The airline industry is a major user of jet fuel and this constitutes a large component of the operating costs and is a risk coefficient for airlines. Several studies have been conducted on how oil price volatility affect stock prices and cash flows as well as how, in general, firms that uses derivatives experience lower stock returns volatility and stock s .The impact of oil price volatility on airline stock s and the impact of hedging on airline stock s have not been adequately examined, this paper fills this gap. By gathering daily frequency of oil spot prices to access the quarterly oil price volatility and stock s from 16 European airlines, we correlate quarterly oil price volatility to quarterly airline stock s as well as stock s and hedging percentages between 2010-2015, we reject the hypothesis that oil price volatility has an impact on airline stock s and that hedging reduces stock s. These findings therefore suggest that oil price volatility do not have a large impact on systematic risks or that hedging offset systematic risks. The findings are of interest to investors who want to make well informed investment decisions based on non-diversifiable equity risk since it has become popular for management recently to implement hedging policies to signal competency in risk management in order to attract investments.

While numerous studies have investigated the impact of oil prices on the stock market, Chapter 2 is the first to examine the association between corporate bond yields and oil returns. We examine the association between oil-returns and corporate bond yields of four major U.S. industrial and financial sectors (including thirteen sub-sectors). Chapter 3 examines the reaction of stock markets in the U.K. and the Netherlands to a major composite event in the oil industry – the merger of the Royal Dutch Shell (RDSA) and the BG Group (BRGYY) on April 8, 2015, and the subsequent discovery of oil in southern England on April 9. We employ an exponential autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic (EGARCH (1, 1)) framework in both Chapters, which allows for asymmetry of the effects between positive and negative external shocks including oil return shocks, shows the effects on both the yields/stock returns and their volatilities, and permits the persistence of the shocks to be measured. Three main results are obtained in Chapter 2. First, oil returns are significantly associated with the yield levels of corporate bonds issued in ten out of the thirteen sub-sectors considered within the oil-substitute, oil-related, oil-user, and financial services sectors. The three exceptions are the Petroleum Refinery, Building, and Chemical sub-sectors. Second, the return volatilities of corporate bonds issued in the Plastic & Rubber sub-sector demonstrate asymmetric responses to positive and negative shocks. To elaborate, negative shocks lead to lower volatility in the Plastic & Rubber sub-sector than positive shocks of the same magnitude. Third, the half-life, or the time it takes for the volatility of the portfolio of bonds in the Industrial Machinery sub-sector to move halfway back to its conditional mean after a shock is introduced, is 8.6 months. For bonds in all other sub-sectors, the half-life is less than 2.5 months. We obtain several results in Chapter 3. First, the composite event of merger and oil discovery generated significant abnormal returns in six out of the thirteen sub-sectors considered in the U.K. and three out of ten sub-sectors in the Netherlands. The remaining seven sub-sectors in the U.K. and the other seven sub-sectors in the Netherlands show no sensitivity in returns to the shock. Second, there is evidence of some information leakage about the composite event as demonstrated in the significant abnormal returns for Coal, Oil & Gas Extraction, Depository Institute, Chemical and Plastic & Rubber sub-sectors in U.K. and Coal, Depository Institute and Air Transportation sub-sectors in the Netherlands up to three days before the announcement of the composite event. Third, the behavioral patterns of four of the thirteen sub-sectors considered in the U.K. and four of the ten sub-sectors considered in the Netherlands demonstrate asymmetry in response to external shocks to their respective returns. These results have three main implications. First, investors holding bonds issued by the two sub-sectors with asymmetric oil shock effects need to add bonds from oil-related and oil-substitute sectors to lower the volatility of their bond portfolio because the latter do not exhibit asymmetry. Second, considering the overall finding of sensitivity to oil price changes, institutional investors need to examine the sensitivity of their bond portfolios to oil return changes and to guard against excessive risk. Similarly, corporations should monitor oil price variations and hedge the volatility risk accordingly. Finally, stock investors in the U.K. and the Netherlands might benefit from monitoring the key events that may affect the oil supply and oil prices, and acting accordingly. / Economics

This study aims to analyse the precrisis period on the oil markets with a primary objective of assessing the role of speculation in the commodity's price development and its volatility. First it depicts the rapidly increasing speculative activity on the futures market together with the parallel oil price surge. The speculation is initially proxied by non-commercial traders' positions and subsequently quantified by Working's T-index. The paper then uses speculative traders' positions and both spot and futures prices to test for Granger causality within the framework of VAR models. For the sake of consistency it also evaluates causal links between speculation and inventories level. Further the study investigates the speculation impact on volatility of oil prices by employing various approaches in volatility quantification including GARCH models. Contrary to expectations we find that the speculatio's impact on both prices and their volatility is rather insignificant. In the last chapter we therefore seek for an explanation of the oil price developments by examining the market fundamentals. The interaction of supply and demand finally gives substantial evidence for understanding the price developments in the precrisis period.