Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [357]-377). Includes bibliographical references (p. ). / This study explains the construction and maintenance of a one-party dominant democratic political system in South Africa between 1994 and 1999. Against conventional explanations that rely on historical conditions and voting patterns driven by ascriptive identities, this study offers an explanation of events that focuses on the role of political institutions and social demographics in structuring the incentives that shape strategic choices made by political parties. The process by which the ruling African National Congress (ANC) entrenched its dominant position between 1994 and 1999 was attributable to a number of factors. The analysis found that the ANC actively manipulated political cleavages to perpetuate its hegemonic position in South African politics, rather than simply resting on its status as the liberation party or the ethnic loyalties of its supporters. The process of establishing and maintaining dominance, for the ANC, involved maintaining strategic alliances with labor and leftists, manipulating social and political discourse to reinforce the unity of the political community of non-Whites on whose electoral support the party relied; and finally, manipulating state institutions to help the party to reward supporters and maintain the focus of power on the national level. Through each of these strategies, the ANC worked to maintain a political black-White cleavage, perpetuating electoral patterns that promoted the continued dominance of the party. On the other hand, the major opposition parties in South Africa inadvertently contributed to the dominance of the ANC by failing to activate social divisions and potential political cleavages within the ANC's support base. / (cont.) In response to political institutions that focused political competition on the national sphere and the structure of social cleavages that worked against the cultivation of small ethnic support bases, most parties pursued mobilization strategies capable of providing easily mobilizable, large bases to deliver short-term electoral gains. In pursuing these strategies, the opposition rejected mobilizing smaller groups within the ANC's support base that had long-term potential to fracture the support base of the ANC. In developing these strategies, the each of the parties based their strategies on complex relationship between race, class and political affiliation. / by Jessica R. Piombo. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1989. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 369-381). / by AnnaLee Saxenian. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [405]-409). / Can pernicious views about history exacerbate conflict among states, and if so, how? How can we prevent such ideas from emerging, or dampen their more malevolent effects? Despite a long history of scholarly writing on nationalism that assumes that distorted, mythologized history can be dangerous, we still know little about how pernicious historical ideas lead to interstate conflict, if at all. This study clarifies that relationship by identifying a number of hypotheses on the malevolent effects of pernicious ideas that are empirically grounded in the recent experiences of post-Soviet Russia. It examines popular Russian historical ideas widely purveyed through mass public education, assesses their perniciousness, and details the mechanisms by which they have precipitated or exacerbated recent conflicts in Russian foreign policy. Pernicious historical ideas precipitate or exacerbate conflict in two general ways: First, through "emotional" mechanisms, whereby pernicious myths instill resentment and animosity, and manifest grievances over real or perceived injustices. These feelings then lead to violent retaliation or demands for apologies, restitution, reparations or other symbolic gestures that raise tensions, or lead to confrontational or antagonistic policy choices. Second, there are "cognitive" mechanisms. Pernicious myths foster ethnic and nationalist stereotypes and negative or false images about others, or create false assumptions and beliefs about the nature of international politics, the causes of war and peace, and one's own and other's national interests. These images and assumptions reflected in distorted and pernicious views of history-can cause significant national misperceptions that lead to conflictual policies. The study identifies popular views of history by systematically analyzing Soviet and all post-Soviet Russian history textbooks. It examines three cases of wars, conflicts and interventions that have been especially prone to Russian historical mythmaking: The Soviet-German War of 1939-45; Soviet western interventions in 1939-40; and the Russo-Turkish wars of the 19th century. Russia's portrayal of these wars and interventions is dominated by self glorifying, self-exculpating, other-denigrating and victimization myths. An examination of recent Russian foreign policy conflicts in two regions-the Baltic and the Balkans-illustrates how these historical ideas have shaped Russian images and assumptions, and fostered emotional antagonisms and misperceptions that have precipitated or exacerbated conflict.in those regions. / by David A. Mendeloff. / Ph.D.

Thesis: S.M., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, 2016. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (pages 35-39). / How does the expansion of social protection programs to the poor in developing democracies affect social cohesion? I address this question by examining Bolivia's central government run, non-contributory pension program, Renta Dignidad. Using a regression discontinuity design as well as a novel difference-in-discontinuities design, I find that recipients of pension benefits are overall more likely to display increased support for the central government and that in provinces where both territorial tensions and class tensions are most acute, support for the central government is significantly greater. This is consistent with a theoretical argument that expansion of social protection to the poor can mitigate opposition on active dimensions of social conflict that intersect the socio-economic dimension. / by Cristina Gabriela Andronescu. / S.M.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references. / by Antonio José J. Botelho. / Ph.D.

