The thesis consists of four papers. The first two essays deal with entry externalities, the third studies the Law of One Price (LOP), while the last essay examines average profits for a monopolist under uncertainty. In the first essay, entry externalities in the form of information and positive payoff externalities are studied. When a firm enters a market, it often imposes externalities on existing firms and/or future potential entrants. If products are substitutes, these externalities are typically negative; if products are complements, the externalities are typically positive. Externalities related to substitution or complementarities between products are called payoff externalities, since entry by one firm has a direct effect on the other firms' payoff. Another type of externality arises when firms have private information about the profitability of entry. In this case, the entry decision of one firm potentially reveals that firm's private information. The focus of the paper is on the scope for intervention for an uninformed social planner, when firms privately know the profitability of entry and moreover, the firms have an option to delay their entry. The main result is that there is insufficient entry, since firms delay too much in equilibrium and further, the social planner can increase welfare by subsidizing early entry. Continuing on this theme, the second essay has the same focus, but instead takes the time of entry as fixed, while generalizing the analysis of payoff externalities also to the case of negative payoff externalities. The main contribution is the characterization of equilibria under both positive and negative payoff externalities and the implications for public policy. Here, the scope for intervention will, in contrast to the results in the first essay, be low, when entry is profitable for uninformed firms. In the third essay (joint with Richard Friberg), deviations from the LOP are studied in the presence of transport costs, under the assumption that firms can endogenously choose to segment markets in order to prevent arbitrage by consumers. It is shown that the deviation from LOP can increase as transport costs fall between countries. The last essay (joint with Richard Friberg), studies the problem facing a monopolist when the cost of inputs is uncertain. The main result is that the monopolist can gain from this uncertainty, in the sense that average profits are increasing in the variability of costs. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögsk., 2001

This Thesis deals with the convergence of European states and identifies the influence of the European union enlargement in 2014 on the course of convergence. Both real and price convergences are analyzed by using beta convergence and sigma convergence concepts. The Balassa Samuelson effect is tested as well. The Balassa Samuelson effect explains the existence of price convergence and also indicates the relationship between real and price variables. The existence of real and price convergence was verified for the whole period from 1995 to 2013. During 2004 the integration of European states was strengthened, which was significant for real convergence because the speed of convergence was positively influenced. As for the price convergence, the year 2004 was insignificant as the break point. Despite a similar course of both convergences, price convergence was more affected by the crisis in 2008. The presence of Balassa Samuelson effect was confirmed. Despite the complications during intensity measurement, caused by problematic dividing into tradable and non tradable sectors, corresponding values are realistic.

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The dissertation consists of three empirical papers in institutional microeconomics. The first paper examines the role of institutional quality in international trade, the second paper focuses on unintended consequences of intellectual property rights for social welfare, and the last one addresses the impact of banking on corporate financing and investment. An introductory chapter puts these three papers into perspective. In the first paper I analyze the role of institutions in price dispersion among cities in the European region in the 1996-2009 period. Using a number of institutional quality measures I find that the better the institutions, the lower the predicted dispersion. The result is robust to different specifications of the regression model and is consistent with a hypothesis that arbitrage, as an entrepreneurial activity and the main power behind the law of one price, is influenced by institutional quality. In the second paper I use a large data set of U.S. patents applied for between 1980 and 2007 by 22 large technology companies to study development of strategic patenting over time and across industries. Using two complementary methods I reveal strong evidence against the hypothesis of more strategic patenting after 1995. Contrary to the expectations, aerospace patents appear to be on average...