This thesis explores the impact of sectoral competition on inflation in Turkey. To this end, panel data analyses investigating the determinants of deviation of sectoral price inflation from the consumer price inflation, and the resulting effect of the changes in the level of sectoral competition on this deviation measure are conducted in both static and dynamic frameworks. The empirical analyses covers the 1995-2001 period and 62 manufacturing sectors classified according to International Standard of Industrial Classification (ISIC) Rev. 2 at 4-digit level. The findings of the empirical analyses are particularly important for the assessment of the theoretical foundations and empirical basis of the recent proposals favoring enhancement of competition with disinflationary motives. The static analyses suggest that sectoral concentration is insignificant in explaining deviations of sectoral inflation from consumer inflation, while dynamic analyses suggest enhancing competition may lead to higher levels of sectoral inflation. The interpretation of the results indicates that enhancing competition may not be a viable tool for disinflationary purposes in Turkey.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-08T14:45:03Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1233814 bytes, checksum: 141c98291107c0bfe23dcbe8dfe196c0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-02-22 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The objective of this study is to analyze the political-economic cycles in the Brazilian states from 1995 to 2008. The hypothesis that was considered was that the cyclical behavior in public spending caused by politically motivated election and / or party. The theoretical framework used was developed originally in the work of Downs (1957) and Nordhaus (1975). The assumptions of the model of political opportunism and Hibbs (1977) the assumptions of the model party. In the 80s of last century, the work of Alesina (1987) and Roggof and Sibert (1988) incorporated the original models the concepts of rational expectations and asymmetric information. Was made a econometric tests to check the influence of the electoral calendar and the party ideology on the conduct of public spending. The econometric model was used panel data GMM estimator with dynamic system. The results showed that the state increase spending in election years and is set down in post-election years, showing an opportunistic behavior by governments. The results also showed the expenditures implemented by the governments of different party ideologies had different behaviors, left-wing parties promote further expansion of public spending. The completion of the work is in the process of choosing the state public expenditures are both political and partisan cycles. / O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar os ciclos político-econômicos nos estados brasileiros no período de 1995 a 2008. Foi considerada hipótese de existência de comportamento cíclico nos gastos públicos ocasionados por motivações políticas eleitoreiras e/ou partidárias. O marco teórico utilizado foi desenvolvido originariamente nos trabalhos de Downs (1957), Nordhaus (1975) e Hibbs (1977) os dois primeiros estabeleceram pressupostos do modelo de oportunismo político e o terceiro instituiu os pressupostos do modelo partidário. Na década de 80 do século passado, os trabalhos de Alesina (1987) e Roggof e Sibert (1988) incorporaram aos modelos originais os conceitos de expectativas racionais e assimetria de informação. A partir das referências teóricas foram aplicados testes econométricos para verificar a existência de influência do calendário eleitoral e da ideologia partidária sobre o comportamento dos gastos públicos. O modelo econométrico utilizado foi de dados em painel dinâmico com estimador MGM Sistema. Os resultados das estimações demonstram que os gastos públicos estaduais aumentam em anos eleitorais e se ajustam em anos pós-eleitorais, evidenciando um comportamento oportunista por parte dos governantes. Os resultados também demonstraram que os gastos executados por governos de ideologias partidárias diferentes apresentam comportamentos diferentes, partidos de esquerda promovem uma maior expansão dos gastos públicos. A conclusão do trabalho é que no processo de escolha dos gastos público estadual há simultaneamente ciclos políticos e partidários.