Outside of ourselves, exists the object, independent of the human mind. It is the mere presence of the object that enables one to so much as venture to conceive of such abstract realities as Time, Space and other human and inhuman existences. For the object provokes an awakening of consciousness to the being of these three realities: the object renders form and dimension to space, thus providing concrete reference for the human mind. The object transposes time, as it is situated in a precise and historical moment; or, the object may serve as a reflection of another time and space. And ultimately, the object reminds one that the Other exists by bestowing an identity upon it; in fact, the object creates the other's existence. Yet, the object is a being in itself, a reality that remains perpetually indomitable; the object is the Other. / The fictional text, La chasse aux poils, is a compilation of three short stories in which is brought to light the relation existing between the subject and the object.

No description available.

How should we account for our ability to entertain simple, vision-based demonstrative thoughts about particular objects (that is, our ability to entertain thoughts about particular objects simply on the basis of seeing them)? In this thesis I propose an account of this ability that accords with the common-sense view that seeing an object puts one in a position to single it out by visually attending to it, and that this provides one with the ability to entertain demonstrative thoughts about it. An account of this type requires that we account for what it is to see a particular object and to visually attend to it without appealing to particular demonstrative abilities. However, it has been argued that a notion of seeing an object, and similarly a notion of attending to an object, which is accounted for in this way is unsuitable for accounting for demonstrative abilities. I argue that there is no real problem: what we need is a notion of experiential content which is concept-dependent only in a general manner. That is, the account of the relevant notion of experiential content requires appeal to the subject's conceptual abilities, but the account is not given in terms of specific conceptual abilities (especially, not specific demonstrative abilities). I then characterize a notion of attention to a seen object which can be accounted for without appeal to particular demonstrative abilities, and explain how attending to an object in the relevant sense provides the subject with the ability to think about the object demonstratively. It is widely agreed that spatial location plays a central role in an account of demonstratives. I explain this role in terms of the role played by location in visual attention to the object and the subject's grasp of the fact that he attends to the object.

Includes bibliographic references (p. 234-237).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

I defend a naive conception of material objects, according to which there are such things as stones, statues, cats and their tails, but no "strange fusions" of such things as my nose and the Eiffel Tower. Virtually everyone in the literature rejects the naive conception in favor of some revisionary theory of material objects. Eliminativists (e.g., Unger, van Inwagen, Merricks) deny that there are such things as statues and stones and, in some cases, cats as well. Universalists (e.g., Lewis, Rea, Sider) hold that for any objects you like--even my nose and the Eiffel Tower--there is a single object composed of those objects. These revisionary theories are manifestly counterintuitive, but there are powerful arguments for preferring them to the naive conception. The first part of the dissertation is devoted to showing how these arguments can be resisted. First, I assess the charge that, given the correctness of the naive conception, it would have been a miraculous stroke of luck for us to have hit upon the privileged conceptual scheme. Second, I examine the Lewis-Sider argument from vagueness for unrestricted mereological composition, Third, I show that the grounding problem for coincident modally discernible objects can be solved. Fourth, show that the causal exclusion argument as applied to ordinary objects can be resisted without either systematic overdetermination or epiphenomena. In the second part of the dissertation, I argue that the prima facie conflict between revisionary theories and our ordinary discourse, beliefs, and intuitions about material objects proves to be an insurmountable problem for those theories. First, I argue that existing attempts to reconcile revisionary theories of material objects with folk discourse are unsatisfactory, Second, I provide a perspicuous statement of the "challenge from folk belief" and argue that the standard strategies for meeting the challenge are unsatisfactory.

No description available.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 214-217).

No description available.

Thesis (Th. M.)--Westminster Theological Seminary, Philadelphia, 1997. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 194-201).