The current discussion of Inflation Targeting (IT) in emerging economies deals with the effects that nominal exchange rate movements have on the overall inflation rate. The literature has focused in the analysis of the advantages and disadvantages that IT has with respect to other monetary policy regimes and the relevancy of the nominal exchange rate pass-through effect into inflation. So far none of them have dealt with the differences arising from the policy instruments used to fight off inflationary pressure under an IT regime. The literature on IT for emerging economies can be separated in two categories. In the first category the monetary authority uses interest rate policy as the instrument variable to implement and control the inflation target. The second category illustrates when the monetary authorities use international reserves as the instrument to influence the nominal exchange rate in such a way that the depreciation rate is consistent with the overall inflation target. This dissertation presents a model in which both policy instruments are available to the monetary authority. This model is used to address two questions: i) Is IT better than a monetary rule regime? and ii) Is it better to intervene directly in the foreign exchange market rather than use interest rate policy to control exchange rate pressure on inflation, or are they equivalent? The results show that there are important differences between these choices and the answers to these questions are shock dependent. These differences arise because the intervention needed under IT is accompanied by important output costs or benefits depending on the direction of the shock being analyzed. Regarding the pass-through effect, some studies have shown that the pass-through effect from currency depreciation into inflation has been decreasing and therefore is becoming less of an issue for these countries. The literature has offered different explanations for these declines but so far they have not been directly linked to the adoption of IT. This dissertation shows that lower pass-through levels can be a natural result of fear of floating observed in emerging countries that adopted IT and therefore exchange rate effects on inflation are still relevant.

A presente pesquisa objetiva analisar os principais aspectos relacionados ao tema de danos em cartel: sobrepreço, efeito repasse (pass-on) e multa ótima. Com o aumento de políticas de combate a cartéis, pelo sério caráter lesivo à concorrência e à sociedade, intensificaram-se os esforços para estimar o impacto econômico no bem-estar provocado por tais condutas. O estudo confirma que a principal medida de dano econômico do cartel é o sobrepreço, ainda que os demais fatores, como o repasse (pass-on) e o efeito perda de vendas também devam ser considerados na mensuração do dano privado. Metodologias para o cálculo destes três componentes foram mapeadas, revelando que as técnicas disponíveis não são complexas, até fáceis de serem aplicadas, quando se tem amplo acesso a dados. Como avaliação empírica, apresenta-se o caso inédito do cartel dos compressores, sobre danos causados por tão nociva prática, comprovando-se que os valores de sobrepreço calculado estão em linha com a literatura. Por fim, a tese apresenta o histórico de multas impostas por autoridades, em casos de cartel, em diversas jurisdições, e questiona a efetividade dos montantes aplicados para devida dissuasão ou restabelecimento do bem-estar à sociedade. Análise de casos condenados pelo CADE recentemente mostram que as multas não têm sido suficientes para impor dissuasão, recomendando-se o uso de parâmetros que tragam racionalidade econômica e desestimulem as práticas anticompetitivas. / The present research had the aim of analyzing the main aspects related to cartel damages: overcharge, pass-on effect and optimal fine. With the growth of anti-cartel enforcement efforts and given the detrimental nature of conduct, efforts to estimate the economic impact on the welfare have increased. The study shows that the main measure of economic damage of the cartel is the overcharge, although other factors such as the pass-on effect and the output effect cannot be neglected in the calculation of private damage. Methodologies for these three components were mapped, revealing that the available techniques are not complex and even easy to apply when data is available. An empirical evaluation is presented using an unprecedented in the Brazilian market \"compressors cartel case\", showing an overcharge in line with the literature. Finally, the thesis presents the history of fines imposed by authorities in cartel cases in several jurisdictions and questions the effectiveness of the amounts applied for a proper deterrence or restoration of welfare to society. Case studies condemned by CADE recently show that fines have not been sufficient to impose deterrence, recommending the use of parameters that bring economic rationality and discourage anticompetitive practices.

A presente pesquisa objetiva analisar os principais aspectos relacionados ao tema de danos em cartel: sobrepreço, efeito repasse (pass-on) e multa ótima. Com o aumento de políticas de combate a cartéis, pelo sério caráter lesivo à concorrência e à sociedade, intensificaram-se os esforços para estimar o impacto econômico no bem-estar provocado por tais condutas. O estudo confirma que a principal medida de dano econômico do cartel é o sobrepreço, ainda que os demais fatores, como o repasse (pass-on) e o efeito perda de vendas também devam ser considerados na mensuração do dano privado. Metodologias para o cálculo destes três componentes foram mapeadas, revelando que as técnicas disponíveis não são complexas, até fáceis de serem aplicadas, quando se tem amplo acesso a dados. Como avaliação empírica, apresenta-se o caso inédito do cartel dos compressores, sobre danos causados por tão nociva prática, comprovando-se que os valores de sobrepreço calculado estão em linha com a literatura. Por fim, a tese apresenta o histórico de multas impostas por autoridades, em casos de cartel, em diversas jurisdições, e questiona a efetividade dos montantes aplicados para devida dissuasão ou restabelecimento do bem-estar à sociedade. Análise de casos condenados pelo CADE recentemente mostram que as multas não têm sido suficientes para impor dissuasão, recomendando-se o uso de parâmetros que tragam racionalidade econômica e desestimulem as práticas anticompetitivas. / The present research had the aim of analyzing the main aspects related to cartel damages: overcharge, pass-on effect and optimal fine. With the growth of anti-cartel enforcement efforts and given the detrimental nature of conduct, efforts to estimate the economic impact on the welfare have increased. The study shows that the main measure of economic damage of the cartel is the overcharge, although other factors such as the pass-on effect and the output effect cannot be neglected in the calculation of private damage. Methodologies for these three components were mapped, revealing that the available techniques are not complex and even easy to apply when data is available. An empirical evaluation is presented using an unprecedented in the Brazilian market \"compressors cartel case\", showing an overcharge in line with the literature. Finally, the thesis presents the history of fines imposed by authorities in cartel cases in several jurisdictions and questions the effectiveness of the amounts applied for a proper deterrence or restoration of welfare to society. Case studies condemned by CADE recently show that fines have not been sufficient to impose deterrence, recommending the use of parameters that bring economic rationality and discourage anticompetitive practices.