La thèse analyse la promotion de l'électricité produite à partir de sources renouvelables par la régulation économique. Elle combine la recherche existante en économie, sciences politiques et droit. Les principaux apports scientifiques nouveaux par rapport à la recherche existante sont les suivants : - L'échec des efforts de la Commission européenne d'harmoniser les systèmes de soutien au niveau de l'UE s'explique par une alliance (de prime abord improbable) des OGN "vertes" et des producteurs d'électricité verte, soucieux de protéger le système des prix garantis par l'État, ainsi que des États membres, soucieux du respect du principe de subsidiarité. - Contrairement à l'avis dominant en sciences économique, des prix minima garantis, arrêté au niveau de 'UE, constituent la politique règlementaire la plus efficient. - La première analyse compréhensive de la pratique décisionnelle de la Commission européenne eu matière d'aide d'État et la jurisprudence de la Court depuis 1990 montre que, contrairement à l'avis dominant dans la recherche juridique, les systèmes de soutien de la plupart des États membres constituent des aides d'État, car l'arrêt PreussenElektra a un champ d'application beaucoup plus restreint que généralement admis. - Les règles de l'OMC, du Traité sur la Charte de l'Énergie, du droit des aides d'État et du marché intérieur interagissent d'une manière qui n'a pas encore été pleinement compris par la littérature juridique. - Des parallélismes surprenants au débat juridique en Europe existent dans le débat juridique aux États-Unis. Cependant, il n'ont pas été mis en exergue par les juristes. Ainsi, la "dormant commerce clause" soumet les régimes de soutien au États-Unis à des contraintes similaires que les règles du marché intérieur; et le contrôle fédéral de la régulation des prix sous le Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) ressemble au contrôle des aides d'État. / The thesis analyses the promotion of electricity from renewable energy sources by regulatory policies, bringing together the existing research in economics, political science and law. The main new findings compared to the existing research are: The failure of the Commission's attempts to harmonize support schemes al the EU level is due to an (at first sight: unlikely) alliance of green NGO and renewable electricity producers, concerned about protecting fixed purchase prices, and Member States, concerned about subsidiarity; Contrary to the dominating view in the economic literature, fixed purchase prices, set at the EU level, are the most efficient regulatory option; The first comprehensive analysis of the Commission's decision practice and the Court's case law on support schemes under EU State aid rules since 1990 shows that, contrary to the dominating view in legal writing, the support schemes of most Member States do constitute State aid, because PreussenElektra has a much narrower scope than generally thought. WTO rules, the Energy Charter Treaty, and EU State aid and internal market rules interact in ways which have thus far not been analyzed in detail in the legal literature. Surprising parallelisms exist in the legal debate in the US and in the EU, which have thus far been widely overlooked by legal scholars: the "dormant commerce clause" puts very similar constraints on State support schemes as internal market rules; and federal control on price regulation under the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) in the US acts similarly to State aid control in the EU.

Power business is a somewhat special business¡CIt has no stocks. Because of this, power business is classified into inherent monopoly business for a very long time before. Nowadays, most governments of developed countries changed their point of view; they modified the relevant law and began to allow more than two power companies to run on the same power supply area since few years ago. Taiwan's government is affected by this thinking and doing in 1990 and adopted it later since 1994. Firstly, they permitted private power stations built by private enterprises in1995. Since then, domestic power business is treated as a ¡§step by step open¡¨ business. Different from what other Independent Power Station (So called I.P.P.)has done, Taiwan Power Company has adopted the policy of allocating their maintenance crew in each nuclear and fire power station instead of establishing a dependent sub-maintenance company or outsourcing maintenance job to other power station maintenance contractor as the other I.P.P.s. has done¡C This is indeed a quite controversy policy even inside the Taiwan Power Company. But most of the members and representatives of workers Union are against any relocating crew or changing policy and even stronger. The policy of privatizing Taiwan Power Company and open competition of electricity-providing is determined definitely by R.O.C. government, still the progress of it is not very clear to the relevant stakeholder. However, the competence of Taiwan Power Company will be needed much more than ever. And the operation cost and management performance is therefore a major and important factor to the position of Taiwan Power Company in the future electricity market. This research is intended to study only benefit of cost-down and efficiency-rising element of the electricity power company and its nuclear and power station, it concerns nothing to do with any social topics such as working right of the crew , opinion and attitude of the work union and the like.