This thesis aims to analyze Islamic rhetoric of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its underlying objectives and reasons by examining policies, speeches and declarations of the PLO, Fateh and Yasser Arafat. It is widely accepted that the PLO functiones according to secular rules / perceives Israel, Palestine and the Israeli-Palestinian question on Palestinian nationalist and Third worldist grounds. However in spite of its secular functioning and goals, the PLO since its inception has referred to Islamic rhetoric on natinal struggle of Palestine&rsquo / s liberation. Henceforth it is argued that the PLO has chosen a pragmatist and instrumentalist language in referring to Islamic symbols and discourses. Islamic rhetoric of the PLO has aimed primarily to mobilize the Palestinians for national goals and to legitimize the PLO against rising power of political Islam headed by Hamas. Furthermore the thesis also demonstrates that the PLO&rsquo / s Islamic rhetoric was affected by Palestinian society&rsquo / s shift along Islamic lines and Islamic component of Palestinian nationalism and culture. The PLO seemed to intensify its resort to Islamic rhetoric with every crisis that decreased the PLO&rsquo / s authority and power. It is concluded that content of the PLO&rsquo / s pragmatic Islamic rhetoric was never related with making Islam as normative and legal basis of Palestinian society, rather it was related with mobilization and legitimating.

This thesis analyzes the emergence and development process of Palestinian nationalism. The role of the notable families within the development of Palestinian nationalism that led Palestinian Arab society during the British Mandate will be discussed in detail. The thesis is going to examine whether Palestinian nationalism is a genuine ideology or it is developed as a counter nationalism against both Jewish immigration and settlements activities and British Mandate. It will also be analyzed Mandate policies which were applied in order to provide balance between both of the nations.

The study of intractable conflicts has risen in recent years particularly with the work of Daniel Bar-Tal’s work on the ethos of conflict. The ethos of conflict is an original psychological concept that captures the collective societal mindset of cultures locked in intractable conflicts and examines the various factors that keep groups in conflict or help them towards peace. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is arguably the most researched, publicized, and discussed intractable conflict in history. The purpose of this paper is to first examine the foundation of that intractable conflict through the lens of Bar-Tal’s theory and apply it once more how it has changed in the modern day. Particularly, this paper focuses on how the change in power structure in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has prioritized the different elements of the ethos of conflict differently for both sides. In the beginning of the conflict, both groups held equitable power that caused them to have similar manifestations of the ethos of conflict. Working with the foundation of Bar-Tal’s theory, this paper provides an analysis of how Israel’s rise to power in the conflict influences different prioritizations of the ethos of conflict for both parties.

This research argues that during the inter-war years in Palestine, British power was dependent upon intelligence. Intelligence was fundamental to the security of the country, since it varyingly augmented understrength force, or supported overwhelming force. Intelligence also supported policymakers as issues of governance were debated. It allowed British decision makers to avoid making a decision on self-government during the 1920s and it supported Britain’s failed attempts to introduce a constitution during the 1930s. Intelligence also was crucial to Britain’s relations with the Arab nationalist and Zionist communities. Of particular importance was Britain’s partnership and subsequent war with the Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini. This thesis sheds new light on the role of intelligence in British colonial policymaking, the development of the Arab-Zionist conflict, and how Britain failed to manage communal violence. This research offers a new and improved explanation of the origins, unfolding, and defeat of the Palestinian Arab rebellion. British intelligence and policymakers failed to grasp the sophistication of the Palestinian national movement until the mid-1930s, and even then, they focused on clan competition and the politics of ‘notables’. Intelligence and military records explain how British police and military struggled, but ultimately succeeded to suppress and defeat this rebellion. Victory was made possible by innovations within the intelligence and planning staffs, as well as Zionist cooperation. Intelligence shaped policy most clearly at the beginning and end of the period under examination. During 1918-20, the military government was administered by intelligence officers who guaranteed Britain’s future control in Palestine both domestically, and at the League of Nations. In 1939, British policy abandoned its traditional Zionist partners when the need to impose a solution on Palestine coincided with the opportunity, revealed by signals intelligence, to bolster and leverage the influence of ‘Abdul ‘Aziz ibn Sa’ud over the Arab national movement.