In the literature, electoral accountability has been explored in many ways. Among those are the studies of economic voting examining to what degree government parties are held accountable for the state of the economy. By now, the studies have incorporated variables that reflect how clear is the chain of responsibility for the economic policies. Among those are national level variables, such as the clarity of responsibility index, and party level variables, such as the number of seats a party occupies in a government. This dissertation suggests that the responsibility for the government policies can be obscured by yet another party level variable - party novelty. I define party novelty as the quality that reflects the degree of change within a party in terms of its structure (mergers, splits, etc) and attributes (name, leader, and program) within one electoral cycle. I argue that party change obscures party identity and, thus, affects voters' ability to hold it accountable for the state of the economy. This study explores the concept of party novelty and its effects on voter's party preferences in various economic conditions. I construct the Party Novelty Database (1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, and 2009) and show that party novelty can be measured. Moreover, I demonstrate that party novelty varies in understandable ways, and, most importantly, that party novelty matters. Using the European Election Study and the Euromanifesto Project (1994, 1999, 2004, and 2009) I show that party novelty moderates economic voting, and this effect differs across types of party changes and the timing of change. / Political Science