The effective oversight and management of national emergencies are critical to preserving democratic processes and norms. Congress passed the National Emergencies Act (NEA) of 1976 to regulate the open-ended and unchecked implementation of emergency authorities by the president. Notwithstanding the NEA's objectives, the number and duration of national emergencies are proliferating. National emergencies evoke a sense of urgency that results in exceptional governance procedures and alters official and public perceptions. However, national emergencies declared under the NEA rarely reflect the definition of urgency and endure for years, indicating potential oversight failures and a re-emergence of the president's unchecked use of emergency power. Concerns arise that a national emergency shifts legislative power to the executive, making government policy less democratic. The national scope of these emergencies also portends the potential for harm to a broad population. Ambiguous judicial and legislative instructions, presidential aspirations of demonstrating leadership, and congressional blame avoidance further complicate the governance of national emergencies. This research conceptualizes time as the intelligible principle that Congress used to meet the judicial requirements for delegating functional responsibilities to the executive branch while retaining constitutional obligations and maintaining oversight of executive action. Sequences, deadlines, and repetition are temporal mechanisms that help regulate government action and moderate authorities. Understanding how temporal policy mechanisms affect the use of emergency authority, shape government interaction, and adjust accountability is particularly important as the United States confronts a hyper-partisan environment and demands to confront new issues as national emergencies intensify. Employing a policy tracing methodology augmented by survival and qualitative comparative analysis, this dissertation analyzes national emergency data composed of declarations, continuations, amendments, and terminations. The analysis incorporates Supreme Court decisions, budgetary impact statements, and Federal Register data to track and evaluate national emergencies declared via presidential proclamation and executive order. The ensuing model delineates the properties of the national emergencies declared under the NEA and clarifies relational factors contributing to temporal variation amongst emergency declarations. The resulting clarity contributes to scholarly and governmental use of temporal policy mechanisms—particularly sequences, deadlines, and repetition—and offers recommendations for enhancing the oversight of U.S. national emergencies. / Doctor of Philosophy / The oversight and management of national emergencies are crucial for protecting democratic processes and norms. In 1976, Congress passed the National Emergencies Act (NEA) to prevent the president from using unconstrained emergency powers. However, the NEA has not been successful in controlling the frequency and duration of national emergencies. During a national emergency, a sense of urgency generally leads to exceptional governance procedures and changes how people perceive governance situations. This research examined national emergency declarations, continuations, amendments, and terminations to understand how the NEA governs emergencies and what principles guide it. The findings show that national emergencies declared under the NEA have limited congressional oversight and are increasingly influenced by politics. The lack of clear instructions from the judiciary and the legislature, the president's desire to display leadership, and Congress' tendency to avoid blame further complicate the governance of national emergencies, allowing them to last for many years without proper oversight. To address the weaknesses in the NEA and improve the handling of national emergencies, this dissertation proposes the concept of temporal policy mechanisms. Temporal policy mechanisms use time as a guiding principle to delegate emergency authority and ensure accountability. Examples of temporal mechanisms include sequences, deadlines, and repetition to regulate government actions and moderate authorities. The analysis also highlights origination bias, where Congress sets rules for others but fails to follow its own processes. By implementing transparent temporal policy mechanisms and reducing the sense of urgency during prolonged national emergencies, accountability and transparency can be enhanced thereby upholding U.S. constitutional principles and benefiting they citizenry.

No description available.

