African economies, including Nigeria continued to perform poorly despite the adoption of economic policy reforms in the 1980s. An explanation for the failure of economic policy reforms was therefore sought from an institutional perspective. Since active state intervention in the economy was the rationale given for the economic crisis of developing countries, the conventional case for an active state which rested on the need to correct for market failure was counterposed with the argument that the economy was best coordinated by market forces given that the state was not benevolent, omniscient or omnipotent. However, the state has played an important role in the transformation of late developers while a state-market dichotomy takes no account of institutional factors. The widespread adoption of economic policy reforms owed more to an ideological shift in the development paradigm than to the debt crisis and there was a great deal of controversy about the theoretical foundations and impact of these reforms contrary to claims of a consensus. An institutionalist political economy which recognises that the market is not the only institution and that economic transformation requires the positive use of political power was proposed. Such an approach takes account of history, politics and the institutional diversity of capitalism. A more nuanced view of state intervention was therefore advocated. The importance of institutional arrangements in the quest for economic transformation underscored the inadequacy of structural adjustment which was hampered by the lack of price and institutional flexibility as well as other institutional constraints. The Nigerian experience of structural adjustment shows that long term growth prospects were not enhanced and that the reforms tended to favour the financial sector over the real sector. The failure of economic policy reforms in Nigeria can be attributed to the continued presence of constraining institutional factors and the absence of a positive use of political power. / Economics / D. Comm. (Economics)

African economies, including Nigeria continued to perform poorly despite the adoption of economic policy reforms in the 1980s. An explanation for the failure of economic policy reforms was therefore sought from an institutional perspective. Since active state intervention in the economy was the rationale given for the economic crisis of developing countries, the conventional case for an active state which rested on the need to correct for market failure was counterposed with the argument that the economy was best coordinated by market forces given that the state was not benevolent, omniscient or omnipotent. However, the state has played an important role in the transformation of late developers while a state-market dichotomy takes no account of institutional factors. The widespread adoption of economic policy reforms owed more to an ideological shift in the development paradigm than to the debt crisis and there was a great deal of controversy about the theoretical foundations and impact of these reforms contrary to claims of a consensus. An institutionalist political economy which recognises that the market is not the only institution and that economic transformation requires the positive use of political power was proposed. Such an approach takes account of history, politics and the institutional diversity of capitalism. A more nuanced view of state intervention was therefore advocated. The importance of institutional arrangements in the quest for economic transformation underscored the inadequacy of structural adjustment which was hampered by the lack of price and institutional flexibility as well as other institutional constraints. The Nigerian experience of structural adjustment shows that long term growth prospects were not enhanced and that the reforms tended to favour the financial sector over the real sector. The failure of economic policy reforms in Nigeria can be attributed to the continued presence of constraining institutional factors and the absence of a positive use of political power. / Economics / D. Comm. (Economics)

In July 1979, Nigeria's federal military government declared a 100% takeover of select operations belonging to the London-based oil company, British Petroleum (BP). The takeover of BP marked the takeover of Nigeria's most lucrative industry that had been controlled by foreign investors. Within the secondary literature a more elaborate version of this event is offered by scholars, declaring it nationalization with little agreement over why this "Giant of West Africa" nationalization BP. Some mention South Africa, others Southern Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe); some mention oil, while others solely discuss UK diplomacy. Why the discrepancy over the reason for nationalization? This project sets out to explain not only why Nigeria nationalized BP in 1979, but also how the nationalization fits into the broad theoretical discussions on nationalism, economic policy, foreign relations, and nationalization. It challenges the popular narrative of why Nigeria nationalized BP and substantially revises it. The argument is put forward that the nationalization of BP hinged almost entirely on the notion of economic nationalism and that the nationalization fit into an established trend of takeovers aimed at foreign companies. The federal military government simply used southern Africa --discussed as the sole reason for nationalization within the secondary Literature-- as a way to bolster international support. This project also project uses the nationalization as a looking-glass into Nigeria and its oil industry during the 1970s. Also, this project addresses the impact the nationalization had on Nigerian society. With regard to nationalism, Nigeria represents an excellent case for understanding the existence and application of economic nationalism, which functions not only as a subject of study much like ethnic nationalism or civic nationalism, but also as a new perspective on the relationship between the various expressions of nationalism and economic policy.