Malgré un antipsychologisme plusieurs fois réasserté, le philosophe américain Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) maintient une dépendance ambiguë de la connaissance objective envers les états mentaux de la conscience. La thèse rend compte de ce paradoxe apparent en montrant que le projet peircien n'est pas logique mais épistémologique, et consiste en une étude critique de notre pouvoir de connaître. Peirce a cherché différentes manières de naturaliser la connaissance, c'est-à-dire de l'inscrire dans nos facultés réelles sans pour autant renoncer à son ambition fondationnelle et normative. On peut en distinguer plusieurs phases successives : la correction de la psychologie des facultés, la théorie de l'enquête, les recherches en psychologie expérimentale, la création d'un associationnisme logique, une cosmologie de la préformation de la raison, l'invention d'une phénoménologie, et finalement le dialogisme graphique. Ces tentatives plus ou moins heureuses fournissent des outils pour penser aujourd'hui une théorie de la connaissance dans un cadre naturaliste. / In spite of his several times restated antipsychologism, the American philosopher Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) still ambiguously assumes that objective knowledge depends on the mental states of consciousness. The thesis accounts for this apparent paradox in showing that Peirce's purport is epistemological, not logical, and consists in a critical approach to our power of knowing. Peirce sought various ways of naturalizing knowledge, i.e. making it rely on our real faculties, yet without giving up a normative foundation. One can identify a sequence of such attempts : correcting faculty psychology, the theory of inquiry, experimental psychology, logical associationism, a cosmology of preformed reason, the invention of a phenomenology, and finally graphical dialogism. These more or less successful attempts provide tools to conceive today a theory of knowledge in a naturalistic frame.

Dissertation--Bern, 2006.

The term “pragmatism” has been used and abused by doctrines that are even contradictory among them. For the founder of Pragmatism as a philosophicaltradition, Charles Peirce, this situation might seem a sad misunderstanding, and that is why he came up with the term “pragmaticism” in order to distinguish his own particular version of Pragmatism. However, Peirce himself did not leave a systematic treaty that explained what kind of specific conditions distinguish his pragmatism from other versions. In this essay I introduce some criteria that I deem fundamental to disambiguate the meaning of Pragmatism: (1) the use of the logical principle known as the ‘pragmatic maxim’, upon which the corner stone of the tradition should rest; (2) the need to adopt Scholastic Realism and reject Nominalism; and (3), the operationalist character (as opposed to the inferential character) of Peirce’s pragmatism. In addition, I offer some views avowing that in spite of the differences and distinctions that these criteria establish, there is a core of convergence between the different kinds of pragmatisms present in the philosophical tradition. / Distintas doctrinas, incluso contrapuestas entre sí, presumen de ser una forma de “pragmatismo”. Para el fundador del Pragmatismo en tanto tradición filosófica, Charles Peirce, esta situación puede resultar en una lamentable confusión y, por tanto, acuñó el término de ‘pragmaticismo’ para distinguir su particular versión.Sin embargo, Peirce mismo no escribió un texto sistemático en el que explicara qué criterios específicos distinguen su pragmatismo de cualquier otro. En este texto presento algunos de estos criterios que me parecen fundamentales: (1) el uso de una máxima pragmática sobre la cual ha de descansar el principio lógico que fundamenta la tradición, (2) La necesidad de adoptar el realismo escolástico y rechazar el nominalismo; y (3) El caracter operacionalista, opuesto al inferencialista, del pragmatismo de Peirce. Además, presento algunas opiniones que hacen pensar que a pesar de las distinciones que estos criterios establecen hay un núcleo de convergencia entre los distintos tipos de pragmatismos presentes en la tradición filosófica.

