Theoretical models suggest that ownership structure may be an important determinant of securities' market characteristics. For example, the presence of informed traders leads to greater bid-ask spreads (Copeland and Galai (1983), and Glosten and Milgrom (1985)), and strategic trading of informed and discretionary liquidity traders leads to intertemporal variation in both trading volume and trading costs (Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), and Foster and Viswanathan (1990)). However, the empirical studies on the effect of ownership structure on market characteristics are limited. Prior studies focus on either one type of market characteristics or one type of owners, and usually do not address the potential endogeneity problem between market characteristics and ownership structure. This dissertation extends existing literature with two essays on ownership and market characteristics. The first essay broadly examines the effect of ownership structure (inside ownership, institutional ownership, and individual ownership) on market characteristics such as order flow, price impact of trade, quoted spread and quoted depth. For each market characteristic examined, I establish an empirical model based on existing theories and empirical evidence. My results indicate that stocks with greater inside ownership have lower order flow, greater price impact of trade, greater quoted spread and lower quoted depth, while stocks with greater active institutional ownership and greater individual shareholders have greater order flow, smaller price impact of trade, lower spread and greater depth. These results may have implications for corporate governance. For example, while agency theory suggests managerial ownership may align interests of managers and shareholders, this essay finds that this comes with a liquidity cost. Further, my results suggest there are liquidity benefits of individual and institutional ownership. If as suggested by Amihud and Mendelson (1989), investors require a higher rate of return for illiquid stocks, firms can target their shares to specific types of investors (for example, active institutions and individuals) to improve liquidity, and reduce their cost of capital. The second essay is a specific application of the first essay and examines the effect of institutional ownership on price discovery around earnings announcements. I select earnings announcements as the event for my analysis because there are three well-documented regularities about earnings announcements. First, market participants anticipate the forthcoming earnings announcements. Second, the announcements of earnings news are usually accompanied by abnormal price changes and abnormal volume. Third, there is evidence that stock price continues to move in the direction of earnings surprise after the announcements of earnings news. Since results from the first essay suggest that institutional investors affect market characteristics such as price impact of trade and quoted spread, I expect that institutional participation would also affect the price discovery process around earnings announcements. My results indicate that institutional ownership is associated with greater anticipation of earnings news. Further, stocks with greater institutional ownership have a greater price response to announcements of earnings news. Finally, institutional investors have no significant effect on post-announcement drift. The results of the second essay suggest that institutional investors contribute to the price discovery process. / Ph. D.

This study examines the effect of ownership structure on dividend policy of 284 firms listed on the OMX Stockholm Exchange in Swedenfrom 2010-2015. Specifically, the purpose of the study is to investigate therelationship betweendifferentinvestor types and dividend policies of firms, measured as dividend yield and dividend payout ratio.Also, the study aims to predict dividend behaviours based on ownership structure which may be useful inthe future since ownership structures of listed Swedish firms havebeen changing over time, with an increased consolidation of ownership and a sharpincrease in institutional ownership. The sample consistsof 1046 observations and was gathered from Thomson Reuters’ Datastream and Eikon databases. This is the first study to examine the relationship between ownership structure and dividend policy in Sweden.The dividend policy is measured using two dependent variables; dividend payout ratio anddividend yield and a multiple regression has been used in orderto test the hypotheses whether any relationships exist between 17 different types of ownership structure used as independent variables, four additional control variables and dividend policy.The findings indicated significant positive relationships between institutional ownership and dividend yield and dividend payout, with one exception being private equity which exhibited a negative relationship with dividend yield. Furthermore, market capitalization, return on assets and price to book value are positively related to dividend payout while debt/equity ratio showed a negative relationship with dividend yield. The results contradict those of the most recent research conducted in Turkey (Al-Najjar & Kilincarsla, 2016) but adds supportin the debateto existing theories of dividends’ relevance to the value of firms developed by Gordon (1963), Lintner (1962) and Walter (1963). Limitations of the study include the geographical delimitation to Sweden which creates some constraints to wider generalization ofthe results to other geographical settings. Furthermore, the datacollected from Thomson Reuters Eikon hadmissing values, showed signs of heteroscedasticity and relevant investor variables such as family ownership were unavailable.

