Cette thèse a pour objectif de reconstruire à travers les principales œuvres pratico-politiques, de l'"Essai sur le droit naturel" aux "Principes de lu philosophie du droit" - la pensée juridique hégélienne en saisissant sa spécificité à l'égard du contexte historique-culturel de l'époque. au moment où la tradition du droit naturel est affaiblie par l'apparition d'une démarche volontariste et d'une méthode historique. Tout en visant le rapport entre le droit et la philosophie de l'esprit et en soulignant la valeur du droit en tant qu'esprit objectif, cette recherche envisage de mettre en évidence les noyaux conceptuels de la philosophie hégélienne, comme par exemple le lien unissant la rationalité à la positivité, la tension entre la nature et l'histoire ou bien la relation de l'individu par rapport à l'éthicité. Notre recherche s'intéresse en particulier au statut de la raison, au rôle de la volonté et aux caractéristiques de la liberté afin d'en mettre en exergue les retombées aussi bien sur le fondement du droit que sur les droits subjectifs, La thèse a pour but de mettre en valeur la réflexion de Hegcl en tant qu'enquête sur le rapport entre idéalité. empirie et historicité. en se penchant sur la corrélation entre droit et loi et sur la connexion entre celle-ci et les coutumes, les institutions. les pratiques sociales qui appartiennent à une communauté. Ce travail montre la modernité de la pensée hégélienne qui concerne le conflit entre autonomie individuelle et ordre social. la relation intrinsèque entre droit et état, l'identification du droit comme droit positif, ainsi que le lien entre le rôle accordé au juridique et la conception du pouvoir, / The thesis I am presenting is a path that. from the " Essay on Natural Law" and through the main practical- political works. leads to Hegel's "Philosophv of Right". It aims al retracing Hegels juridical thought and understanding its peculiarity with respect to the historical context of the time when the tradition of the natural law was thrown into crisis by the birth of the voluntarist approach and the historical method. The investigation highlights some conceptual points of Hegel', philosophy such as the connection between rationality and positivity, the tension between nature and ,history and the relationship between individuals and ethical life. The aim is achieved by underlining both the relationship between right and the philosophy of spirit and the value of right as an objective spirit. The research underlines, in particular, the stature of reason, the role of will and the characteristics of freedom with respect to the basis of law and the issue regarding subjective rights. Moreover. it gives value to Hegel's reflection as an investigation on the relationship among ideality, empirics and historicity. The research also deals with the relationship between right and law and the link that the latter has with a community's set of customs, institutions and social practices. The thesis gathers the modernity of Hegel's thought starting from the conflict between individual autonomy and social order, from the relation between law and state and the identification of right with positive law, as well as from the connection between the role attributed ta the right and the conception of power,

<p>U radu nastojimo da pokažemo da Hegelovi pojmovi spekulativne logike, povesti i objektivnog duha omogućuju da se u potpunosti shvati Aristotelov pojam praktičkog i njegovo razvijanje. Aristotelova praktčka filozofija bivstvo praktičkog dovodi do pojma=logosa, te vladajući pojam=logos praktičkih stvari, koji nije izvan onog alogičkog=žudnje, omogućuje delatnost=energeiju praktičkog. Pojam=logos praktičkog u Aristotela stoga nema teorijski i retrospektivni karakter u samom praktičkom kako to izvodi hermeneutička filozofija, već upravo jeste su&scaron;tina praktičkog odno&scaron;enja koju izlaže i ističe Aristotelova praktička filozofija. Spekulativni pojam onog praktičnog je tačka jedinstva Aristotelove i Hegelove filozofije. Hegel u pojmu političke=unutra&scaron;nje države kao običajnosnog organizma prevladava uz očuvanje Aristotelov logos entelehije polisa=pojam dejstvenosti grada-države. Razlika Aristotelove i Hegelove filozofije o praktičkom je povesna, sistemska i logička. Povesna razlika leži u Hegelovom situiranju modernog principa subjektivnosti kao prava posebnosti subjekta na zadovoljenje u pojam građanskog dru&scaron;tva sistema filozofije prava, te u sledstvenom specifičnom podru&scaron;tvljenju kako privatne sfere tako i sfere države. Logička razlika leži u Hegelovom određenju ideje praktičkog saznanja=ideje objektivnog duha i apsolutne ideje u sistemu spekulativne logike.</p> / <p>In the paper we are trying to show that Hegel&#39;s concepts of speculative logic, history and objective spirit are enabling us to fully understand Aristotle&#39;s concept of practical and its development. Aristotle&rsquo;s practical philosophy brings the being of practical down to the concept=logos, and the ruling concept=logos, that is not beyond the a-logical=desire, enables the effectiveness=energy of the practical. Therefore, with Aristotle, the concept=logos of practical does not have a historical and retrospective nature in the practical itself the way hermeneutic philosophy derives it, but it is the very essence of the practical relation proposed and accented by Aristotle&rsquo;s philosophy of practical.<br />Speculative concept of the practical is the point of unity between Aristotle&rsquo;s and Hegel&rsquo;s philosophy. Hegel, in the concept of political=inner state as ethical life overrules with retention Aristotle&rsquo;s logos of polis entelechy=concept of the effectiveness of the city-state. The difference between Aristotle&rsquo;s and Hegel&rsquo;s philosophy on practical is historical, systematic and logical. The historical difference is in Hegel&rsquo;s placement of modern principle of subjectivity as the right of one&rsquo;s individuality to satisfaction into the concept of civil system of the philosophy of right, and in the specific consequential socialization as both a private affair and a state one. Logical difference is in the Hegel&rsquo;s specification of the idea of practical cognition=idea of the objective spirit and an absolute idea in the system of speculative logic.</p>

