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There has been a long line of studies concerning the nexus between R&D expenditure and Economic Performance. However, there has been little research on this nexus on a regional level in Germany. This paper aims to analyse the relationship between R&D expenditure (total, business sector and public sector each) and GDP per capita at a regional level in Germany for the time period 2000-2017. The method of estimation employed in fixed effects panel regression analysis. It is found that total R&D expenditure and regional GDP per capita have an insiginificant relationship, but a negtiavely significant one when a lagged value of R&D expenditure is considered. The relationship between public R&D expenditure and regional GDP per capita is significantly negative, whereas the relationship between business sector R&D expenditure and regional GDP per capita is insignificant. Further scope for research could include analysing the effect of regional innovation clusters and the role of R&D strategy in improving the economic performance of regions in Germany.

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Governments in both advanced and emerging markets invest heavily into joint R&D projects to facilitate inter-firm collaboration and scientific productivity. As a science-based cluster, nanotechnology is a highly R&D-intensive field with very complex interdisciplinary features that enables multiple interactions between scientists from diverse cultural backgrounds working for multi-faceted organizations across public and private sectors and through internationally regulated borders. In this thesis, I examine the main determinants of the dimensions of inter-firm collaboration in high-tech industries particularly among nanotechnology R&D organisations across Europe. Also, I investigate the key factors that influence the innovation, financial and exit performance of nanotech companies during the commercialisation period and across 15 developed and developing countries, taking into consideration the involvement of venture capital (VC) firms. In order to methodically integrate the qualitative and quantitative features of my research study, I employed mixed method to analyse primary and secondary data collected via survey instruments and comprehensive databases; to gain valuable insights into the complexities around nanotech R&D organisations. The regression results show that a predictable legal system; a high level of tolerance for uncertainty; the proximity to key partners; a high level of export demand for high-tech products; and expansionary economic policies, leads to highly valuable and long-term relationships which produces optimal partnership size with an effective organizational structure. I find that a high financial status of nanotech firms equips R&D project managers with sufficient tangible and intangible resources to engage into complex collaborative partnerships which yield innovative performing outcomes. Also, I find that nanotech R&D firms that exit venture capital investments via IPO are more likely to have their head offices in a big city; and access foreign capital to expand manufacturing operations. I conclude that the successful commercialisation of nanotechnology industries across the globe has been due to the substantial R&D public expenditures and private investments into the application and proliferation of nanotechnologies in key converging scientific fields which require robust inter-firm collaborative partnerships to rapidly develop and promote several portfolios of high-tech products that continually satisfy consumer needs in disruptive ways and secure long-term profitability for nanotech R&D organisations.

Abstract The purpose of this study is to use Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) to find out success factors of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) R&D alliances and relative importance of these factors, and then to get the key successful factors (KSFs) to discuss why these KSFs have important influence on SMEs R&D alliances. AHP and case study are used in this research. Through literature review, the researcher develops 4 criteria and 16 successful factors which are arranged in hierarchical structure chart. Next, case study is used to make this chart reflect better the conditions of Taiwanese SMEs R&D alliances. Finally, to find out the KSFs, AHP is used to design the questionnaire and do questionnaire survey. The results of this study are: 1. The relative importance of the 4 criteria is: business strategy (0.386), the mechanism of R&D alliance management (0.283), partners¡¦ relationship (0.207), and government policy (0.124). 2. The 6 KSFs are: identifying market demand (0.137), clearly defining roles and responsibilities (0.101), establishing mechanism of communication and mutual trust (0.091), using complementary resources and technology (0.079), routinely assessing and adjusting (0.074), and emphasizing the degree of commitment (0.074).

Prior relative studies document that the initial underpricing and long-term underperformance of IPOs are due to information asymmetry and investors¡¦ misevaluations. However, these studies rarely identify the source of information asymmetry. The purpose of this study is to identify the contribution of R&D to information asymmetry. We then discuss the influence of R&D on initial underpricing of IPOs, and examine whether the long-term underperformance exists in R&D-intensive companies or not. Based on a sample of 702 Taiwen IPOs issued during 1991-2003, this study identify the source of information asymmetry ¡X the R&D activities of issuers. Our findings indicate that these activities significantly affect both the initial underpricing of IPOs and their long-term performance. The results can be summarized as follows. (1) R&D is positively correlated with underpricing. (2) R&D is positively related to long-term performance.