As a post-Soviet economy, Ukraine has inherited substantial production assets and qualified personnel. However, the economy was dominated by large-scale enterprises designed for much bigger markets. After the collapse of the Soviet Union Ukrainian firms faced lack of planning, breaks in contacts with their former suppliers and customers, and distortion of prices. There was a clear need in restructuring of the entire economy. Restructuring included splitting firms into smaller parts and privatization. The first phase of transition was completed by 2000 when the output grew for the first time after a long recession in nineties, and most firms became private property. In this work I explore trends in geographic and industrial concentration of Ukrainian manufacturing firms over the period of 2001 to 2005. I found that this period was characterized by relocation of firms between sectors and between regions, as well as by an increase in economic concentration of industries. The speed of adjustment was different for various sectors and even for different industries within manufacturing. Even though the economy is still dominated by large firms, the average firm size decreases due to a rapid growth in the number of new firms. Geographically, manufacturing tends to increasingly concentrate mostly around a few big cities, apparently at the expense of other regions. I also estimate the external scale effects and compare them with Western studies. In particular I focus on machinery and high tech. I found strong localization and urbanization effects in both industry groups. An important contribution of this work is the analysis of the effect of ownership structure on agglomeration economies. I found that private firms tend to enjoy external scale effects to a greater extent than state owned, and foreign owned firms appear to be the most efficient in extracting benefits form agglomeration. Aggregation of the data may distort the estimates of agglomeration effects. I show that most effects take place at the nearest neighborhoods. When the physical distance between firms increases agglomeration effects attenuate quickly. However, localization effects reveal themselves at different level of industrial aggregation for various industries. This may reflect more complicated relationships within sectors and requires further analysis.

This study is motivated by one of the most prevalent properties of modern corporations: separation of ownership and control. Ownership concentration has been one of the corporate governance mechanisms to solve the agency problem between shareholders and management. Existing literature is mainly concerned with the impact of managerial ownership on firm performance. Little evidence is provided on the impact of general ownership concentration, including multiple large shareholders, on firm performance. This study aims to examine the efficiency of ownership concentration as a corporate governance mechanism, and to explore relevant policy implications to improve firm performance. Based on the company ownership data across a sample of 1291 European companies in the year of 2004, this study shows that European companies' ownership are highly concentrated with the largest three shareholders own more than 60% ownership of company. Industrial companies hold direct controls of European non-subsidiary companies, while private shareholders turn out to be the ultimate owners. On average, there is more than one large shareholder who owns more than 10% of the shares in a European company. A further sample of 655 European companies is used to investigate the relationship between ownership, control and firm performance. A significant non-linear impact of ownership concentration on firm performance with multiple turning points is confirmed. Specifically, Tobin's Q is highest when the Herfindahl index, which incorporates the degree of dispersion of shareholdings other than the largest one, reaches a value of 0.08. The largest shareholding of 10% might also be able to deliver relatively strong performance. Restructuring owner identities could be another efficient governance approach. Direct control from founder owners, ultimate control from insurance companies, and management ownership are beneficial for firm performance, while government, financial institutions except insurance companies and ultimate control of non-financial corporate owners are found to be detrimental for firm performance. Firm performance can also be improved by strengthening the contestability of the controlling coalition's power. The impacts of ownership and control on firm performance are found conditioned by country and industry. Therefore policies should be adjusted according to the companies' institutional environments. Although the endogeneity of ownership concentration and current firm performance is rejected in this study, past firm performance seems to affect current ownership concentration level. Higher accounting rates of return four years ago could result in lower current ownership concentration, while higher last year's Tobin's Q could result in higher current ownership concentration. Capital structure is found to be a significant substitute mechanism for ownership. These elements should be taken into account when the ownership governance mechanism is implemented.

Disclosure of accounting information is crucial in facilitating efficient contracts in the publicly listed firm and in reducing information asymmetries in capital markets. A well-known perception in disclosure literature is that, as the separation between managers and owners increases, so does the demand for publicly available disclosure. Many publicly listed firms around the world are controlled by a few large owners that obtain information through their insider positions in the firm. Thus, variations in ownership structures have a considerable effect on how firms’ disclosure practices are resolved. Despite the increased attention paid to the identity of controlling owners and their influence on financial reporting practices, little is known about how owner types and governance mechanisms influence corporate disclosures and capital-market effects. This thesis contributes to the disclosure literature by studying a context in which controlling owners have a large influence on the governance and disclosure practices of firms. This contrasts with the much-studied setting in which management influences the governance and reporting decisions of firms. Thus, the aim of this thesis is to examine the determinants and capital-market effects of Swedish listed firms’ annual report disclosure. This thesis uses a self-constructed disclosure index from manually gathered data from the annual reports of Swedish publicly listed firms during the years 2001 to 2013. This includes information on the notes to the financial statements, corporate governance and strategy. The findings of the four empirical studies show that the ownership structure of firms and the various contractual relationships that firms are engaged in, drive the disclosure practices. Additionally, the results indicate that higher levels of disclosure decrease information asymmetries between capital-market participants and increase trading activity. However, the findings also show that firms with controlling owners are less forthcoming with disclosure, even after a new disclosure reform. Considering the large influence of controlling owners in the studied context, these are important findings in the research field and in regulators’ processes of deriving disclosure regulation. The thesis concludes that the variety in firms’ disclosure incentives and local governance structures are important disclosure determinants to understand in framing international accounting standards.

