Thesis--Lund. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 236-246).

The role of instinct has been justifiably neglected by the mainstream readers of Charles Peirce's philosophy. The aim of this project is to examine Peirce's theory of instinct in terms of his distinction between theory and practice. Peirce introduced a clear distinction between theory and practice and also attempted to link them together. Instinct has a double-edged role in linking theory and practice. In practice, instinctive beliefs guide our acts as norms to which we conform. In theory, instinctive reason passes through the course of reasoning by providing simple hypotheses. "A Neglected Argument" (1908) is the very example of Peirce's attempt to link theory and practice. We have instinctive beliefs in the idea of God and we are infinitely inspired into inquiry by it. Musement leads one to contemplate the idea of God, and this contemplation in turn leads one to a belief in God's reality. The idea of God is instinctively apprehended by human minds in the form of judgments and our doubting the judgments is the starting point of scientific inquiry. In this sense, the human inquiry begins with instinctively and commonsensically given judgments without exception.

Thesis advisor: Christopher L. Constas / This work presents the post-modern problem in philosophy. It first presents knowledge as subjective or perspectival through the work of Martin Heidegger's Being and Time. Part Two aims to show, how, in the midst of post-modern relativism, meaningful truths may be constructed in society. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2005. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: College Honors Program.

Thesis advisor: Nasser Behnegar / My dissertation explores the epistemological and political thought of Charles S. Peirce, the founder of American pragmatism. In contrast to the pragmatists who followed, Peirce defends a realist notion of truth. He seeks to provide a framework for understanding the nature of knowledge that does justice to our commonsense experience of things. Similarly in contrast to his fellow pragmatists, Peirce has a conservative practical teaching: he warns against combining theory and practice out of concern that each will corrupt the other. The first three chapters of this dissertation examine Peirce’s pragmatism and related features of his thought: his Critical Common-Sensism, Scholastic Realism, semeiotics, and a part of his metaphysical or cosmological musings. The fourth chapter explores Peirce’s warning that theory and practice ought to be kept separate. The fifth chapter aims to shed light on Peirce’s practical conservatism by exploring the liberal arts education he recommends for educating future statesmen. This dissertation makes clear that Peirce was not a crude utilitarian or simply concerned with “what works.” He was, moreover, not anti-metaphysical. Peirce has much to instruct contemporary thinkers. His is an anti-skeptical but modest theory of reality that remains valuable to contemporary readers. His message of caution in the practical realm is sound. Finally, his call for what a university ought to be and the liberal arts education that will best groom students for a life of action is still an important message. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2016. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

Thesis (M.A.)--Boston University / The purpose of this thesis is to compare and contrast the thought of Charles Sanders Peirce and William James in two respects: (1) their ideas of reality and (2) their doctrines of the continuity of consciousness and its metaphysical implications. Chapter II traces their different theories of reality to basic differences in their metaphysical orientations. Peirce, as a metaphysical realist, maintains that general terms refer to ideas and laws which are realities apart from the particulars which manifest them and the minds which apprehend them. The real correspondents of general terms are within two realms of being: the realm of first-ness, which is possibility and feeling; and the realm of thirdness, which is law, meaning, and thought, all of which are synonymous. Both differ from the world of existence, or secondness, in which possibility is actualized, and in which ideas, including laws, are physically and mentally operative. [TRUNCATED]

<p>Naturalism faces problems caused by a lack of agreement about whether there is or can be a meaningful and useful conception of naturalism as a general research position. Without a widely agreed upon account of what naturalism in general amounts to there is no clear and definitive way to adjudicate disputes as to what is consistent with naturalism; the absence of such an account also makes it impossible for specific projects in naturalistic inquiry to take guidance from naturalism in general. In the following, I develop a determinate account of naturalism in general, which I think could find acceptance among naturalists because it accounts for many of the features commonly associated with naturalism. To do this, I first lay out the problem to be solved, express its importance, and explain what a solution to the problem would involve. I then make appeal to an account of naturalism developed by Penelope Maddy and use this account to show that the published and unpublished work of Charles Sanders Peirce offers, prima facie, a more determinate account of naturalism than is commonly recognized and that goes beyond the account given by Maddy. With this Peircean account developed, I then measure it against the criteria I develop and conclude that a Pericean account of naturalism does promise to adjudicate various disputes in the naturalism literature and to offer guidance to the development and application of specific projects in naturalistic inquiry.</p> / Dissertation

Dissertation--Köln--Universität, 2005. / Bibliogr. p. 283-299.

Texte remanié de: Thèse de doctorat--Sémiotique--Perpignan, 1991. Titre de soutenance : Problèmes d'interprétation en peinture. / Bibliogr. p. 317-324. Index.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1981. / Bibliography: leaves [230]-234. / Microfiche. / iv, 234 leaves, bound 29 cm

Proefschrift Universiteit van Amsterdam. / Met lit. opg. - Met samenvatting in het Nederlands.