This dissertation identifies and discusses a new form of political theology. The starting observation is that over the past few decades, the position of organized Christianity with respect to democracy has changed. Traditionally, the notion of political theology referred to a doctrine of sovereignty which opposed the 'People' to 'God' as the ultimate sources of political legitimacy. Now, most Christian organizations have come to accept the democratic principle of popular sovereignty, attempting to define a new role for themselves within this framework as guardians of the moral principles democratic societies supposedly need in order to survive. This is reflected by a discursive shift in the rhetoric employed by such organizations: over the past few decades we have witnessed the rise of a new religious discourse primarily focused on 'moral relativism' as the principal 'threat' confronting contemporary democratic societies. In the first homily he gave as Pope, for example, Benedict XVI famously denounced a 'dictatorship of relativism' as the most urgent social and political problem of our age. A similar discourse of 'anti-relativism' has also been increasingly adopted by numerous Protestant and Evangelical preachers across the world, particularly in the United States. The argument I want to advance is that there are two ways democratic theory can respond to this new form of anti-relativist political theology. The dominant one, pursued for example by Jurgen Habermas and many of the contemporary theorists writing in the lineage of John Rawls, agrees that 'moral relativism' would indeed constitute a problem for democratic societies. However, it suggests that these societies do not necessarily need to draw their substantive moral commitments from 'religion', because they can succeed in establishing them autonomously, on the basis of the necessary presuppositions of 'reason' itself. My contention is that this 'rationalist' response to the contemporary form of political theology ultimately fails for the same reason Hegel already criticized Kant's practical philosophy: that 'reason' only stipulates a purely formal set of criteria, and it is impossible to deduce anything substantive from something merely formal. 'Rationalists' are therefore ultimately forced to re-import their substantive moral commitments from 'outside'; and, in particular, the source from which these commitments are drawn always prove to be the religious traditions within which these conceptions of rationality are embedded. Thus, the opposition between 'reason' and 'religion' proves to be more problematic than the rationalists suppose. For this reason, I attempt to recover an alternative response to the contemporary form of political theology, which questions the assumption that 'moral relativism' does indeed represent such a serious 'threat' for democratic societies. Indeed, what the work of authors such as Hans Kelsen and Claude Lefort seems to suggest, is that some form of 'moral relativism' may actually be the only sound philosophical foundation for an allegiance to democracy in the first place. Focusing on this work therefore provides the occasion for the recovery of a resolutely 'relativist' conception of democracy, as a more adequate response to the contemporary form of 'anti-relativist' political theology.

This study joins the growing research in social science centered on exploring the political implications of individual-targeted development programs by empirically examining the political behavior and attitudes of program participants. It also joins the established literatures in political theory and political science on what motivates individuals to become politically active, and the effect of economic inputs on an individual's propensity to engage in political activities. Using an original survey of more than 700 Senegalese citizens in the administrative department of Guediawaye, Senegal, the study finds that microfinance in Senegal is vastly different from more popular notions of microfinance. The overwhelming majority of microfinance clients in Senegal borrow as individuals, and not as members of groups. Both men and women are active in the micro-credit industry and more than 18% of adults in Senegal have experience with micro-credit loans. By using econometric analysis to compare the political activities of microfinance borrowers and non-microfinance borrowers, group and individual microfinance borrowers, and pre-microfinance borrowing political participation to post-microfinance political participation, this study offers a more nuanced and accurate understanding of the relationship of microfinance to political participation. It explores how ideas of political and economic empowerment and what motivates people to become politically active translates across different contexts. The study concludes that microfinance is positively and significantly associated with political participation, and social capital, that microfinance and the various forms of social capital matter more for some forms of participation than for others, and that microfinance experience does not systematically cause an increase in political participation, through social capital or any other mechanism.

This study joins the growing research in social science centered on exploring the political implications of individual-targeted development programs by empirically examining the political behavior and attitudes of program participants. It also joins the established literatures in political theory and political science on what motivates individuals to become politically active, and the effect of economic inputs on an individual's propensity to engage in political activities. Using an original survey of more than 700 Senegalese citizens in the administrative department of Guediawaye, Senegal, the study finds that microfinance in Senegal is vastly different from more popular notions of microfinance. The overwhelming majority of microfinance clients in Senegal borrow as individuals, and not as members of groups. Both men and women are active in the micro-credit industry and more than 18% of adults in Senegal have experience with micro-credit loans. By using econometric analysis to compare the political activities of microfinance borrowers and non-microfinance borrowers, group and individual microfinance borrowers, and pre-microfinance borrowing political participation to post-microfinance political participation, this study offers a more nuanced and accurate understanding of the relationship of microfinance to political participation. It explores how ideas of political and economic empowerment and what motivates people to become politically active translates across different contexts. The study concludes that microfinance is positively and significantly associated with political participation, and social capital, that microfinance and the various forms of social capital matter more for some forms of participation than for others, and that microfinance experience does not systematically cause an increase in political participation, through social capital or any other mechanism.

