Digitized by Kansas Correctional Industries

Capitalism has been evaluated by liberals primarily for its distributive consequences. Liberal egalitarians argue for state responsibility in rectifying economic injustices. Yet capitalism is not only an institution of distribution. Rather, it creates ethical and cultural consequences that pervade every aspect of life. In order to function as a system, capitalism requires individuals to spend the greatest part of their lives actively participating in production and consumption. It requires individuals to be profit-seeking, materialistic, consumption-loving, and to define the good life in terms of career and economic success. In short, a particular conception of the good life is embedded in and promoted by capitalism. The rising phenomena of consumerism and the work-centered life that dominate developed societies are empirical testimonies to this inherent bias in the economic system. According to liberal state neutrality, however, the state must remain neutral on matters of the good life, and thus this state of affairs does not render state attention. This thesis argues that state neutrality is both impossible and undesirable by showing the inherent contradiction between ideals of individual freedom and societal pluralism at the core of liberalism, and the very specific conception of the good life that is embedded in and promoted by capitalism. First, I explicate the ethical aspect, or the conception of the good life inherent in capitalism; second, I show how it is promoted through manipulation and incentives-sanctions mechanisms that restrict individual choice; third, I examine the neutralist distinction between justification and consequence and argue that it is impossible for the state to claim neutrality under capitalism, and that it is at least negatively responsible for the ethical impact of capitalism. Lastly, I conclude that there needs to be some form of perfectionist state that takes up the task of evaluating dominating conceptions of the good in terms of their contribution to the good life. / published_or_final_version / Politics and Public Administration / Master / Master of Philosophy

Liberal neutrality is the idea that laws should not be based on religious or philosophical doctrines that not everyone accepts. The idea is closely related to the "liberal principle of legitimacy", which holds that laws are legitimate only if they are acceptable to people who are subject to them. In this thesis, I examine if the idea of neutrality meets liberalism's own requirements of legitimacy. To do so, I ask what arguments can be given to persuade evangelical Christians--a sizable minority of the U.S. population who are opposed to neutral policies on abortion, school prayer, etc.--to accept neutrality. First, I examine Ackerman and Rawls's "consensus-finding" argument, which claims generally that most comprehensive conceptions of the good are compatible with neutrality. Second, I examine Larmore, Dworkin, and Kymlicka's "consensus-building" arguments, which try to locate particular principles which non-neutralists (perfectionists) are likely to accept, and the acceptance of which is said to guarantee the acceptance of neutrality as well. I find both arguments unsatisfactory; neither is acceptable to a person who subscribes to the evangelical view of God and human nature. Third, I consider Rawls's proposal to exclude evangelicals and the like, based on the test of reasonableness which he believes is "freestanding". However, I find his test of reasonableness dependent on particular understandings of the terms "free and equal citizens", "common human reason", and "fair terms of cooperation". The test of reasonableness, I suggest, is not freestanding, and it is thus circular to use it as a criterion of exclusion. I conclude, therefore, that liberal neutrality fails to satisfy the liberal principle of legitimacy. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2007-09-22 16:42:44.821

No description available.

Diss. Stockholm : Stockholms universitet, 2007.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Civil-Military Relations)--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2008. / Thesis Advisor(s): Knopf, Jeffrey ; Abenheim, Donald. "March 2008." Description based on title screen as viewed on May 13, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 115-124). Also available in print.

Thèse. / Contient une bibliographie.

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 157-163). Also available in print.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University, 1931. / Vita. Published also as Studies in history, economics and public law, edited by the Faculty of political science of Columbia university, no. 350. Bibliography: p. 280-283.

Thesis--Zürich, 1931. / Issued also as author's dissertation, Zürich. Includes bibliographical references.