By May 1945, most major German cities lay in ruins, and a largely demoralised population struggled for subsistence in many areas. National Socialist remnants, Christian faith and communist ideology met in the rubble of the Third Reich. The Protestant and Catholic Churches attempted to ‘re-Christianise’ the Volk and reverse secularisation, while the German communists sought to inspire dynamism for their socialist project in Eastern Germany. This thesis recreates the religious world of Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia in the Soviet zone, 1945-9, and analyses ‘religio-politics’ (the interactions between the secular authorities and the Churches), the affairs of the priesthood/pastorate, and the behaviours, mentalities and emotions of ‘ordinary people’ amongst the pews. After the American withdrawal in July 1945, the Soviet authorities occupied the entirety of Thuringia and Saxony-Anhalt, and they proclaimed a ‘freedom of religion’. The realities of this policy were different in each state, and the resolution or non-resolution of local-level disputes often determined Church and State relations. At the grassroots, though, many people engaged in a latent social revolt against all forms of authority. The Churches’ hopes of ‘re-Christianisation’ in 1945 were dashed by 1949, despite a brief and ultimately superficial ‘revival’. The majority of people did not attend church services regularly, many allegedly practiced ‘immorality’, and refused to adopt ‘Christian neighbourly love’ in helping often-destitute refugees. ‘Re-Christianisation’ also did not incur comprehensive denazification or a unified pastorate, and there was even a continuation of the Third Reich Kirchenkampf in some areas. Christian ideas of guilt for a popular turning from God, much less for Nazism and its crimes, rarely resonated amongst the population and some sections of the pastorate. This mentality encapsulated the popular rejection of authority, whether spiritual or political, that endured up to and beyond the foundation of the German Democratic Republic in October 1949.

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Studies of postwar Germany, from 1945-1955, have concentrated on the American influence as a military occupier, the development of German reconstruction and national identity, and memory of this period from the German perspective. Within the memory analyses, firsthand accounts have been analyzed to understand the perspectives of Germans living through the postwar period. Absent from this historiography is an account of American memories and firsthand perspectives of the occupation, particularly during the 1950-1955 period. This thesis employs oral histories of American veterans stationed in postwar Germany, American propaganda and popular cultural mediums during the early 1950s, and modern historiographical trends to provide an understanding of how Americans remember the German postwar decade. American veterans remembered this period, and their encounters with local Germans, as a positive experience. These positive memories were mediated by 1950s Cold War rhetoric and propaganda and were subsequently predicated upon the men's perspective as occupying soldiers. Their recollections align with American popular memory delineating the military occupation as ending in 1949 upon the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany, therefore overshadowing the 1950-1955 period of occupation. The ways in which Americans remember the postwar occupation in Germany, particularly from 1950-1955, inform broader memory and historical narrative trends of this era.

This dissertation examines U.S. food diplomacy in occupied Germany. It argues that the origins of food aid as an anti-communist strategy are located in postwar Germany. Believing a punitive occupation was the best insurance against future conflict, Allied leadership agreed to enforce a lower standard of living on Germany and did not allow relief agencies to administer aid to German civilians. Facing a growing crisis in the U.S. Zone, President Truman authorized food imports and permitted voluntary agencies to operate in 1946. This decision changed the tenor of the occupation and provided the foundation to an improved U.S.-German relationship. It also underscored the value of American food power in the emerging contest with the Soviet Union. Food served as a source of soft power. It bridged cultures and fostered new relationships while reinforcing notions of American exceptionalism. Officials recognized that humanitarian aid complemented foreign policy objectives. American economic security was reflected in their abundance of food, and the dispersal of this food to war-torn Europe, especially a former enemy, made a strong statement about the future. As relations with the Soviet Union soured, policymakers increasingly relied on American food power to encourage German embrace of western values. Occupation officials portrayed food relief as an expression of democratic ideals, emphasizing the universality of Freedom from Want and focusing on well-nourished German children as the hope for future peace. American food fostered the spread of liberal democracy but its dispersal also contained communism. This work bridges diplomatic history and food studies to investigate the consequences and significance of the transnational food exchange. Food aid had layered political, cultural, and emotional implications. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach, this dissertation examines the role of compassion in diplomacy and the symbolism inherent in food to demonstrate the lasting political currency of humanitarian aid. Paying close attention to the food relationships that emerge between Germans and Americans allows one to better gauge the value of U.S. food aid as a propaganda tool. Food embodies American power; it offers a medium for understanding the experience and internalization of the occupation by Americans and Germans alike. Food aid began as emergency relief in 1946, reflecting the transition from a punitive to rehabilitative occupation policy. Recognizing Germany’s need for stability and self-sufficiency Military Government officials then urged economic recovery. Food aid was an important piece for German economic recovery, with supporters emphasizing Germany’s potential contribution toward European recovery. The positive press generated by the Marshall Plan and Allied airlift of Berlin contributed to the growing significance of propaganda in the emerging Cold War. Food relief was both good policy and good public relations, providing a narrative that cast the United States as a benevolent power in a rapidly changing world. Food aid to Germany underscored America’s humanitarian obligations, conscripted emotion into the Cold War, and swayed public opinion on the home front and with the former enemy. / History

