

This is a study in the political ethics of liberalism. It uses political obligation theory to shed light on the neutrality-perfectionism debate. My thesis is that neutralism cannot provide a coherent foundation for liberal political morality because a viable account of general political obligation relies on background assumptions about persons and conduct that are reasonably contestable even though they are not illiberal. To make this case, Section I reviews the conceptual details of neutrality across two generations of thinking. Second-generation neutrality, under political liberalism, is the more plausible rendering because it acknowledges that liberalism must stake a middle-ground between non-moral instrumentalism and moral absolutism. Liberalism, in other words, needs a moral reason to be neutral. I question whether political liberalism remains sufficiently moral and sufficiently neutral by asking if it offers mutually sustaining legitimacy and obligation principles. Section II discusses perfectionist ethics and highlights a crucial kind of value, called inherent value, often invoked but rarely scrutinized in political theory. Inherent value marks the main ethical difference between liberal neutrality and illiberal perfectionism, showing how liberal-perfectionist positions on controversial matters can be taken without prescribing for the whole of life. Including this type of value, I then outline the precise neutralist and perfectionist conditions that liberals adopting either perspective would have to meet in justifying general political obligation. Section III then answers my main research question about whether political liberalism’s moral account of political obligation coheres with its neutralist position on legitimacy. My essential claim here is that our responsibility to comply with the moral and epistemological standards of civility is a position from inherent value. And since political liberalism cannot escape these inherent value assumptions while explaining and justifying its account of general political obligation, it is there that we can most clearly see political liberalism’s perfectionist leanings. My dissertation therefore shows a new way to understand that only liberal-perfectionist valuation can hang-together a coherent and viable liberalism for today’s pluralistic polities. / Thesis (Ph.D, Political Studies) -- Queen's University, 2011-10-30 21:13:30.823

Habilitationsschrift--Zürich. / Issued also as thesis, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, 1966. Bibliography: p. 209-232.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Breslau.

Habilitationsschrift--Zürich. / Issued also as thesis, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, 1966. Bibliography: p. 209-232.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Bern, 1947. / Bibliography: p. 3-6.