Thesis (S.M. and S.B.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 151-156). / As non-traditional security threats such as terrorism and organized transnational crime gain greater prominence around the globe, the need for international cooperation against these non-state actors has consequently acquired greater urgency. Due to the cross-boundary nature of these activities, international cooperation is particularly critical for eradicating these threats. This thesis analyzes a particular instance of a non-state threat, maritime piracy, and uses it as a probe for understanding the nature of international cooperation vis-a-vis non-state actors. I observe a somewhat surprising trend while collating a database of all instances of international cooperation against maritime piracy throughout the world - Asia, and in particular Southeast Asia, has been the source of a disproportionately high level of international cooperation that is focused on eradicating the piracy problem. Furthermore, this trend has occurred even though Asia is often regarded as lacking the conditions necessary for international cooperation in the traditional security domain - binding multilateral institutions that can facilitate the institutionalization of cooperation agreements, as well as a hegemonic power with the ability to enforce cooperation. What has enabled international cooperation against maritime piracy to flourish in Asia, and what does this imply about non-traditional forms of security cooperation? I propose that non-traditional security cooperation has thrived in Asia for at least two unconventional reasons - the ability of non-binding institutions such as ASEAN to facilitate and promote non-traditional security cooperation, as well as the effective use of national coast guard agencies to avoid the political sensitivities that often result from security cooperation in the traditional domain. / (cont.) I make these arguments by relying on evidence post-processed from two international datasets that I have collated - one on the instances of international cooperation against maritime piracy, and another on the geographical distribution of piracy attacks over time. It is hoped that these datasets, made publicly available for the first time, will be expanded upon for further research by the academic community. Finally, non-traditional forms of security threats appear to greater enable national governments to leverage off their commonality of interests to promote cooperation, and may even be an important confidence building measure for generating greater cooperation in the traditional security domain in future. / by Ruijie He. / S.M.and S.B.

Thesis (M.S.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1992. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 270-287). / by Takemi Chiku. / M.S.

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 97-102). / I examine America's reputation for sustaining casualties (i.e., foreign perceptions of American casualty sensitivity) in order to test and shed light on the larger "reputation" hypothesis. For the purposes of this paper, the reputation hypothesis posits that foreign perceptions of American casualty tolerance are based on past American actions. The central question of this paper asks how countries come to hold their perceptions of American casualty sensitivity. I conduct six case studies to test four (not mutually exclusive) hypotheses - reputation, interests, democracy, and culture - concerning foreign perceptions of American casualty sensitivity. The case studies document foreign leaders - including adversaries, allies, and neutrals - giving the United States reputations for lacking resolve and being unable to sustain casualties based upon America's previous retreats and defeats. I conclude that, in disagreement with the central conclusions of the reputation literature to date, it is indeed right for a state to fight for its reputation. In addition, the evidence suggests that the reputation hypothesis, democracy hypothesis, and culture hypothesis explain different aspects of the phenomenon. However, when viewed in combination, these three hypotheses provide a nearly complete explanation of how countries come to hold their perceptions of American casualty sensitivity. Surprisingly, the historical record provides the least amount of support for the interests hypothesis. / (cont.) These foreign perceptions of American casualty sensitivity hurt the ability of the United States to deter adversaries from making challenges against U.S. interests and to compel adversaries to back down once conflicts have broken out. Therefore, American leaders should understand that there are reputational costs and/or benefits associated with their foreign policy statements and actions. / by Adam Marshall Horst. / S.M.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1981. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND DEWEY. / Bibliography: leaves 361-372. / by Akihiko Tanaka. / Ph.D.

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2009. / "February 2009." Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 32-36). / Why do individuals participate in weak-against-strong resistance, terror or insurgency? Drawing on rational choice theory, many claim that individuals join insurgent organizations for self-interested reasons, seeking status, money, protection, or rewards in the afterlife. Another line of research, largely ethnographic and social network based, suggests that prospective fighters are driven by social identity-they join out of an allegiance to communal values, norms of reciprocity, and an orientation towards process rather than outcome. This project tested these two lines of argument against each other by directly linking values orientations in a refugee camp to professed willingness to participate in resistance or rebellion in two different contexts. Professed willingness to participate in resistance, and especially in violent rebellion, is positively correlated with communal orientation and negatively correlated with self-enhancement values. The strength of correlation grows-negatively for self-enhancement and positively for communal orientations-as anticipated sacrifice increases. Results are discussed. / by T. Nichole Argo. / S.M.