The contemporary "Red-Blue" political alignment is characterized by a national divide between cities and rural areas. This urbanicity divide is stronger than it has ever been in our modern history, but it began with the development of an urban political order that changed the Democratic Party during the New Deal era. These cities, despite being the site of serious, multidimensional conflicts at home, have been remarkably cohesive in the way they represent themselves in national politics, forming "city delegations" whose members attend to more than their own district's concerns. These city delegations tend to cohesively represent a "city" interest that often coincides with what we think of as liberalism. Using evidence from Congress, where cities represented themselves within the nation, and a unique dataset measuring the urbanicity of House districts over time, this dissertation evaluates the strength of this urban political order and argues that city delegation cohesion, which is a basic strategic tool if cities are to address their urgent governance needs through action at higher levels of government, is fostered by local institutions developed to provide local political order. Importantly, these integrative institutions also helped foster the development of civil rights liberalism by linking constituencies composed largely of groups that were not natural allies on such issues. This development in turn contributed to the departure of the Southern Democratic bloc, and to our contemporary political environment. This combination--of diversity and liberalism, supported by institutions that make allies of constituencies that might easily be rivals--has significant implications for an America characterized by deep social difference and political fragmentation.

For at least the past two hundred years, ethnoconfessional nationalism has been the most powerful ideology and force shaping political and social developments in southeastern Europe. This dissertation argues that Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism is such an important element in southeastern Europe because it is a collective, chronic and non-economic phenomenon which transcends other political ideologies, generations, or socio-economic classes. As such, conventional Marxist-based approaches to understanding the phenomenon of nationalism, and their intellectual descendants such as the more materially-based forms of social constructivism and instrumentalism, consistently fail to both understand and predict its appeal and success in southeastern Europe. The dissertation concludes by arguing that there are severe limitations to the extent to which outsiders can manage the outcome of ethnoconfessional conflicts; hence, in terms of policy prescriptions, the analysis provided in this dissertation argues for a cautious and modest understanding of the extent to which intervention by the international community can transform Balkans states and societies.

Why does the control of patronage significantly increase a party's chances of staying in power? What do public employees do that affect electoral competition? What motivates public employees to do it? In this dissertation, I seek to describe what it is that public employees do that affects electoral competition and to establish why they do it. I argue that patronage jobs are distributed to supporters in exchange for a wide range of political services. Since government jobs are expensive, the type of political support that is expected in exchange for public sector employment goes far beyond the simple act of voting. Patronage employees perform a number of different political activities that are essential for attracting and maintaining electoral support. However, a citizen who receives a public sector job with the understanding that she will provide political services in return can easily renege on her side of the contract after getting the job. Why would public sector employees comply with their side of the patronage contract after receiving the job? Existing explanations are based either on fear of punishment (clients comply with their side of the agreement because they are afraid the patron will cut off the benefit if they fail to do so) or feelings of reciprocity (clients comply with the agreement because they want to help the person that have helped them). Departing from these explanations, I argue that patronage employees engage in political activities that support politicians (patrons) because their fates are tied to the political fate of their patrons. Put simply, their incentives are aligned. What makes patronage contracts self-sustaining without punishment or reciprocity is the fact that patronage jobs are distributed to supporters (because only supporters can credibly commit to provide political support), whose fates are tied to the political fate of the politician who has hired them. Patronage jobs (and working conditions) held by supporters will be maintained by the incumbent politician (the patron) but not by a competing politician, because supporters of the incumbent cannot credibly commit to provide political services for the opposition. Supporters, then, have large incentives to provide political services to help the incumbent stay in power, which makes their original commitment to provide political services a credible one. This alignment of interests between patrons and clients (or politicians and patronage employees) makes patronage contracts incentive-compatible and therefore self-sustaining. I test the empirical implications of my theory using an original face-to-face survey of 1200 local public sector employees that I fielded in three Argentine municipalities (Salta, Santa Fe, and Tigre). Using list experiments--a technique that provides respondents with the anonymity needed to obtain accurate information about sensitive topics-- I show that a considerable proportion of public sector employees are involved in political activities. To establish why public sector employees provide these political services I use two survey experiments that allow me to identify employees' comprehension of the likely effect of a change in municipal government. The results strongly support the empirical predictions--public employees believe that their jobs are tied to the political success of the incumbent politician. Finally, I complement the analysis of the survey results with a series of in-depth interviews of public sector employees, brokers, and politicians. I conclude by providing additional evidence from other Latin American countries as an out of sample test of the theory and to provide more confidence about the external validity of the argument.

