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This thesis explores the role of regional powers in the development of regional nuclear regimes. Its central argument is that the devise of regional nuclear regimes through the leadership of regional powers is driven by both functional and strategic reasons. Functionally, regional nuclear institutions serve to provide more tailored solutions to respond to nuclear risks emerging at the local level. Strategically, the formation of sub-global institutions enables regional powers to exercise considerable influence on nuclear governance processes at both regional and global levels. And in situations where regional powers are dissatisfied with the global nuclear-institutional status quo, regional nuclear institution-building provides an incomparable opportunity to question that status quo and challenge, albeit indirectly, the preferences of the United States, their main architect. The type of leadership provided by regional powers in the establishment of regional nuclear regimes is affected dynamically by two relationships: the regional powers' relation with the United States and their relation with secondary regional players. The former relation is defined as 'global nuclear alignment' and refers to the degree of proximity of the regional power towards U.S. nuclear preferences. The latter is defined as 'regional embeddedness' and captures the degree of convergence of regional powers' nuclear preferences with those of its most proxy regional contender, as well as the level of commitment shown by the regional power vis-à-vis regional integration. The thesis argues that when both relations are low, divergence of the regional nuclear regime from global nuclear institutions is most acute. Conversely, when only one of the relations is high, the regional nuclear regime tends to converge with global nuclear institutions, either in goals or in methods. The theoretical framework is applied to investigate three cases of regional leadership as provided by Brazil, Indonesia and France in the establishment of the regional nuclear regimes in their respective regions.

This thesis explores the role the U.S. plays in the developmental process of international nonproliferation regime. The argument of this thesis is mainly based on the power-based perspective, which assumes that the U.S., the first country to obtain nuclear technology, profoundly influences the creation and persistence of the nonproliferation regime. First of all, I discuss the debate on the theories of international regime in order to highlight the applicability of power-based approach in the research of nonproliferation regime. Secondly, I examine both the nuclear policy of the U.S. and the developmental history of nonproliferation regime, so as to explain the former¡¦s impacts over the latter. Finally, I evaluate the different means and postures of the U.S. when she confronts different violators. Through this inquiry, I attempt to expose the flaw of the nonproliferation regime: the proliferation problem is still not totally suspended even after the establishment of the nonproliferation regime. The main factor of the flaw is, nonetheless, resulted from the U.S.¡¦ misapplication of her nuclear hegemonic power and her selective proliferation policy towards different violators, although she had positively contributed to the creation and persistence of the nonproliferation regime.

This thesis is an attempt to understand the role of nuclear weapons in Britain's defence and foreign policies. It works from the assumption that decisions in relation to nuclear weapons, can only be understood in the context of a broader overview of the British state's policies since the 1940's. In turn Britain's nuclear policies have made a decisive impact on defence policy as a whole and have had an important effect on international developments. It is hoped that this thesis will contribute to a better-understanding of the causes and effects of the nuclear weapons policies adopted by the UK since the 19401s. The thesis will focus on the politics and political economy of nuclear weapons and British defence policy. This central concern has required that a number of other important aspects of the subject have been given only peripheral consideration. The thesis does not attempt to provide a detailed technological history of Britain's nuclear force. Nor is it intended to provide particular new insights on the nuclear decisionmaking process. Rather it seeks to explore the underlying factors which have shaped both the technology and the perceptions of decision-makers. There is no shortage of historical accounts of Britain's nuclear force. The unique contribution which it is hoped that this thesis makes, however, does not lie so much in its subject matter as in the way that this subject matter is approached. In my view that approach is sufficiently different from those of previous works in this area as to be both original and of some interest to other scholars in this field. / Rowntrees Memorial Trust

This thesis is an attempt to understand the role of nuclear weapons in Britain's defence and foreign policies. It works from the assumption that decisions in relation to nuclear weapons, can only be understood in the context of a broader overview of the British state's policies since the 1940's. In turn Britain's nuclear policies have made a decisive impact on defence policy as a whole and have had an important effect on international developments. It is hoped that this thesis will contribute to a better-understanding of the causes and effects of the nuclear weapons policies adopted by the UK since the 19401s. The thesis will focus on the politics and political economy of nuclear weapons and British defence policy. This central concern has required that a number of other important aspects of the subject have been given only peripheral consideration. The thesis does not attempt to provide a detailed technological history of Britain's nuclear force. Nor is it intended to provide particular new insights on the nuclear decisionmaking process. Rather it seeks to explore the underlying factors which have shaped both the technology and the perceptions of decision-makers. There is no shortage of historical accounts of Britain's nuclear force. The unique contribution which it is hoped that this thesis makes, however, does not lie so much in its subject matter as in the way that this subject matter is approached. In my view that approach is sufficiently different from those of previous works in this area as to be both original and of some interest to other scholars in this field.