Chapter 1: Tradable Permits under Environmental and Cost-reducing R&D: This chapter models simultaneous investments in both environmental and cost-reducing R&D by asymmetric Cournot duopolist. Pollution rights (emission permits) are allocated by the regulator and can be traded between firms. Both R&D competition and cooperation are considered. In a three-stage game, firms first invest in R&D, then trade permits, and then compete in output. The strategic interaction between different types of R&D investments is analyzed. It is found that giving more permits to one firm induces it to conduct more cost-reducing but less environmental R&D. The second-best optimal allocation of pollution rights is also analyzed. This allocation matters for social welfare under R&D competition, but is irrelevant under R&D cooperation. Moreover, the optimal allocation depends on R&D spillovers. This paper also studies the grandfathering of permits based on historical output. Compared with the second-best optimal allocation, the higher the emissions reduction level, the more likely that grandfathering allocates too few permits to the large firm and too many permits to the small firm. Adding an R&D budget constraint leads firms to under-invest in cost-reducing R&D relative to environmental R&D. Chapter 2: Tradable Permits under Environmental R&D between Upstream and Downstream Industries: This chapter models the simultaneous investments in environmental R&D by both downstream and upstream industries, with two symmetric firms within each industry competing à la Cournot. Pollution rights are allocated by the regulator, and firms can trade permits. R&D competition, intra-industry (horizontal), inter-industry (vertical) and both intra- and inter-industry (generalized) R&D cooperations are considered. In a four-stage game, firms first invest in R&D, then trade permits, then upstream firms compete in intermediate good production, and finally downstream firms compete in final food production. The strategic interactions between R&D investments are analyzed. It is found that an increase in either vertical or horizontal R&D spillovers reduce the permit price but increase production, but the spillover effects on R&D investments are ambiguous and they depend on the number of permits that a firm receives from the government. However, firms undertake more R&D under generalized cooperation than vertical cooperation, irrespective of spillovers and the allocation of permits, and this results in higher social welfare under generalized cooperation than vertical cooperation. The optimal allocation of pollution rights by the regulator is also considered. This allocation matters for social welfare under R&D competition and horizontal cooperation, but is irrelevant under vertical and generalized cooperations. Chapter 3: Is There a Principle of Targeting in Environmental Taxation?: This chapter studies whether the "principle of targeting", which is referred to by Dixit (1985) as the tax formulae for dirty goods have "additivity property" (Sandmo 1975) and externality-generating sources should be directly targeted (Bhagwati and Johnson 1960), can be applicable in the presence of a uniform commodity tax with an additional emissions tax. We consider three perfectly competitive markets, one of them produces a non-polluting good and the other two produce polluting goods. The regulator chooses optimal taxes on all three markets to maximize social welfare and finances an exogenous public expenditure. First all, it is found that the additivity property does not hold under differentiated taxes, and is even further weakened with a uniform commodity tax. It is also shown that the Pigouvian tax is unlikely to apply on the top of the uniform commodity tax. Furthermore, if there is only tax instrument available -- i.e. either the uniform commodity tax or the emissions tax -- then the uniform commodity tax (emissions tax) induces higher social welfare when marginal social damage is low (high).

Chapter 1: Tradable Permits under Environmental and Cost-reducing R&D: This chapter models simultaneous investments in both environmental and cost-reducing R&D by asymmetric Cournot duopolist. Pollution rights (emission permits) are allocated by the regulator and can be traded between firms. Both R&D competition and cooperation are considered. In a three-stage game, firms first invest in R&D, then trade permits, and then compete in output. The strategic interaction between different types of R&D investments is analyzed. It is found that giving more permits to one firm induces it to conduct more cost-reducing but less environmental R&D. The second-best optimal allocation of pollution rights is also analyzed. This allocation matters for social welfare under R&D competition, but is irrelevant under R&D cooperation. Moreover, the optimal allocation depends on R&D spillovers. This paper also studies the grandfathering of permits based on historical output. Compared with the second-best optimal allocation, the higher the emissions reduction level, the more likely that grandfathering allocates too few permits to the large firm and too many permits to the small firm. Adding an R&D budget constraint leads firms to under-invest in cost-reducing R&D relative to environmental R&D. Chapter 2: Tradable Permits under Environmental R&D between Upstream and Downstream Industries: This chapter models the simultaneous investments in environmental R&D by both downstream and upstream industries, with two symmetric firms within each industry competing à la Cournot. Pollution rights are allocated by the regulator, and firms can trade permits. R&D competition, intra-industry (horizontal), inter-industry (vertical) and both intra- and inter-industry (generalized) R&D cooperations are considered. In a four-stage game, firms first invest in R&D, then trade permits, then upstream firms compete in intermediate good production, and finally downstream firms compete in final food production. The strategic interactions between R&D investments are analyzed. It is found that an increase in either vertical or horizontal R&D spillovers reduce the permit price but increase production, but the spillover effects on R&D investments are ambiguous and they depend on the number of permits that a firm receives from the government. However, firms undertake more R&D under generalized cooperation than vertical cooperation, irrespective of spillovers and the allocation of permits, and this results in higher social welfare under generalized cooperation than vertical cooperation. The optimal allocation of pollution rights by the regulator is also considered. This allocation matters for social welfare under R&D competition and horizontal cooperation, but is irrelevant under vertical and generalized cooperations. Chapter 3: Is There a Principle of Targeting in Environmental Taxation?: This chapter studies whether the "principle of targeting", which is referred to by Dixit (1985) as the tax formulae for dirty goods have "additivity property" (Sandmo 1975) and externality-generating sources should be directly targeted (Bhagwati and Johnson 1960), can be applicable in the presence of a uniform commodity tax with an additional emissions tax. We consider three perfectly competitive markets, one of them produces a non-polluting good and the other two produce polluting goods. The regulator chooses optimal taxes on all three markets to maximize social welfare and finances an exogenous public expenditure. First all, it is found that the additivity property does not hold under differentiated taxes, and is even further weakened with a uniform commodity tax. It is also shown that the Pigouvian tax is unlikely to apply on the top of the uniform commodity tax. Furthermore, if there is only tax instrument available -- i.e. either the uniform commodity tax or the emissions tax -- then the uniform commodity tax (emissions tax) induces higher social welfare when marginal social damage is low (high).