This study uses agency theory to test whether the demand for quality audits by listed Chinese companies is associated with changes in ownership structure, which is characterized by the dominance of the state, institutional and individual shareholders. The empirical test results obtained in a concentrated ownership setting are supportive of agency theory. Specifically, I find that the decrease of state shares and the corresponding increase of institutional shares result in a demand for higher-quality audits in China’s stock market. The results provide empirical support for the government’s recent initiative in reducing state ownership in listed companies to improve firm performance and the supply of quality accounting information through independent auditing.

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<p>Stock splits are supposed to be financial cosmetics. However, this study shows that such corporate events have impact on ownership structure. This study exploits unique data from Swedish Central Security Registration regarding ownership and analyzes the ownership structures in stock splitting firms. Our data consists of exclu-sive semi-annually reported ownership structures of companies listed on Stockholm Stock Exchange. We categorize stock owners as domestic institutional investors, foreign investors and domestic individual investors. The information on ultimate ownership composition in listed companies is rare and more or less exquisite for Sweden.Our results confirm positive abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of stock splits and stock dividends. Moreover, we find evidence on changes in owner-ship structure as well as number of shareholders. The results show evidence on decreasing ownership concentration due to the stock split, which implies a more dispersed ownership structure.</p>

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Many previous studies suggest that agency costs and information asymmetry are signifi-cant factors that affect the relationship between the investment expenditures of firms and the availability of cash from internal operations. Some other studies show that dividing firms in terms of the degree of ownership concentration further explains the relationship. However, the findings of previous studies are not consistent suggesting that other firm characteristics may be affecting the results. We propose that additional attention to the nature of ownership control of firms may explain the inconsistency. In this study, we examine the investment behaviour of family-controlled firms, institu-tion-controlled firms and widely-held firms. We distinguish between these three kinds of firms as they represent different levels of market imperfection. Therefore, we expect diverse investment behaviours among the three groups. Compared with family-controlled and institution-controlled firms, widely held firms have dispersed ownership structures. The greatest weakness of a widely-held ownership structure is the lack of shareholder monitoring due to the unmatched benefit and cost of control for small shareholders. The existence of at least one large shareholder will reduce the agency costs and asymmetric information. On one hand, enhanced monitoring will decrease the waste of free cash flows by managers. On the other hand, large shareholders are willing to spend time and effort to collect more information on management performance or to estimate the firms investment projects and thus reduce the information asymmetry. Both family-controlled firms and institution-controlled firms have large shareholders. However, whether or not the shareholders are playing an active monitoring role is still an important issue. From the point of aligning the interests of managers and shareholders, the family-controlled group is superior to the institution-controlled group as family-controlled firms generally assign influential positions to family members whose focus is in line with that of the family group. Even though a non family member may be appointed as the manager, the level of monitoring is significant given the high ownership concentration by the family. On the other hand, significant family ownership may lead to agency costs of its own. The main disadvantage of owner-managers is that they may lack the expertise to manage their firms although their position in the family may make it natural for them to be the manager. Another advantage of the family-controlled firm is that the family may divert company resources for its own benefit despite the presence of a manager who may or may not be a family member. Essentially, the family and the manager can all collude to spend on perks and personal benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. Therefore, as we move from widely-held to institution-controlled the level of agency costs may decrease but as we move further into higher control, as may be suggested by family ownership, the level of agency costs may increase again. Although previous studies have noticed the influence of ownership structure, no analysis has been carried out to explore the investment behaviour of firms controlled by the three differ-ent kinds of shareholders. Our first motivation is to fill this gap. Splitting our sample into three representative groups enables us to study the financing constraints and investment behaviour of firms that are family-controlled, institution-controlled, and widely held. The focus of this study is on Canadian firms. The Canadian evidence is worth particular attention because the Canadian business environment is similar to the US business environment in terms of legal, regulatory, and market institutions but it is similar to European or Asian firms in terms of ownership structure. Therefore, a study of Canadian firms can provide a useful and rational assessment of the investment behaviour of firms that follow the ownership structures of Europe and Asia but operate in a business environment and institutional setting similar to those of the US. Further, a large number of Canadian firms have controlling shareholders and a large proportion, approximately 60%, of Canadian firms can be categorized as having concentrated ownership structure. Among the firms with concentrated ownership, over 1/3 of them can be dis-tinguished as family-controlled. This dataset provides an ideal setting to study the investment behaviours of firms according to the nature of their controllers. Our results illustrate that the intensity of investments of widely-held firms is higher than the intensity of investments of concentrated ownership firms and that the intensity of investments of widely-held firms is positively and significantly affected by the availability of funds from internal sources. In contrast, for concentrated ownership firms the intensity is positively and significantly affected by the availability of growth opportunities. These observations suggest that in comparison with the concentrated ownership firms, the widely-held firms face higher levels of financing constraints and exhibit less value maximizing behaviour. However, once we separate the family-controlled firms from the institution-controlled firms, we find that the investment expenditures of the family-controlled firms and the institution-controlled firms are not significantly different in terms of their dependence on internal cash flows or on the market-to-book ratios. We also find that widely-held firms tend to invest in projects that payoff quickly. This preference may be the result of these firms desires to ease their external funding constraints by generating funds internally.

