No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

In the British colonial system, the governor of a colony is often believed to be “the man on the spot with last word”，enjoying tremendous autonomy and discretion from the metropole (London) in managing colonial affairs. Nevertheless, while there is little doubt that the social and public policies, or so-called “domestic policies and affairs”, were generally part of the Colonial Governor domain to manage, the level of autonomy that he was able to exert on those policies, other than the conventional concept of “domestic policies and affairs”，remains a debatable topic. This thesis, therefore, attempts to shed new light on how much autonomy colonial governors in fact enjoyed in the colonial system, using Sir Edward Youde, Governor of Hong Kong (1982-1986), as a case study. By reviewing the three major selected policies concerning the British government and the Hong Kong government during the Sino- British negotiation in the early 1980s, namely, the British negotiation policy from 1982 to 1984 , the introduction of Hong Kong’s further representative government reform in 1984, and the introduction of the “new style” Legislative Council in 1985, this thesis re-examines how much actual “autonomy” the Governor of Hong Kong could enjoy from London, the metropole of Hong Kong, on those policies that were sensitive and could potentially lead to London5s enormous reaction in the 1980s. Through dividing the policy process into different policy tasks, findings suggest that, the degree of autonomy that the Governor was able to enjoy was considerably constrained and diminished by London in several aspects. Based on the assessment scheme developed by the author, the Governor’s autonomy had been generally limited to the task of formulating the policy agenda, policy, and implementation over the three selected policy cases. Occasionally, he was given the autonomy to act independently and to decide whether a policy should be adopted. His level of autonomy and the policy-making competence were in essence characterized by the principal-agent framework, and highly dependent on the principal’s willingness to delegate. The three selected case studies show that political salience of each of the policy might be one of the important boundaries limiting the Governor’s autonomy. Policy of higher salience to London might lead to less room for Governor to maneuver, and vice versa.

The East Asian modernization divergence in the late nineteenth century has long puzzled historians and social scientists. As Qing China, given its vast territory, large population and dominating influence spreading to neighboring countries, failed to modernize herself as its small island neighbor Japan did after the forced opening up by the West. One important divergence is their military capability, especially that of navy. The relatively higher capacity of the Imperial Japanese Navy has played a decisive role in its victory over the Beiyang Fleet in the 1894/95 First Sino-Japanese War. Following the defeat, Qing China was burdened with huge indemnity, eventually collapsed and entered long decades of chaos, whereas Meiji Japan continued rapid modernization, further demonstrated its military power in war with Russia, and became the only recognized power in Asia. Explaining the Sino-Japanese divergence in naval buildup is the first step to tackle the entire modernization puzzle. Having challenged two conventional explanations of national security decision-making and economic modernization, this thesis offers a new perspective by arguing that the root of divergence lies in their different resource mobilization capacity. Specifically, I demonstrate that the elastic tax revenue, fiscal centralization and enormous borrowing capacity equipped Meiji Japan as a strong state able to quickly mobilize a vast sum of resource for expensive naval buildup and war. In contrast, in Qing China, the growingly decentralized fiscal system, together with the stagnated tax revenue and limited borrowing capacity, made resource mobilization a prolonged struggle for the central government. Consequently, despite the statesmen’s repetitive emphasis of naval security and buildup, the Chinese state’s weak resource mobilization capacity has significantly hindered its pursuit of naval power and gradually widened the gap with the stronger Japanese state.

This study examines Chinese citizens’ awareness, perceptions of economic inequality, preferences for redistribution, as well as how the Chinese government portrays inequality and how citizens respond to propaganda. I theorize that the low-, middle- and high-income classes will observe different realities of inequality, have different opinions of inequality, and that lead to different reactions to propaganda. The low-income class is expected to be unaware of inequality and their attitudes toward inequality should be affected by the government rhetoric because of their low levels of education and exposure to inequality. The educated and informed middle class should observe the reality and criticize inequality. The high-income class should understand the reality of inequality but will not criticize inequality as they enjoy their wealth and success. Government propaganda will persuade the disadvantaged but not the middle class, and will elicit support for redistribution from the wealthy at least on the surface. I test my theory by examining two national public opinion surveys on inequality and distributive justice, also by collecting original data through a survey experiment in China. Analyses of the national surveys and the experimental data show that the low-income Chinese are not well-aware of inequality and believe government rhetoric. The middle class is critical of inequality and resistant to propaganda. The rich are ambiguous toward inequality: they do not perceive inequality negatively, but are willing to show compliance with the government’s populist pledges of fighting against inequality. This study concludes that the middle class is the critical group in China. Propaganda persuades the low-income class but backfires among the middle class.

