This study is situated within two streams of research that examine how foreign aid and ethnic diversity impact development. Institutions and governance, specifically market-protecting institutions (MPIs), have increasingly become the focus of foreign aid donors as the key to development success. At the same time, however, ethnic diversity thwarts institutional development. Does foreign aid in diverse states present a cross-cutting relationship or can aid help diverse states out of the development-trap? I explore whether or not targeted foreign aid can help states break out of the diversity-development trap. To begin, I look at the necessity of sound formal MPIs to spur economic growth. Ethnic diversity, however, is associated with weak and fragmented MPIs. I then put forth a theory that foreign aid can have a positive influence on development in diverse states. I argue that foreign aid helps to overcome incentive deficiencies created by diversity and provides an opening for externally induced change. Foreign aid, thereby, mitigates the negative effect of ethnic diversity on the development of MPIs. To test the theory, I employ a time-series cross-sectional design for all developing countries during the years of 1995-2005. The results of various tests show support for the argument that aid for institutional reform has a differential impact on MPIs in ethnically diverse states. Specifically, I find that 1) aid mitigates the negative effects of ethnic diversity on the development of MPIs, 2) that aid is better able to mitigate the negative effects of diversity in democracies than in autocracies, 3) that aid has a greater positive effect on MPIs as the level of ethnic diversity increases, and lastly 4) that aid is more effective in ethnically diverse democracies than ethnically diverse autocracies. The results have profound implications for the 5 billion people who currently live in underdeveloped and ethnically diverse states. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Degree Awarded: Summer Semester, 2010. / Date of Defense: April 29, 2010. / Foreign Aid, Institutions, Market Institutions, Ethnic Diversity / Includes bibliographical references. / Dale L. Smith, Professor Directing Dissertation; James H. Cobbe, University Representative; Mark Souva, Committee Member; Sean Ehrlich, Committee Member; Ozge Kemahlioglu, Committee Member.

In the 20th century, nearly 66% of governments killed around 262,000,000 civilians. Existing research tends to explain the government's decision to kill by focusing on the conditions and incentives that surround murderous campaigns. Yet even when conditions and incentives to kill are similar, civilian body counts vary widely. I leverage the puzzle of variance in civilian death tolls by shifting the focus away from the decision to kill. Instead, I conceptualize killing as the outcome of a process of strategic interaction between the government that sends the killing order and the perpetrators who implement that order. A game-theoretic model reveals that under changing conditions, perpetrators may kill as many civilians as they are asked to kill, or they may kill any other number, including zero. Empirical tests support implications from the formal model, suggesting in part that international actors are well-equipped to protect civilian life. The solution to the puzzle is this: civilian death tolls may vary even when conditions and incentives to kill are similar, because the actors care not only about the killing that results from their interaction but also about the consequences of that killing for their own lives and liberties. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Degree Awarded: Spring Semester, 2009. / Date of Defense: April 6, 2009. / Government Killing, Human Rights Violence, Against Civilians Repression, Quantitative Methods, Formal Theory / Includes bibliographical references. / Will H. Moore, Professor Directing Dissertation; Tim Salmon, Outside Committee Member; William D. Berry, Committee Member; Sona N. Golder, Committee Member; Mark Souva, Committee Member; Jeffrey K. Staton, Committee Member.

The purpose of this project is to gain a broader understanding of how the multiple contexts in which individuals interact influence political behavior and attitudes. By drawing upon and adapting work from community psychology the research questions in this project ask 1) to what extent does sense of community vary within contexts—if at all? and 2) if variance does exist, does it matter for political behavior and attitudes? For example, people might have a sense of community from their neighborhoods or their workplaces but they may also have a sense of community from belonging to an organization or a church. Attention to how sense of community develops and how much variation exists within each context are critical to broadening our understanding of how to model the process of how, why, and when social forces influence individuals' attitudes and behaviors. Does sense of community enhance participation, lead to increased trust, and produce more interest in local governance? Original data from a random group of citizens in Tallahassee, Florida are used to address these questions. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Degree Awarded: Summer Semester, 2005. / Date of Defense: May 9, 2005. / Community Action, Sense of Community, Political Participation, Local Political Action / Includes bibliographical references. / Jeffery J. Mondak, Professor Directing Dissertation; John J. Reynolds, Outside Committee Member; Charles Barrilleaux, Committee Member; Thomas M. Carsey, Committee Member; Carol S. Weissert, Committee Member.

In the Aftermath of the September 11th attacks, the fear of apocalyptic terrorism has caused many Americans and academics worldwide to reexamine previously held beliefs on the morality and suitability of torture as a means of ensuring public safety. While much of the ensuing debate has focused on deontological versus teleological ethics (Kant vs. Bentham), torture can only properly be understood as an empirical system - a means of gathering information. By applying an analytical narrative framework to comparative case studies, I argue that torture must depend on certain conditions that are inherently difficult to satisfy - and that the attempts by various authorities to make use of torture have instead led them inexorably towards a deceptive cycle where bad information corrupts the system. The implication is that torture can paradoxically do more harm to the torturing state even than to the enemy it hopes to combat. The cases under examination include the Salem witch trials in 17th Century New England, the Algerian Revolution both from the standpoint of the French counterinsurgency and the FLN, and the United States during the War on Terror. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.. / Degree Awarded: Spring Semester, 2011. / Date of Defense: March 25, 2011. / Algeria, Human Rights, Torture, War on Terror / Includes bibliographical references. / William H. Moore, Professor Directing Dissertation; Michael Creswell, University Representative; Charles Barrilleaux, Committee Member; Jens Grosser, Committee Member; Mark Souva, Committee Member.

Rational deterrence theory understates the importance of declaratory policy by dismissing such as rhetoric. The theory presented here asserts that declaratory policy can provide significant information to a challenger regarding a defender's resolve. In keeping with the traditional deterrence literature, the success of deterrence is described as a function of the credibility of the deterrent threat; however, a somewhat different formulation of credibility is proposed. Credibility is explained as a combination of the balance of capabilities and the balance of interests between the challenger and defender, conditioned by the contextual risk propensity of each. Risk propensity is most important when information on the balance of capabilities and interests is either unavailable or reveals relative equality between challenger and defender. By looking to the declaratory policy of a defender, this uncertainty can be reduced. Including rather than ignoring the impact of declaratory policy provides a more accurate understanding of deterrence with important prescriptive implications for policy-makers. To assess risk propensity, a psychologically based approach is used rather than the expected utility approach more common to political science models. Based on a framework of psychological biases offered by Jervis (1976) and prospect theory as developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979; 1982; 1984; 1992), a contextual, individually based determination of risk propensity is created. The theory is tested using a series of nine crises in the Asian Pacific from 1950 through 1970 in which the United States attempted to deter behavior by different autocratic states. Each crisis is discussed in depth with assessments provided of the significant factors suggested by the theory. The final chapter analyzes these assessments to determine whether there is empirical support for the theory. By moving away from assumptions endemic to rational choice and toward a conscious inclusion of psychological factors, a more accurate descriptive theory of practical deterrence is provided. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Degree Awarded: Fall Semester, 2003. / Date of Defense: October 22, 2003. / Declaratory policy, contextual deterrence / Includes bibliographical references. / Dale L. Smith, Professor Directing Dissertation; James P. Jones, Outside Committee Member; William R. Van Cleave, Committee Member; Thomas M. Carsey, Committee Member; Paul R. Hensel, Committee Member.

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