Using the data collected from various national poll surveys conducted after the transition to democracy in the late 1980's, this study analyzes the trend of national identity change among the general populace in Taiwan. Counter to the popular view that the nascent Taiwanese national identity rose at the cost of the orthodox Chinese national identity, this study argues that most people in fact upheld dual identity in the first two decades following the democratic transition. They acquired a new Taiwanese national identity without forsaking the old Chinese identity. In analyzing the phenomenon of dual identity, this dissertation challenges the conventional view that national identities are mutually exclusive. It also shows that the trajectories of the two national identities are different processes, having occurred during different historical stages and in different international environments. They were also the results of different political forces. In explaining the rise of Taiwanese national identity, this study focuses on the factors of state and politics, rather than history and ethnicity. It is contended that the new national identity is largely engendered by democratic institutions and political participation. It thus was able to co-exist with existing Chinese national identity. This dissertation then explains the decline of Chinese national identity not with the rise of Taiwanese identity, but with the rise of China. The dominance of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the international community along with its staunch One China Principle has removed the important component of the Republic of China (ROC) from the Chinese national identity in Taiwan. Chinese unification no longer means the fulfillment of self-rule but to be ruled by another state (the PRC). People who have identified with the ROC no longer opt for a unified great China and hence forgo their Chinese national identity.

This dissertation examines the relationship between leadership selection and public goods provision in self-help organizations. Leadership selection is defined as the rules for selecting leaders, as well as the factors that determine the quality of the leadership class. Self-help organizations are defined as relatively small-size voluntary groups that are created to provide goods and services to members and that select their leader via democratic procedures. Examples include micro-lending and micro-insurance groups, common-pool resource groups, women and artisan cooperatives and farmer associations. The dissertation focuses on Uganda's recent largest development project: the Agriculture Productivity Enhancement Project (APEP). USAID funded, APEP's stated goal is to expand rural economic opportunities by supporting the transition of smallholder producers into commercial farming. During the project's lifespan (2005-2009), APEP helped about 60,000 small-scale producers to organize into over 200 farmer associations (i.e. cooperatives). Importantly, the success of these farmer associations in overcoming social dilemmas and in providing goods and services to their members, varied tremendously. Why are some groups more successful than others in overcoming the social dilemmas inherent in public goods production? To explain this variation, the dissertation uses a range of disciplinary perspectives --- drawn mainly from political science, economics, social psychology and sociology --- as well as a diverse set of methodological tools.

Many developing countries exhibit deficits in governance, including corruption, rent-seeking, the suboptimal provision of public goods, and weak accountability. This dissertation uncovers the micro-foundations of political failure by evaluating how government revenue windfalls and information asymmetries affect the will or ability of citizens to curb rent-seeking and hold politicians accountable. The first chapter provides one of the first causal, micro-level tests of the prominent claim that windfalls lower demand for good governance in comparison to taxation. It also sheds light on the relationship between revenue and information by examining whether windfalls and taxes produce differences in how citizens become politically informed. The second chapter turns attention to the role of information and examines how new information on government spending affects citizen political participation and incumbent support. The final chapter analyzes whether windfalls induce citizen groups to engage in rent-seeking behavior to appropriate wealth in more divided societies. To identify causal effects at the individual level, I employ experimental and quasi-experimental research designs and original survey and behavioral data from two separate, large-scale field projects conducted in Indonesia. Overall, the dissertation deepens understanding of the causes of political failure by examining not only whether windfalls and information asymmetries have adverse effects on citizen political behavior but also when and why.

How do countries, through their political institutions, adapt fiscal policy to economic and political shocks? The goal of this dissertation is to explain variation in the response of public spending and the fiscal balance to the business and electoral cycle across a large sample of countries. I develop a theory that builds on the political agency problem to argue that a government's ability to run prudent spending decisions over the business and electoral cycle is conditional on the structure of public finance (e.g. where does revenue come from?). Government revenue stems from two main sources: general taxation, and fiscal windfalls derived from natural resource wealth such as oil royalties, or grants from foreign aid. The key assumption of the theory is that each of these two revenue sources affects the amount of information that voters have about the true state of public finance, and thus the degree of uncertainty about the extent of rent extraction by incumbents. When governments rely on fiscal windfalls to finance most of their expenditures, voters have incentives to behave as fiscal liberals and demand higher public spending in the face of a positive economic shock. The reason is that while taxes are perfectly observed by voters, windfalls that accrue directly to government coffers are not, limiting voter ability to keep rent seeking politicians under control. Thus, fiscal policy is driven by voter's demands. I offer cross-national and subnational empirical evidence that is consistent with this theory: fiscal policy is more procyclical, political budget cycles prevalent, and levels of fiscal transparency lower in places with greater dependence of windfall revenue.