This project is about the distinction between universals and particulars. The fundamental claim I defend is this: The distinction between universals and particulars can be vindicated via the fact that universals are identical if indiscernible while particulars are not identical if indiscernible. This way of "making" the universal-particular distinction is "extensionally" adequate--it (by and large) gets the pre-theoretical extensions of 'universal' and 'particular' right. The entities that one would ordinarily classify as universals get classified as universals, and the entities that one would ordinarily classify as particulars get classified as particulars. Furthermore, this way of making the distinction is "intensionally" adequate--it situates smoothly in the theory of universals and particulars motivated independently of the need to vindicate the distinction. The natures that universals and particulars must have if they are to play their respective theoretical roles require that universals are identical if indiscernible and that particulars are not. No more can reasonably be asked of a proposed universal-particular distinction. / text

This thesis deals with one of the essential problems in epistemology, that is, the foundation and variety of universal concepts. The classical controversy on universals is baseless if we do not consider different kinds of universal concepts. In this thesis, universal concepts are examined as classified into three groups: first intentions, logical second intentions and philosophical second intentions. / We elaborate these three kinds of concepts from two perspectives. First, we have a journey in the history of Islamic philosophy from Farabi to contemporary philosophers in order to see what they mentioned in this regard. We found that the origin of the distinction between first and second intentions in Ibn Sina; however, he does not mention the philosophical second intentions, rather this kind of intentions is added sometime after Suhrawardi and Tusi We also examined William of Ockham's theory for the purposes of a comparative approach. Second, we discussed this threefold division based on our own understanding and analysis in the light of both Islamic and Western philosophy.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2008. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Alberta, 2009. / Title from pdf file main screen (viewed on July 24, 2009). "A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta." Includes bibliographical references.

Thèse--Paris. / Description based on print version record. Xerox copy.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Iowa, 2004. / Supervisor: Richard Fumerton. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 155-164).

No description available.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1956. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 131-136).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

I defend a naive conception of material objects, according to which there are such things as stones, statues, cats and their tails, but no "strange fusions" of such things as my nose and the Eiffel Tower. Virtually everyone in the literature rejects the naive conception in favor of some revisionary theory of material objects. Eliminativists (e.g., Unger, van Inwagen, Merricks) deny that there are such things as statues and stones and, in some cases, cats as well. Universalists (e.g., Lewis, Rea, Sider) hold that for any objects you like--even my nose and the Eiffel Tower--there is a single object composed of those objects. These revisionary theories are manifestly counterintuitive, but there are powerful arguments for preferring them to the naive conception. The first part of the dissertation is devoted to showing how these arguments can be resisted. First, I assess the charge that, given the correctness of the naive conception, it would have been a miraculous stroke of luck for us to have hit upon the privileged conceptual scheme. Second, I examine the Lewis-Sider argument from vagueness for unrestricted mereological composition, Third, I show that the grounding problem for coincident modally discernible objects can be solved. Fourth, show that the causal exclusion argument as applied to ordinary objects can be resisted without either systematic overdetermination or epiphenomena. In the second part of the dissertation, I argue that the prima facie conflict between revisionary theories and our ordinary discourse, beliefs, and intuitions about material objects proves to be an insurmountable problem for those theories. First, I argue that existing attempts to reconcile revisionary theories of material objects with folk discourse are unsatisfactory, Second, I provide a perspicuous statement of the "challenge from folk belief" and argue that the standard strategies for meeting the challenge are unsatisfactory.