One usually makes assertions by means of uttering indicative sentences like It is raining. However, not every utterance of an indicative sentence is an assertion. For example, in uttering I will be back tomorrow, one might be making a promise. What is to make an assertion? C.S. Peirce held the view that to assert a proposition is to make oneself responsible for its truth (CP 5.543). In this thesis, I interpret Peirces view of assertion and I evaluate Peirces reasons for holding it. I begin by reconstructing and assessing Peirces case for such view as it appears in (EP 2.140, 1903), (EP 2.312-313, 1904), and (CP 5.546, 1908). Then, I continue by elaborating on three aspects of Peirces view of assertion, namely, assertion as an act involving a certain kind of responsibility, the proposition as what is asserted, and responsibility for truth as a responsibility to give reasons. With respect to these three aspects, I argue for the following claims: (1) Peirce construed the responsibility involved in asserting as a moral responsibility; (2) Peirce held that propositions are types; and (3) Peirce was committed to a dialogical interpretation of responsibility to give reasons. Finally, I end by presenting two objections to Peirces view of assertion and its corresponding replies. I conclude that Peirces account of assertion is a valuable contribution to the philosophical debate on assertion. / Costumamos fazer asserções quando proferimos sentenças indicativas como \"Está chovendo\". Mas, não toda proferição de uma sentença indicativa é uma asserção. Por exemplo, quando dissemos vou voltar amanhã, poderíamos estar fazendo uma promessa. O que é fazer uma asserção? C.S. Peirce argumentou que \"asseverar uma proposição é fazer-se responsável pela sua verdade\" (CP 5.543). O propósito do presente texto é interpretar a visão de Peirce sobre a asserção assim como examinar as razões que a suportam. Para cumprir esse propósito, primeiro reconstruo e examino o argumento que, em defesa da sua visão, Peirce propôs em (EP 2.140, 1903), (EP 2.312-313, 1904), e (CP 5.546, 1908). A continuação aponto para três aspetos constitutivos dessa visão, a saber, a asserção como um ato que envolve certa responsabilidade, a proposição como o que é asseverado, e a responsabilidade pela verdade como a responsabilidade de dar razões. Tendo em consideração esses três aspetos, passo a defender as seguintes teses: (1) Peirce concebeu a responsabilidade envolvida na asserção como uma responsabilidade moral. (2) Peirce pensou que as proposições são types. (3) Peirce interpretou responsabilidade de dar razões de modo dialógico. Para finalizar, apresento duas objeções à visão de Peirce sobre a asserção e as réplicas respetivas. Concluo que a visão de Peirce sobre a asserção é uma contribuição valiosa ao debate filosófico sobre a asserção.

Submitted by Geandra Rodrigues (geandrar@gmail.com) on 2018-01-29T11:08:24Z No. of bitstreams: 0 / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2018-01-29T11:30:08Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 0 / Made available in DSpace on 2018-01-29T11:30:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2017-03-09 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / O presente trabalho dedica-se a investigar a eficiência comunicativa da Wikipedia em reter seus usuários colaboradores, tendo como referência a teoria abdutiva de Charles S. Peirce com base no instinto, que descreve um método inferencial não confinado à categoria científica, mas capaz de desvendar a forma como uma cognição é construída frente a uma situação em que ainda não possuímos hábitos estabelecidos. Sustentados na teoria investigativa de Peirce, partimos de seu conceito de dúvida e crença e sua oposição categórica ao argumento Cartesiano da intuição para chegarmos à sua concepção do instinto e seu papel desempenhado na investigação, compreendendo como este atua na apreensão de uma nova matriz sígnica. Em seguida, fazemos uso de sua teoria do sinequismo para trabalhar a noção de evolução e continuidade nos signos da plataforma. Em nossa investigação sustentamos a hipótese de que a presença de múltiplos signos, cuja apreciação é necessária para participação na Wikipedia, compromete a colaboração instintiva, levando a uma alta taxa de abandono por parte de novos usuários. Buscando compreender a apropriação multicódigos da plataforma e suas potencialidades instintivas, aplicamos um questionário aos usuários recém-cadastrados na Wikipedia Português pelo período de uma semana, avaliando suas primeiras percepções sobre a plataforma. Suas respostas e nossas posteriores análises sustentam as conclusões apresentadas neste trabalho. / This dissertation aims to analyse Wikipedia communicative effectivity which creates a binding with their collaborative real-time editors, having as reference Charles Peirce’s theory of Abduction which is based upon instinct and describes an inferential method non-bounded exclusively to scientific domain that is capable of clarify the ways a cognition act is formed when exposed to a situation to which there is no embedded habits. Supported by Peirce’s investigative theory, this investigation departs from his concept of doubt and belief as well as his categoric opposition to the Cartesian argument of intuition, in order to understand this concept of instinct and its role in the investigation and apprehending of a new sign matrix. Subsequently, we use his theory of synechism in order to develop the notion of evolution and continuity in the sign of Wikipedia platform. In our investigation, we hold to the hypothesis according to which the presence of multiple signs, whose appreciation is needed to take part in Wikipedia, compromises the instinctive collaboration, leading to a high dropout rate among users. Seeking to understand the multicode appropriation and its instinctive potencialities, applying a quiz to newly-registered users in the Portuguese version of Wikipedia during one week, assessing their first perceptions about the platform. Their answers and our later analysis uphold the presented conclusions in this study.