Many previous studies suggest that agency costs and information asymmetry are signifi-cant factors that affect the relationship between the investment expenditures of firms and the availability of cash from internal operations. Some other studies show that dividing firms in terms of the degree of ownership concentration further explains the relationship. However, the findings of previous studies are not consistent suggesting that other firm characteristics may be affecting the results. We propose that additional attention to the nature of ownership control of firms may explain the inconsistency. In this study, we examine the investment behaviour of family-controlled firms, institu-tion-controlled firms and widely-held firms. We distinguish between these three kinds of firms as they represent different levels of market imperfection. Therefore, we expect diverse investment behaviours among the three groups. Compared with family-controlled and institution-controlled firms, widely held firms have dispersed ownership structures. The greatest weakness of a widely-held ownership structure is the lack of shareholder monitoring due to the unmatched benefit and cost of control for small shareholders. The existence of at least one large shareholder will reduce the agency costs and asymmetric information. On one hand, enhanced monitoring will decrease the waste of free cash flows by managers. On the other hand, large shareholders are willing to spend time and effort to collect more information on management performance or to estimate the firms investment projects and thus reduce the information asymmetry. Both family-controlled firms and institution-controlled firms have large shareholders. However, whether or not the shareholders are playing an active monitoring role is still an important issue. From the point of aligning the interests of managers and shareholders, the family-controlled group is superior to the institution-controlled group as family-controlled firms generally assign influential positions to family members whose focus is in line with that of the family group. Even though a non family member may be appointed as the manager, the level of monitoring is significant given the high ownership concentration by the family. On the other hand, significant family ownership may lead to agency costs of its own. The main disadvantage of owner-managers is that they may lack the expertise to manage their firms although their position in the family may make it natural for them to be the manager. Another advantage of the family-controlled firm is that the family may divert company resources for its own benefit despite the presence of a manager who may or may not be a family member. Essentially, the family and the manager can all collude to spend on perks and personal benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. Therefore, as we move from widely-held to institution-controlled the level of agency costs may decrease but as we move further into higher control, as may be suggested by family ownership, the level of agency costs may increase again. Although previous studies have noticed the influence of ownership structure, no analysis has been carried out to explore the investment behaviour of firms controlled by the three differ-ent kinds of shareholders. Our first motivation is to fill this gap. Splitting our sample into three representative groups enables us to study the financing constraints and investment behaviour of firms that are family-controlled, institution-controlled, and widely held. The focus of this study is on Canadian firms. The Canadian evidence is worth particular attention because the Canadian business environment is similar to the US business environment in terms of legal, regulatory, and market institutions but it is similar to European or Asian firms in terms of ownership structure. Therefore, a study of Canadian firms can provide a useful and rational assessment of the investment behaviour of firms that follow the ownership structures of Europe and Asia but operate in a business environment and institutional setting similar to those of the US. Further, a large number of Canadian firms have controlling shareholders and a large proportion, approximately 60%, of Canadian firms can be categorized as having concentrated ownership structure. Among the firms with concentrated ownership, over 1/3 of them can be dis-tinguished as family-controlled. This dataset provides an ideal setting to study the investment behaviours of firms according to the nature of their controllers. Our results illustrate that the intensity of investments of widely-held firms is higher than the intensity of investments of concentrated ownership firms and that the intensity of investments of widely-held firms is positively and significantly affected by the availability of funds from internal sources. In contrast, for concentrated ownership firms the intensity is positively and significantly affected by the availability of growth opportunities. These observations suggest that in comparison with the concentrated ownership firms, the widely-held firms face higher levels of financing constraints and exhibit less value maximizing behaviour. However, once we separate the family-controlled firms from the institution-controlled firms, we find that the investment expenditures of the family-controlled firms and the institution-controlled firms are not significantly different in terms of their dependence on internal cash flows or on the market-to-book ratios. We also find that widely-held firms tend to invest in projects that payoff quickly. This preference may be the result of these firms desires to ease their external funding constraints by generating funds internally.

