La cohabitation entre la révision en matière pénale et l’autorité de la chose jugée constitue la pierre angulaire de notre réflexion. En effet, en autorisant la remise en cause d’une décision définitive, la révision déroge au principe cardinal de l’immutabilité des décisions de justice une fois celles-ci revêtues de l’autorité de la chose jugée. Dès lors, en matière de révision, la difficulté consiste, pour le législateur et les juges, à trouver le bon équilibre entre ces deux impératifs afin d’organiser une révision qui concilie le respect dû à la chose jugée et l’exigence de justice liée à la réparation des erreurs de fait commises par les juridictions répressives. L’étude démontre qu’antérieurement à la réforme de la révision par la loi n° 2014-640 du 20 juin 2014, le choix de la logique oppositionnelle entre le pourvoi en révision et l’autorité de la chose jugée l’avait emporté. C’est ainsi qu’il était fait droit à une conception plutôt restrictive et fermée de la révision, orientation préjudiciable à l’éclosion des aspects pourtant libéraux de la loi n° 89-431 du 23 juin 1989. L’antagonisme entre le pourvoi en révision et l’autorité de la chose jugée est toujours perceptible dans le nouveau texte. Cette retenue n’est pas sans conséquences sur la qualité du texte et sur ses nouvelles prétentions. / The coexistence between the procedure of retrial in criminal matters and the authority of res judicata is the cornerstone of this analysis. Understood as an authorization to question a final decision, the procedure of retrial reflects an exception to the fundamental principle of immutability of the judgments which have gained the authority of res judicata. Therefore, the challenge for legislators and judges in matters of revision is to find the right balance between those two imperatives and to organize a review procedure which reconciles the respect of res judicata and the related necessity to repair justice errors made by the criminal courts. The study shows that prior to the reform of the retrial procedure by Act No. 2014-640 of June 20, 2014, the choice of understanding the retrial as opposed to the authority of res judicata had prevailed. Consequently it had granted a rather restrictive design to the review procedure, and had damaged by the same, the rather liberal aspects of Law No. 89-431 of June 23, 1989. However, the antagonism between retrial and the authority of res judicata is still noticeable in the new text. This restraint is not without consequences to the quality of that text and to any new claims referring to the latter.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:30:36Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Rugero Guibo.pdf: 1573495 bytes, checksum: 9def86b958a0b96eaf9030646ce2f8da (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005-08-04 / nenhum / The present work is related to the study of the tension between, on one side, the necessity of the steadiness of the dispute by which the claimant is not allowed to modify the cause of action, and on the other side, the recognition that the new facts have to be taken into consideration by the judge, thus interfering on the judgement of the lawsuit. The main goal is to examine the origin and historic evolution of the cause of action as the identifying element of the lawsuit, to arrive at the study of the steadiness of the dispute theme in the comparative law, as well as in the Brazilian statutory law. Further, the problem is analyzed as the way it is presented in the current civil proceeding s system, where a parallel is made with a very similar but not identical institute, the contingency principle. Also the different implications of the preclusive characteristic of the res judicata are analysed, if it is related to a new fact which benefits the claimant and the defendant, as well as the relation of the steadiness theme of the lawsuit with the congruency and causality principles. Finally, the question is posed from the appeal theory point of view. The purpose of the present work is to seek a systematization of the concepts involved which allows the harmonization of the rules which will take to the steadiness of the lawsuit, due to the necessity of dealing with the new fact. Without prejudice to the discussion in respect to the theoretical aspects, it is intended not to lose track of the practical interest of seeking criteria capable of making operable, coherent and efficient the group formed by the above mentioned institutes, with the view to delimitate the exact reach of the immutability of the cause of action in the Brazilian civil proceeding s system, due to the appearance of new facts. / O presente trabalho volta-se para o estudo da tensão existente entre, de um lado, o imperativo da estabilização da demanda, segundo o qual é vedado ao autor alterar a causa petendi, e de outro, o reconhecimento de que os fatos supervenientes devem ser tomados em consideração pelo juiz, influindo, assim, no julgamento da lide. Busca-se, primeiramente, examinar a origem e evolução histórica da causa petendi, como elemento identificador da ação, para chegar ao estudo da temática da estabilização da demanda, tanto no direito comparado quanto no direito positivo brasileiro. Passa-se, então, à análise do problema tal como se apresenta no ordenamento processual em vigor, quando se traça um paralelo com um instituto bastante correlato, porém distinto, que é o princípio da eventualidade. Examinam-se, ainda, as diferentes implicações decorrentes da eficácia preclusiva da coisa julgada, conforme se trate de fato superveniente que beneficie o autor ou o réu, bem como a relação da temática da estabilização da demanda com os princípios da congruência e da causalidade. Por fim, coloca-se a questão sob a ótica da teoria dos recursos. O objetivo do presente trabalho é buscar uma sistematização dos conceitos envolvidos, de modo a harmonizar as normas tendentes à estabilização da demanda, em face da necessidade de lidar com o fato superveniente. Sem prejuízo da discussão quanto aos aspectos teóricos, pretende-se não perder de vista o interesse prático na busca de critérios aptos a tornar operável, coerente e eficiente o conjunto formado pelos institutos mencionados, com vistas a delimitar o exato alcance do postulado da imutabilidade da causa de pedir no direito processual civil brasileiro, em face da ocorrência de fatos supervenientes.