Dissertation thesis Semiotics of schizophrenia aims to analyse manifestations of the symptoms of schizophrenia from the point of view of semiotics. The goal is to find common features of otherwise heterogeneous manifestations of schizophrenia and the features that make them abnormal. The method of the thesis is semiotic reduction, i.e. approach to phenomena as to sings and significations, which approach is based on the semiotic theory of Charles Peirce. The proposed thesis characterises symptoms of schizophrenia as a disorder of indexical relation between a sign-object and the group of signs of the Self. An object can be a voice or an image in the case of hallucinations, a proposition in the case of delusions, a rule of communication in the case of disorganization of speech or behaviour or a habitus in the case of negative symptoms. Abnormality of the manifestations of schizophrenia is due to a disorder of indexical relation between signs of the Self, which have features as indisprovability or basis for interpreting the world, and these objects. The author compares conclusions of the thesis with clinical studies and so called unifying theories of schizophrenia.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / My thesis is broadly construed this way: intentionalism, as a theory about perceptual experience, says that the intentional character of perceptual experience determines the phenomenological character of that experience. In some way, to be explained, phenomenology is determined by intentional content. I will show that intentionalism fails on two accounts. It fails to replace the sense-data theory as an explanation of the content of perceptual experience. It also fails to deal satisfactorily with the problem of perceptual illusion. I will then offer an alternative rooted in the perceptual theory of Charles Peirce. I believe his critical but common sense approach preserves the intuition of sense-data theory, that perception is primarily a relation between perceivers and objects. Peirce’s theory also provides a better solution to the problem of illusion.

Dissertation thesis Semiotics of schizophrenia aims to analyse manifestations of the symptoms of schizophrenia from the point of view of semiotics. The goal is to find common features of otherwise heterogeneous manifestations of schizophrenia and the features that make them abnormal. The method of the thesis is semiotic reduction, i.e. approach to phenomena as to sings and significations, which approach is based on the semiotic theory of Charles Peirce. The proposed thesis characterises symptoms of schizophrenia as a disorder of indexical relation between a sign-object and the group of signs of the Self. An object can be a voice or an image in the case of hallucinations, a proposition in the case of delusions, a rule of communication in the case of disorganization of speech or behaviour or a habitus in the case of negative symptoms. Abnormality of the manifestations of schizophrenia is due to a disorder of indexical relation between signs of the Self, which have features as indisprovability or basis for interpreting the world, and these objects. The author compares conclusions of the thesis with clinical studies and so called unifying theories of schizophrenia.

Semiotics and the concept of signs can be used to analyse the signs that can be found in a Swedish primary school in order to understand and expand our understanding of the role of signifiers, including cultural ones, in child education. The study identifies what signs can be found, what purpose they have and what category of sign they belong to, whether they are signs as defined by Saussure, how they might be categorized within Peirce‘s triadic typology and, applying Barthes’ notion of cultural signification, the extent to which they contribute to maintaining and promoting a school’s identity and values. In order to analyse the signs, a Swedish public primary school located in Halmstad was visited and the visible signs were photographed and catalogued. In order to confirm the intentions behind the design and meaning of signs, an interview with a senior teacher was arranged. The result, and signs, that were documented and described; these included drawings, emergency escape signs, posters, diplomas and other instructions with picture or sign language representations. The signs were categorized and analysed using semiotic theories of signs suggested by Saussure, Peirce and Barthes. The study facilitates a clearer understanding of the range of functions of signs in schools, both for practical purposes and as signifiers of culture and identity, and also highlights the possible applications and limitations of using semiotic theories in investigating generated meanings in physical locations.