When managers face the choice of decision-making financing tool, how to assess the status of the selected company's corporate profit and shareholder equity of the financing tool for maximizing. This study focused on the Taiwan Listed electronic industry, ownership structure and the different financing tools on the issue of the impact of corporate performance The data are using Taiwan Stock Exchange Market Observation Station of the company's financial number, Taiwan Economic Journal database of financial information of listed companies and various listed electronics company Annual Reports. The use of statistical analysis methods, including: t test, one way analysis of variance, and correlation and regression analysis. The results as below: 1. Electronic industry financing tool for the proportion of ownership structure and financing impact; 2.Electronic industry financing tool have an impact on business performance; 3. Electronic industry financing ratio will be part of the performance indicators impact; 4. Electronic industry financing tool part of the index change over time; 5. Electronic industry and mostly the equity structure will change with time; 6. Electronic industry financing percentage change over time.

One of the goals for an enterprise is to increase the operation performance. However, there are several factors may affect the operation performance. According to the reviews, we found that many researches are discussing the impact of capital investment and ownership structure on the operation performance under different industries. Iron and steel are the mother of industry and also the essential raw materials for production. The development of Taiwan¡¦s iron and steel industry has expanded overseas to enhance the competitive ability and operation performance. Therefore, this research focus on Taiwan¡¦s iron and steel companies which are already listed in the stock exchange and over-the-counter markets and we use regression to analyze the relationship between capital investment, ownership structure and operation performance of those companies. The ownership structure plays a role of interference factor to test the relation between capital investment and operation performance. According to the result, we found that the relation between shares of directors and supervisors and operation performance is positive. Also the effect of the capital investment on operation performance is remarkable when take the ownership structure into consideration. This result not only shows the different between iron and steel industry and other industries but also gives practical suggestions for company managers and investors. Before investment, both enterprise and investors could estimate the operation performance of a company base on two factors, the capital investment and shares of directors and supervisors.

This study examines the changes in the inside ownership structure of companies after undergoes initial public offering in Taiwan. After initial public offering, the company¡¦s shares are in public possession while inside shareholders only possess part of its shares. To maximize their own interests, inside shareholders¡¦ ownership policies may vary due to different factors. Literature review shows that after IPOs the inside shareholders¡¦ share tends to be dropping but previous research focuses mostly on the changes in operating performance and ownership structure after IPOs. DeMarzo and Urosevic (2006) believe that the changes in inside ownership structure are due mainly to the trade-off between monitoring incentives and diversification. My study aims at companies which undergoes IPOs in Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation or at GreTai Securities Market between Jan. 1st 1998 and Dec. 31st 2000. The article investigates how such factors as, corporate value, corporate risks, inside/outside shareholders¡¦ risk tolerance and the ownership structure of companies which undergoes IPOs, have effects on inside shareholders¡¦ share-holding adjustment speed, long-term share holding equivalence level as well as the long-term share holding differences between inside/outside stockholders and little investors. My findings substantiate my assumption that risk factors and monitoring incentives do have effects on the shareholders¡¦ ownership policies and that factors mentioned above do have different effects on the inside ownership structure of IPO companies. The more inside stockholders avert risks, the higher the share-holding adjustment speed becomes. In contrast, the more share inside shareholders possess during IPO, the lower the speed. Inside shareholders¡¦ optimal ownership policies are positively relevant to the corporate value and negatively relevant to corporate risks. They are also positively relevant to the risk aversion of investors. The degree of risk aversion on the part of both investors and inside shareholders also influences ownership structures of various shareholders.

In this study, we examine the impact of political factors in corporate governance on the performance of firm. The major difference between this study and other corporate governance studies is use of three stage least square method, which can estimate the cause and effect between endogenous variable. Our sample consists of 100 firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange. We find that the political directors harm the performance of firm.