The United States has been at war with North Korea since 1950, although hostilities have been on hold on the peninsula since July 27, 1953. Despite the cessation of active hostilities, the tensions on the Korean Peninsula increased in recent years when North Korea developed nuclear weapons. Increasing tensions due to nuclear weapons and the frozen state of conflict necessitate a re-evaluation of United States foreign policy on the peninsula to achieve a détente. To date, relations on the Korean peninsula are best described as zero sum. Central to the challenge of achieving détente on the peninsula is the ability to shift actors away from zero-sum behavior to that of positive-sum relationship to achieve gains that foster iterative interactions. As these iterative interactions occur, states extend their view of threats outward and build new reference points for mutual engagement. They become, in the words of Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane, interdependent. How can the United States shift its relationship with North Korea from one defined by relative gains to one defined by absolute gains? Has the United States or another country effectively transitioned an adversary from a zero- to a positive-sum relationship and what lessons are applicable to relations on the Korean peninsula? / Master of Arts / This analysis builds a theoretical framework for understanding neoliberal institutionalism. Building on past negotiations, the interpretation of these findings aim to assist military and global security scholars and policymakers with findings and recommendations to help find a way forward for the United States to contain the nuclear power of North Korea. We find that, consistent with the theory, leaders on both sides (i.e., Democratic and Communist) have used political, domestic, economic, justice, and security to support their specific theoretical mechanisms. These are all foundational principles for a theoretical approach. This analysis uses a multiple-case study approach and cross-case analysis to understand how the outcomes were reached. We evaluate our theory through Korean history and the careful analysis of two United States and Korean agreements: the 1994 Agreed Framework and multilateral six-party talks/2005 agreement. By determining the outcomes of these two negotiations, we can understand the motivating factors on both sides. Through these case studies analysis of these negotiations, we can help the United States deescalate/rid the current nuclear crisis with one or several hypothetical outcomes.