Background: Sweden has a tradition of a concentrated ownership structure where many owners use dual asset classes to maintain corporate control by possessing small portions of the dividend rights. Financial literature has shown that these controlling owners find more incentives to divert corporate resources for private use, at the expense of shareholders. Recent studies also show that involvement in extraction of private benefits leads to long maturity debt as controlling owners avoid frequent monitoring by lenders. As this causes a conflict over corporate debt maturity between controlling and minority shareholders, we investigate if the presence of multiple large shareholders (MLS) mitigates this conflict through control contests. Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to examine and analyze how different ownership structures affect the informative environment within a firm. In addition, the thesis investigates how ownership structure affect debt maturity structure and what this mean for large and minority shareholders. Method: The study uses a quantitative approach with panel data of 74 publicly traded non – financial Swedish firms over the period of 2006 – 2014. A deductive approach has been applied in order to explain empirical results from theory and previous literature. Results: We find evidence that controlling owners with a separation in control and cash flow rights tend to insulate themselves through long term debt, creating a bad informative environment with information asymmetry and agency costs. Furthermore, our results show robust evidence that MLS mitigates these problems since control contest between large shareholders leads to a shorter debt maturity, yielding a better informative environment. In addition, our results imply that MLS may be an important factor in facilitating financing as investors associate these firms with less risk of extraction of private benefits.

Bakgrund: Svenska företag har visat sig vara bland de bästa i världen på hållbarhetsredovisning. Tidigare studier har försökt hitta förklaringsfaktorer för att definiera vilka faktorer som ökar den mängd hållbarhetsupplysningar företag rapporterar frivilligt. Ägarstrukturens påverkan på hållbarhetsredovisning är ett relativt outforskat område och ska därför förklaras i den här studien.   Syfte: Syftet med uppsatsen är att genom en kvantitativ metod förklara hur ägarstrukturer påverkar hållbarhetsredovisning hos Large-Cap- och Mid-Cap företag noterade på Nasdaq OMX Stockholm.     Metod: Ämnet har testats utifrån skapandet av hypoteser och empiriska observationer. En innehållsanalys har gjorts genom granskning av 173 företags års- och hållbarhetsredovisningar, noterade på Nasdaq OMX Stockholm. Hållbarhetsredovisningen har studerat dels utifrån det ekonomiska perspektivet och dels utifrån det miljö och samhällsmässiga perspektivet.   Resultat/slutsats: Utifrån vår analys av de olika ägarstrukturerna och deras påverkan på hållbarhetsredovisning har slutsatsen blivit att det inte finns något större samband mellan de två.   Bidrag/framtida forskning: Ägarstrukturens förklaringsgrad visade sig vara låg då få signifikanta samband fanns mellan ägarstrukturer och hur de redovisar hållbarhet. Framtida forskningsförslag är att genom en kvalitativ och kvantitativ metod jämföra skillnader gällande hållbarhet som företag redovisar och deras faktiska hållbarhetsaktivitet.

Nos últimos anos, o mercado de capitais brasileiro tem experimentado um crescimento da participação do investidor minoritário concomitantemente ao do volume de negociação de ações. Este trabalho propõe-se a avaliar se o perfil dos acionistas controladores de uma empresa pode implicar em um percentual diferente do seu lucro que é distribuído como dividendos para seus acionistas. Para a realização desse trabalho, por meio da utilização da base de dados da Economática®, foram selecionadas as empresas cujas ações apresentaram maior volume de negociação entre os anos de 2001 e 2006, Os resultados obtidos por meio do modelo de mínimos quadrados ordinários mostraram que empresas cujos maiores acionistas faziam parte do conselho de administração distribuíram como dividendos, um percentual maior do lucro para seus acionistas. Entretanto, em contrário, empresas onde o governo foi classificado como acionista controlador, foi distribuído um percentual menor. Os resultados também corroboram a afirmação de que as empresas consideradas como grandes, distribuem mais dividendos do que as pequenas. Além disso, empresas com uma estrutura de propriedade mais concentrada distribuíram um percentual menor do lucro, como dividendos para seus acionistas, do que aquelas com estrutura menos concentrada. / In the last few years, the Brazilian capital market has experienced growth in the participation of the minority investor as well as in the volume of trade of stocks. This study intends to analyze if the profile of the controlling shareholders of a company can imply on a different percentual of profit being distributed as dividends to its shareholders. This work was carried out by selecting companies whose stocks were among the most tradable between the years of 2001 and 2006, by means of the use of the database Economática®.The results obtained by using the Ordinary Least Square Model have demonstrated that companies whose the largest stockholders were part of the management board have distributed as dividends, a larger percentual of their profit to their stockholders. However, on the other side, companies with the government as their largest shareholders have distributed a smaller percentual of it. The results also corroborated the statement that companies considered to be large have distributed more dividends than the small ones. Besides, companies with a more concentrated ownership structured have distributed a smaller percentual of the profit as dividends to their shareholders than those with a less concentrated structure.