A regulação financeira, especialmente a regulação bancária, tem um papel central na organização da vida social. As modernas técnicas regulatórias, altamente sofisticadas, são o resultado de décadas de evolução. Elas exigem técnicos especializados, orçamentos específicos e uma estrutura institucional complexa. Mais que isso: para promover as regulações sistêmica e prudencial, os reguladores necessitam de amplos poderes normativos uma capacidade normativa de conjuntura. A atribuição de tais competências a órgãos que não contam com a legitimidade das urnas é considerada por alguns autores uma espécie de anomalia no direito constitucional. Para outros, ao contrário, ela é um elemento necessário do desenho institucional do Estado Regulador contemporâneo. É nesse ponto que se cruzam os debates sobre o processo de burocratização da vida social e sobre o desenvolvimento dos cânones do direito ocidental, especialmente a doutrina da separação dos poderes. A juridificação das esferas sociais suscita o tema do déficit democrático da formulação de políticas pela burocracia. A presente tese desenvolve, a partir do modelo de democracia deliberativa de Jürgen Habermas, a premissa normativa segundo a qual o controle judicial é necessário para garantir a legitimidade democrática do processo administrativo normativo. Como o cidadão comum não dispõe nem do conhecimento técnico nem dos meios materiais necessários para acompanhar o processo de tomada de decisões, o controle judicial deveria funcionar como um mecanismo de controle democrático da regulação financeira. A tese analisa esse déficit democrático a partir da jurisprudência constitucional do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) relativa à separação dos poderes e às disputas doutrinárias sobre delegação legislativa e poder regulamentar. Os estudos de caso, focados no sistema financeiro, buscam investigar se a atuação do STF tem garantido de forma adequada um equilíbrio entre a racionalidade tecnocrática e as exigências normativas de uma democracia deliberativa. / Financial regulation, specially banking regulation, plays a central role in the organization of social life. The current regulatory techniques, highly sophisticated, are the result of decades of evolution. They require well-trained public officials, specific budgets and a complex institutional framework. Moreover, in order to carry on the systemic and prudential regulations, regulators need broad rule-making powers. The assignment of such authority to non-majoritarian bodies is considered by some authors as a sort of anomaly in Constitutional Law. To others, it is seen as a necessary element of the institutional design of the contemporary Regulatory State. This is the stage where the debate about the process of bureaucratization of social life meets the intellectual concern about the current developments of western public law, namely the issue of the separation of powers. The juridification of the social spheres brings the issue of the democratic deficit of bureaucratic policymaking. Since ordinary citizens lack the expertise as well as the material and financial resources which are necessary to monitor the decision-making process, this dissertation develops the normative assumption that judicial review is necessary to ensure the democratic legitimacy of the administrative process. The dissertation analyses that democratic deficit from the viewpoint of the constitutional jurisprudence of the Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal STF) regarding separation of powers, the rule-making authority of Brazilian non-majoritarian bodies and the doctrinal disputes about legislative delegation. The case studies show that the judicial review by STF has in practice rejected the Brazilian public law non-delegation doctrine, but has done it in a way that does not strike a balance between technocratic rationality and the normative claims of deliberative democracy.

A regulação financeira, especialmente a regulação bancária, tem um papel central na organização da vida social. As modernas técnicas regulatórias, altamente sofisticadas, são o resultado de décadas de evolução. Elas exigem técnicos especializados, orçamentos específicos e uma estrutura institucional complexa. Mais que isso: para promover as regulações sistêmica e prudencial, os reguladores necessitam de amplos poderes normativos uma capacidade normativa de conjuntura. A atribuição de tais competências a órgãos que não contam com a legitimidade das urnas é considerada por alguns autores uma espécie de anomalia no direito constitucional. Para outros, ao contrário, ela é um elemento necessário do desenho institucional do Estado Regulador contemporâneo. É nesse ponto que se cruzam os debates sobre o processo de burocratização da vida social e sobre o desenvolvimento dos cânones do direito ocidental, especialmente a doutrina da separação dos poderes. A juridificação das esferas sociais suscita o tema do déficit democrático da formulação de políticas pela burocracia. A presente tese desenvolve, a partir do modelo de democracia deliberativa de Jürgen Habermas, a premissa normativa segundo a qual o controle judicial é necessário para garantir a legitimidade democrática do processo administrativo normativo. Como o cidadão comum não dispõe nem do conhecimento técnico nem dos meios materiais necessários para acompanhar o processo de tomada de decisões, o controle judicial deveria funcionar como um mecanismo de controle democrático da regulação financeira. A tese analisa esse déficit democrático a partir da jurisprudência constitucional do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) relativa à separação dos poderes e às disputas doutrinárias sobre delegação legislativa e poder regulamentar. Os estudos de caso, focados no sistema financeiro, buscam investigar se a atuação do STF tem garantido de forma adequada um equilíbrio entre a racionalidade tecnocrática e as exigências normativas de uma democracia deliberativa. / Financial regulation, specially banking regulation, plays a central role in the organization of social life. The current regulatory techniques, highly sophisticated, are the result of decades of evolution. They require well-trained public officials, specific budgets and a complex institutional framework. Moreover, in order to carry on the systemic and prudential regulations, regulators need broad rule-making powers. The assignment of such authority to non-majoritarian bodies is considered by some authors as a sort of anomaly in Constitutional Law. To others, it is seen as a necessary element of the institutional design of the contemporary Regulatory State. This is the stage where the debate about the process of bureaucratization of social life meets the intellectual concern about the current developments of western public law, namely the issue of the separation of powers. The juridification of the social spheres brings the issue of the democratic deficit of bureaucratic policymaking. Since ordinary citizens lack the expertise as well as the material and financial resources which are necessary to monitor the decision-making process, this dissertation develops the normative assumption that judicial review is necessary to ensure the democratic legitimacy of the administrative process. The dissertation analyses that democratic deficit from the viewpoint of the constitutional jurisprudence of the Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal STF) regarding separation of powers, the rule-making authority of Brazilian non-majoritarian bodies and the doctrinal disputes about legislative delegation. The case studies show that the judicial review by STF has in practice rejected the Brazilian public law non-delegation doctrine, but has done it in a way that does not strike a balance between technocratic rationality and the normative claims of deliberative democracy.