The Allied Occupation of Germany, 1945-49, was intended to transform the war-torn Third Reich into a peaceable nation through a series of far-reaching political, economic, and social reforms. But amid the growing tensions between East and West these radical plans would be significantly altered, culminating in the formation of two German states in 1949. Historians have tended to view the occupation as a backdrop to the nascent Cold War or a transitional period in the history of modern Germany. Yet this thesis suggests that British participation in the Allied occupation was, in fact, much more than simply an exercise in political pragmatism or a contribution to the rebuilding of war-torn Europe. Rather, this undertaking catalysed Britain's political and public confrontation with Nazism, laying some of the most significant and durable foundations of the postwar Anglo-German relationship. This research utilises contemporary mass media sources and official records to explore British images and perceptions of Germany under occupation, scrutinising the interactions of decision-makers, the media, and the public. It begins with an examination of the pervasive culture war that emerged in wartime Britain over the precise interpretation and resolution of the so-called 'German problem'. The thesis then goes on to consider public portrayals of the occupation vis-à-vis the evolution of official policy, beginning in the summer of 1945 when British policymakers responded to popular demands for a 'hard peace' and approved a rigorous programme of denazification, re-education, and demilitarisation. In the coming years, scandals engulfed the public image of the British occupiers, threatening to undermine Britain's claims on 'winning the peace' and even prompting an official public relations campaign. The mass market press led calls for an abrupt end to the occupation, fearing it was undermining the nation's prestige while failing to adequately address the threat still posed by Germany. At around the same time, Britain's political and military leaders reassessed their position in the face of the Cold War, turning towards the reconstruction and rehabilitation of western Germany. By 1949, a clear dichotomy had emerged, with implications reaching far beyond the immediate postwar period: while anxieties over the 'German problem' remained largely intact amongst substantial sections of the British press and public, with many regarding the occupation as an abject failure, policymakers were firmly set on the path towards Anglo-German reconciliation and alliance.

The study deals with the evolution of French policy towards the Saar from 1945, when the first concepts of an economic union between France and the Saar, to the refusal of the Saar to become an international territory governed by the Council of Europe in 1955. Analyzing the developments within the French administration in Paris and in Saarbrücken, the aim of the study is to prove that the failure of France to secure an annexation of the Saar resulted from a variety of internal and external forces, the most notable being the lack of interest, co-ordination and competence of the French bureaucracy regarding the Saar. Shortly after the conclusion of World War II, France justified its claims in the Saar by a dire need of coal and the necessity of curbing future German economic potential. The creation of an economic union between France and the Saar was based on superficial and irresponsible planning, which proved to be the stumbling block of future French-Saar relations. The troubled partnership, initially a cause for optimism, resulted in the alienation of both countries. At the same time the rebirth of Western Germany caused the pragmatic view of the Saar to doubt the future of a union with a fragile and economically weak France. Following the rejection of the Saar Statute, a French plan of...

This dissertation examines relations between Canadian soldiers and German civilians from March 1945 to April 1946. This study will show that Canadian relations with German civilians were, in part, an extension of relations with civilians in liberated countries, but were also something new altogether. At the beginning of the invasion of Germany, most Canadian soldiers did not wish to associate with Germans and followed a fraternization ban that had been put into effect. Canadians were more likely than American soldiers to believe in the ban. Soldiers were fed a propaganda campaign that told them all Germans were evil and needed to be punished for starting the war. As the invasion proceeded further into Germany, more Canadians realized that all Germans were not Nazis and began to fraternize with the ban still in place. In the Netherlands, where Canadians have been remembered as liberators, relations at times were also tense and bitter after the war ended. Canadians also had to deal with large number of Displaced Persons (DPs), who caused more headaches than German civilians for the occupation authorities.