South Africa is pursuing the exploration and exploitation of its possible petroleum resources particularly shale gas, following the estimation of just over 400 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of shale gas resources in the Karoo region. This, including the lodgement of five shale gas exploration right applications has necessitated the strengthening of the petroleum regulatory framework as well as the fiscal regime to ensure that South Africa remains an attractive destination for investors and for South Africa to extract maximum economic benefits. This paper has undertaken an examination of the current fiscal regime particularly the non-tax elements as stipulated in the current regulatory framework. Upon its face value the South African fiscal regime appears to be underdeveloped and not necessarily designed to cater for development of shale gas. Furthermore, it is not designed to address the specifics of shale gas development within the South African context. Some aspects of the South African fiscal regime may require to be strengthened while also remaining relevant and competitive internationally. A fiscal regime that is flexible and sensitive to shale gas development specific within a country context is required. Consideration for a differentiated tax construction may also be incorporated to make up for allowances provided at the beginning of the project. This will be in line with South Africa’s objectives for the creation of a sustainable and competitive petroleum industry that provides a win-win solution for both government and the industry. / Mini Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2019. / Public Law / LLM / Unrestricted

The investment treaty network and the tax treaty network comprise more than 3,000 treaties each. The provisions of these treaties generally are highly customized on the basis of the investment flows and economic interests of the contracting States. The number of treaties in force and their customization potentially turn the amendment of these treaty networks in their entirety into a cumbersome and long process. To modify the treaty networks in a swift and coordinated manner, the investment treaty makers and the tax treaty makers almost contemporaneously developed the idea of implementing treaty changes through a single multilateral convention. On 10 December 2014, the United Nations adopted the Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor' State Arbitration, also known as the Mauritius Convention. In addition, on 24 November 2016, the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), commonly referred to as the Multilateral Tax Instrument, was concluded under the aegis of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The Mauritius Convention and the Multilateral Tax Instrument share the object and purpose of modifying an extensive number of treaties. However, due to their novelty, little research has been done until now on their common characteristics and differences. The article aims at filling this gap by comparing both multilateral conventions. It also aims at drawing lessons from the analysis of both multilateral conventions that might be of benefit for future modifications of an extensive number of treaties through a single instrument.

We examine the working mechanisms and efficiencies of zoning (regulation of floor area ratios and land-use types) and fiscal instruments (tolls, property taxes, and income transfer), and extend the instrument choice theory to include the congestion of road and nonroad infrastructure. We show that in the spatial model with heterogeneous households the standard first-best instruments do not work because they trigger distortion of spatial allocations. In addition, because of the household heterogeneity and real estate market distortions, zoning could be less efficient than, as efficient as, or more efficient than pricing instruments. However, when the zoning enacted deviates from the optimum, zoning not only becomes inferior to congestion charges but is also likely to reduce welfare. In addition, we provide a global platform that extends the instrument choice theory of pollution control to include various types of externalities and a wide range of discrete policy deviations for any reasons beyond cost–benefit uncertainties.