Según Dilthey, el análisis formalista llevado adelante por la gnoseología de Kant no logra comprender el mundo humano, por su parte, Hegel si aborda al hombre histórico, pero subsume su mundo al despliegue de la razón o el saber absoluto. El proyecto de una fundamentación de las ciencias del espíritu llevado adelante por Dilthey busca adentrarse en el mundo humano concibiéndolo como el conjunto de manifestaciones objetivadas de la vida. Kant y Hegel se convierten en sus interlocutores, pero también Comte con quien se enfrenta en pos de fundamentar la autonomía metodológica de las ciencias del espíritu. Sostengo que la noción tardía de «espíritu objetivo», que Dilthey toma de Hegel, pero que la concibe como el devenir de la vida política y cultural, permite releer toda la filosofía de Dilthey con otra perspectiva. El presente estudio no busca realizar un análisis comparativo entre Dilthey y Hegel, sino partir de la recepción que el primero hace del segundo a los efectos de comprender su filosofía. En este sentido, para Dilthey el «espíritu objetivo» está constituido por el conjunto de las organizaciones exteriores de la sociedad –la estructura político-jurídica de la sociedad- y por las formas culturales como arte, religión y filosofía. El hombre es quien, según Dilthey, produce estas instituciones las cuales a su vez le anteceden y le sucederán en su existencia. En este sentido Dilthey concibe al hombre como un ser histórico y un «punto de cruce» de las distintas objetivaciones históricas. Este mundo compartido es el mundo histórico –expresado a través de las nociones como Gemeinsamkeit, objektive Geist, verwebt y kreuzungspunkt-, aquel que contiene el conjunto de experiencia de vidas acumuladas y las expectativas de futuro. En síntesis, se sostiene que para Dilthey el mundo es manifestación objetiva de la vida –fenomenología del espíritu-, siendo el espíritu objetivo o la vida objetivada, un producto del devenir de la vida humana. Es decir, en el mundo histórico actúan individuos -dotados de voluntad- en una conexión estructural con su entorno, como «puntos de cruce» de las distintas objetivaciones. Es decir, la preocupación histórico-sistemática diltheyana gira en torno al tema del hombre –sujeto individual, «punto de cruce»- y lo socio-histórico –mundo intersubjetivo y espíritu objetivo, manifestación objetivada de la vida-. Así, el hombre juega, para Dilthey, un papel central en la historia y en el despliegue de la vida. Todos los estudios gnoseológicos, epistemológicos, históricos y toda fundamentación sistemática es producto de las conexiones de vida. La importancia de los individuos, sus propias manifestaciones de vida y el «espíritu objetivo» -centros de análisis de las ciencias del espíritu-, permite comprender a la filosofía diltheyana como una filosofía de la intersubjetividad, en oposición a las interpretaciones clásicas que hacían que ella cayera en un psicologismo-empático. Asimismo, el plano de la exteriorización de las acciones individuales y sociales le permite a Dilthey encontrar un saber objetivo para las ciencias del espíritu. / Dilthey points out that while the formalist analysis carried out by Kant's gnoseology fails to understand the human world, Hegel does speak about the historical man, but subsumes his world to the manifestation of reason or absolute knowledge. The project of a foundation of the Geisteswissenschaften carried out by Dilthey seeks to penetrate the human world conceiving it as a set of objectified manifestations of life. Kant and Hegel become their interlocutors, but also Comte with whom Dilthey face in order to sustain the methodical autonomy foundation of the Geisteswissenschaften. I assume that the late notion of "objektive Geist", which Dilthey takes from Hegel, but which he sees as the process/activity of the political and cultural life, allows for a rereading of the whole philosophy of Dilthey in a new perspective. This study does not seek to make a comparative analysis between Dilthey and Hegel, but to set a starting point from/of go along the im put that the first author makes over the latter so as to understand his philosophy. In this regard, for Dilthey, the "objektive Geist" is constituted by the external organizations of society (political-legal structure of society) and the cultural forms as art, religion and philosophy. It is man who, according to Dilthey, produces these institutions, which precede and will surpass the existence of the individual man. Dilthey conceives man as a historical being and as a "crossing point" of the various historical objectifications. This shared world is the historical-world (expressed through the notions of Gemeinsamkeit, objektive Geist, verwebt and kreuzungspunkt), that which contains all the accumulated life experience and future expectations. In short, it is argued that for Dilthey the world is objective manifestation of life (phenomenology of Geist) being objektive Geist or objectified life a product of the manifestation of human life. I.e, in the historical world individuals act -gifted with will- in a structural connection with their environment, as "crossing points" of different objectifications. That is, the historical and systematic Diltheyan concern revolves around the theme of man (individual subject, «crossing point») and the socio-historical world (intersubjective world, objektive Geist, objectified manifestation of life). So, the man plays, for Dilthey, a central role in the history and in the manifestation of life. All gnoseological, epistemological, historical studies and any systematic foundation is a product of life connections. The importance of individuals, their own expressions of life and the «objektive Geist» (the centre of analysis of de Geisteswissenschaften), enable a better understanding of Dilthey's philosophy as a philosophy of intersubjectivity, as opposed to classical interpretations that made its fell into a psychologism-empathetic study. Furthermore, the level of externalization of individual and social actions allows Dilthey to find objective knowledge for the Geisteswissenschaften.