Background: Human capital disclosure is a widely examined topic by scholars, previous studies has mainly focused on annual reports and companies webpages. However, during the last decade, social media has grown in importance and it represent a new way for companies to interact with stakeholders. The increased interactivity provided by social network sites have made it one of the most important communication tools for companies to interact with stakeholders. One of the larger social media, LinkedIn has received little attention by researchers, only one previous study has investigate human capital disclosure on LinkedIn. Previous research has examined different corporate disclosure in connection to ownership structure. Purpose: The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between ownership structure and human capital disclosure made by companies in Sweden and Norway via LinkedIn. Method: This study is conducted with a quantitative methodology, investigating a sample of 150 companies from Sweden and Norway. Human capital disclosure on LinkedIn are analysed through a content analysis and a regression analysis to test the hypothesis in this study. Conclusion: The results confirm the hypothesis that a negative relationship exists between ownership concentration and the level of human capital disclosure via LinkedIn. This is in line with previous research; however, this study shows that companies in a more digitalized environment disclose more HC information.

Este estudo investiga a relação entre a estrutura de propriedade e controle e o valor e desempenho das empresas não-financeiras privadas brasileiras, listadas na Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo, entre os anos de 1998 a 2002. A análise busca investigar e compreender os conflitos de agência existentes nas empresas resultantes da separação entre propriedade e controle sob o ponto de vista da governança corporativa. As variáveis de estrutura de propriedade analisadas são a concentração de votos, concentração de capital e o grau de excesso de votos, sempre em relação aos acionistas controladores. O estudo parte da suposição de que a estrutura de propriedade é um fator determinante do valor e desempenho das empresas, observando-se a endogeneidade da mesma. As principais correntes teóricas propõem que em um contexto como no caso brasileiro, onde existe uma separação entre direito de controle e direito sobre fluxo de caixa através da emissão de ações sem direito de voto, a concentração de votos e de capital favorece o melhor monitoramento efetivo por parte do acionista controlador sobre os executivos de uma empresa. Entretanto, esse efeito seria ao mesmo tempo combinado a uma maior probabilidade de expropriação dos acionistas não controladores, pois os controladores teriam o poder de usufruir de benefícios privados da empresa enquanto os custos desses benefícios seriam compartilhados entre todos os demais acionistas. Na investigação empírica foram utilizados os métodos de Mínimos Quadrados Ordinários, Efeitos Aleatórios e Efeitos Fixos. Os resultados sugerem uma influência quadrática da concentração de votos no valor e uma influência negativa do excesso de votos no valor, mas positiva no desempenho. A concentração de capital não apresentou resultados significantes, e as evidências de endogeneidade da estrutura de propriedade se mostraram fracas e inconsistentes estatisticamente. / This study focuses on the relation between ownership structure, value and performance of non-financial Brazilian public companies listed in the São Paulo Stock Exchange during the period of 1998-2002. The aim of this research is to investigate the agency conflicts that arise from the separation of ownership from control in the meaning of corporate governance. The ownership structure variables used are the voting concentration, property concentration and excess-votes of controlling owners. The main hypothesis is that ownership variables are determinant of value and performance, testing for endogenous problems, concerning the Brazilian context where the separation of control rights from cash-flow rights are widely used by the issuing of non-voting shares. The costs and benefits of such concentration are a combined effect of improved monitoring and higher probability of non-controller owners’ wealth expropriation. The empirical evidence comes from Ordinary Least-Square, Random Effects and Fixed Effects models, suggesting a quadratic relation between voting concentration and value, a negative linear relation between excess-votes and value and a positive linear relation between excess-votes and performance. Property concentration has weak influence on value and performance variables and endogenous effects do not appear to be influential in the models.