How do government bond markets expect and affect states’ conflictual behaviors? Many assume that interstate disputes harm states’ credit; however, existing research on finance have sparingly investigated specifically through what channel international disputes disturb government bondholders and the extent of the effect. On the contrary, although government bonds have been used as primary means for states to finance disputes, most empirical studies on conflicts have not factored in the financial costs of disputes. My study delves into the questions of what role government bondholders play in international disputes, and how they constrain or give leeway to states’ conflictual behaviors. My study seeks to propose detailed criteria that rational bondholders use when they evaluate states’ credit risks when facing interstate disputes and to provide an overview of how government bonds could be an instrument of market power for the purpose of state security. I analyze my theory of how government bondholders react to international disputes, by using a dataset of Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) incidents and government bond yields of 25 countries, including 18 developed and 7 developing countries, for 1971—2010. My results of panel regressions show that investors do not always react negatively when they observe their bond issuer engaged in an international dispute. Instead, they evaluate the actual risk that the interstate dispute would impose on their bond investments, conditional on how likely a dispute is to escalate to war and the predicted outcome of potential war in case the parties in dispute go into war. Investors are prudent enough to show more sensitive reactions to major clashes than minor quibbles among states. Further, bondholders withdraw their investments only when they expect their bond issuer’s defeat in potential war or when they have difficulties predicting the outcomes of disputes. Moreover, states’ economic development status conditions bondholders’ risk assessments in the sense that investors have biased perceptions of the (in)capabilities of developing countries’ governments to deal with potential credit risks associated with international disputes. Bondholders respond more negatively to the interstate disputes in which developing countries are the parties than developed countries are, even though the disputes themselves have objectively similar prospects of escalation to war. Next, I investigate how states’ borrowing as well as their interest rates lead to different outcomes of disputes in two ways: whether a dispute is likely to escalate into war and if not who will be winner of the dispute. While the amount of debt has contradictory effects on a state’s waging conflict, augmenting its win probability on the one hand, but increasing the burden of debt service, on the other hand, the level of borrowing costs contributes only to financial pressure on a state’s economy. My results of binomial and multinomial logistic regressions on MIDs and interest rates of 56 countries for 1816–2007 show that high interest rates suppress the likelihood of escalation to war as well as a state’s win probability in a dispute. On the contrary, states try to avoid developing into war as far as the amount of debt is bearable, but once it exceeds a certain level, states turn more aggressive and prefer escalating to war over staying in the bargaining process.

Given the appalling consequences of civil wars, why are the competing actors within a state unable to come to a settlement to avoid the costs of conflict? How might external parties affect the likelihood that a civil war begins? How do their actions affect the duration and outcome of civil conflicts that are already underway? This project draws on three main approaches--bargaining theory, signaling theory, and rational expectations--to examine how external actors might affect the onset, duration and outcome of civil wars. Signals from external actors are important because they represent a potential increase (or decrease) in fighting capabilities for the government or the opposition if a war were to begin. Costly signals should not affect the probability of civil war onset because they are readily observable ex ante, which allows the government and opposition to peacefully adjust their bargaining positions based on changes in relative capabilities. In contrast, cheap hostile signals make civil war more likely by increasing the risk that an opposition group overestimates its ability to stage a successful rebellion with external support. Cheap supportive signals work in the opposite manner because they represent increased fighting capabilities for the government. Furthermore, signals sent in the pre-war period have important implications for the duration and outcome of civil conflicts because competing intrastate actors develop expectations for future interventions prior to deciding to fight. Expected interventions should have little consequence for the duration and outcome of the conflict because they are endogenous to the pre-war bargaining positions. In contrast, unexpected interventions should drastically reduce the fighting time as one side finds itself far weaker than expected when the war began. This theory is tested by examining the likelihood of civil war onset, the duration and the outcome of all civil wars since 1945. Empirical tests provide strong support for each component of this theory. I conclude by offering specific advice to US policy-makers to prevent the outbreak of civil conflict in states most at-risk for civil war, and to help end those that are currently underway.

This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections. / Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, 2018 / Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (pages 545-562). / Since 1990, China has used coercion for territorial disputes, foreign arms sales to Taiwan, and foreign leaders' meetings with the Dalai Lama, despite adverse implications for its international image. China is also curiously selective in the timing, target, and tools of coercion: most cases of Chinese coercion are not military coercion, nor does China use coercion against all states that pose the same threats to its national security. The question regarding China's coercion patterns -- crucial for the prospect of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and critical for understanding states' use of coercion -- has not been systematically answered. My dissertation therefore examines when, why and how China attempts to coerce states over perceived threats to its national security. This question entails two parts: 1) when and why does China choose coercion, and 2) if coercion is chosen, what tools does China utilize? I explain Chinese coercion with the cost balancing theory -- / and test it against China's diplomacy. I employ qualitative methods such as process tracing and congruence testing, leveraging on primary Chinese documents and interviews with officials, government policy analysts, and scholars. My dissertation project conducts congruence tests of the macro trends of Chinese coercion while employing process tracing on specific cases of Chinese coercion. For temporal variation, I examine cases in which for the same country that is a potential target for coercion, when China coerces that country and when it refrains from coercion. For cross-national variation, I analyze cases in which for the same period and among comparable countries, China coerces some but not others. Contrary to conventional wisdom and in contrast with historical rising powers, China is a cautious bully, does not coerce frequently, and uses military coercion less when it becomes stronger, resorting mostly to non-militarized tools. / In short, states' decision to coerce and choices over coercive tools cannot be simply explained by the power variable. I identify the centrality of the reputation for resolve and economic vulnerability in states' calculation of coercion. States coerce one target to deter others -- "killing the chicken to scare the monkey." / by Ketian Zhang. / Ph. D. / Ph.D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science