721 |
ON DATA UTILITY IN PRIVATE DATA PUBLISHINGZhang, Yihua 04 May 2010 (has links)
No description available.
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722 |
Releasing Recommendation Datasets while Preserving PrivacySomasundaram, Jyothilakshmi 26 May 2011 (has links)
No description available.
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723 |
Social Networking Dilemmas for Psychologists: Privacy, Professionalism, Boundary Issues, and PoliciesAfsahi, Afshan January 2015 (has links)
No description available.
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724 |
Mitigating Uncertainty Through Government Intervention-exploring the Impact of Public Policy on Internet Privacy ConcernsJones, Melanie Anne 21 May 2002 (has links)
No description available.
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725 |
PRIVACY: ARCHITECTURE IN SUPPORT OF PRIVACY REGULATIONWITTE, NATHAN ALLAN 07 July 2003 (has links)
No description available.
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726 |
PRIVACY PRESERVING INDUCTION OF DECISION TREES FROM GEOGRAPHICALLY DISTRIBUTED DATABASESKINSEY, MICHAEL LOY 27 September 2005 (has links)
No description available.
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727 |
Trust via Common LanguagesYoussef, Ingy January 2016 (has links)
No description available.
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728 |
De-Anonymization Attack Anatomy and Analysis of Ohio Nursing Workforce Data AnonymizationMiracle, Jacob M. January 2016 (has links)
No description available.
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729 |
Unexpected Reflection CollectionWalker, Jessica E. 15 December 2009 (has links)
No description available.
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730 |
REALIZING INFORMATION ESCROWS AND EFFICIENT KEY-MANAGEMENT USING THRESHOLD CRYPTOGRAPHYEaswar V Mangipudi (13169733) 29 July 2022 (has links)
<p>In this thesis, we address two applications of threshold cryptography — designing information escrows and key-distribution in cryptocurrency systems. We design escrow mechanisms in two-party and multi-party scenarios such that any unauthorized revelation of<br>
data results in the loss of cryptocurrency by the dishonest party. Later, we discuss user mental models in adopting cryptocurrency wallets and propose a protocol to efficiently provide cryptographic keys to the users in large-user systems. An information escrow refers to users storing their data at a custodian such that it can be revealed later. In the case of unauthorized leakage of this data by the custodian (receiver of data), taking legal actions is expensive, time consuming and also difficult owing to difficulty in establishing the responsibility. We address this by automatically penalizing the custodian through the loss of cryptocurrency in case of leakage. Initially, we consider a two party scenario where a sender forwards multimedia data to a receiver; we propose the Pepal protocol<br>
where any total or partial leakage of data penalizes the receiver. To avoid single point of failure at the receiver in a two-party system, we extend the protocol to a multi-party system where a group of agents offer the escrow as a service. However, this introduces a collusion scenario among the rational agents leading to premature and undetectable unlocking of the data. Addressing this, we propose a collusion-deterrent escrow (CDE) protocol where any collusion among the agents is penalized. We show that the provably secure protocol deters collusion in game-theoretic terms by dis-incentivising it among the rational agents. In the second part of this work, we investigate the mental models of cryptocurrency wallet users in choosing single-device or multi-device wallets along with their preferences. We investigate the user-preferred default (threshold) settings for the key distribution in the wallets. We then propose the D-KODE protocol, an efficient key-generation mechanism for<br>
cryptocurrency systems where either the payee or payer may not have the cryptographic setup but wish to transact. The protocol utilizes a practical black-box secret sharing scheme along with a distributed almost key-homomorphic PRF to achieve the threshold key distribution.</p>
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