Cette thèse aborde un sujet très débattu dans la philosophie de l’esprit et les sciences cognitives contemporaines : la naturalisation de l’intentionnalité en vue d’une théorie générale de la signification exprimable dans les prédicats des sciences naturelles. La première partie expose comment, à partir des années 1960 a évolué le programme collectif de naturalisation, depuis le fonctionnalisme jusqu’à ce qu’on peut appeler le « tournant naturaliste » du début des années 1970 dû à l’essor des sciences cognitives et à une forte remise en cause du fonctionnalisme, notamment en ce qui concerne la prise en compte de l’indexicalité des significations (cf. Kripke 1971, Putnam 1975). La deuxième partie expose les deux types de stratégies qui s’esquissent alors au début des années 1980 : d’une part la voie de la « sémantique informationnelle » (SI) (initiée par Fred Dretske et poursuivie aussi par Jerry Fodor, ce dernier défendant un symbolisme cérébral) où il s’agit de fonder l’intentionnalité sur des rapports nomologiques informatifs. D’autre part la voie de la « téléosémantique » (TS) (initiée par Ruth G. Millikan, suivie notamment par David Papineau) qui consiste à expliquer le développement de l’intentionnalité jusqu’à la cognition conceptuelle à partir de contraintes évolutionnistes. La troisième partie opère un « tournant sémiotique » en examinant la théorie logique et métaphysique des signes chez Charles S. Peirce (1845-1914), dont Millikan déclare s’être initialement inspirée. Il s’agit de montrer que la conception peircienne de l’intentionnalité, qui conçoit celle-ci comme un processus inférentiel réalisé dans des signes fonctionnant de manière iconique, est effectivement la voie permettant de fonder une nouvelle conception de la représentation symbolique qui évite d’avoir à assumer les présupposés métaphysiques du cognitivisme computationnel propres à la SI ; cela en développant une notion de signe naturel qui rend compte des faits découverts par les sciences cognitives sans tomber pour autant dans le psychologisme. La quatrième partie constitue alors l’ébauche de ce que pourrait être une philosophie de l’esprit élaborée à partir du concept écologique de signe cognitif, celui-ci comportant une dimension logique (une relation triadique, au sens où l’entend la logique des relatifs de Peirce) et une dimension proprement comportementale (également triadique, mais dépourvue d’auto-contrôle : ce pour quoi on crée le concept d’Image comportementale). Un examen sur la question de l’indexicalité montre que la bonne appréhension du problème consiste en effet à bien penser l’articulation entre les fonctions indexicales et iconiques du signe, qui ne prend la forme d’un rapport contrôlé d’intentionnalité seconde que dans le cadre d’un système symbolique régi par des conventions syntaxiques / The subject of this thesis is the naturalizing project of intentionality, i.e. a theory of meaning expressible in natural sciences predicates. Part I expose the functionalist program in the 1960’ and its calling into question during the 1970’ by the development of cognitive sciences and indexicality problem (Kripke 1971, Putnam 1975). Part II is devoted to the alternative strategies developed since the beginning of the 1980’. In one hand : the “information semantics”, i.e. a nomic grounded semantics initiated by Fred Dretske (followed by Jerry Fodor). On the other hand: the “teleosemantics” of Ruth G. Millikan (followed by David Papineau) which seeks to found the theory of cognition on evolutionary constraints. Part III proceeds to a “semeiotic turn” by analyzing the logical and metaphysical theory of signs of Charles S. Peirce (1845-1914), one of the most prominent sources of Millikan’s thesis. Indeed, Peirce’s conception of cognition as an inferential process grounded in iconic signs is the very way of a naturalistic theory of symbols which symmetrically avoids the metaphysical prejudices of computational cognitivism and psychologism. Then Part IV try to sketch out the project of an ecological theory of mind based on the concept of a multi-functional intentional sign (a sign of which the inferential function of self-control is not reducible to the simpler behavioural functions). In this part we argue in favour of a new behavioural concept : the “Image”. A last development concerning the indexicality problem tends to prove that the matter consists in an adequate description of the relations between iconic and indexical functions in the sign, by which it is possible to understand the specificity of syntactical and conventional systems of expression