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This paper presents and assesses Charles Sanders Peirce's pragmatic theory of belief, with special attention to his account of the role of belief in science. My aim is to present a chronological assessment of Peirce's main epistemological works, to consider two contemporary treatments of those works, and to ultimately determine whether or not Peirce's view of belief is internally coherent and consistent with his larger system of philosophy.

This paper presents and assesses Charles Sanders Peirce's pragmatic theory of belief, with special attention to his account of the role of belief in science. My aim is to present a chronological assessment of Peirce's main epistemological works, to consider two contemporary treatments of those works, and to ultimately determine whether or not Peirce's view of belief is internally coherent and consistent with his larger system of philosophy.

One usually makes assertions by means of uttering indicative sentences like It is raining. However, not every utterance of an indicative sentence is an assertion. For example, in uttering I will be back tomorrow, one might be making a promise. What is to make an assertion? C.S. Peirce held the view that to assert a proposition is to make oneself responsible for its truth (CP 5.543). In this thesis, I interpret Peirces view of assertion and I evaluate Peirces reasons for holding it. I begin by reconstructing and assessing Peirces case for such view as it appears in (EP 2.140, 1903), (EP 2.312-313, 1904), and (CP 5.546, 1908). Then, I continue by elaborating on three aspects of Peirces view of assertion, namely, assertion as an act involving a certain kind of responsibility, the proposition as what is asserted, and responsibility for truth as a responsibility to give reasons. With respect to these three aspects, I argue for the following claims: (1) Peirce construed the responsibility involved in asserting as a moral responsibility; (2) Peirce held that propositions are types; and (3) Peirce was committed to a dialogical interpretation of responsibility to give reasons. Finally, I end by presenting two objections to Peirces view of assertion and its corresponding replies. I conclude that Peirces account of assertion is a valuable contribution to the philosophical debate on assertion. / Costumamos fazer asserções quando proferimos sentenças indicativas como \"Está chovendo\". Mas, não toda proferição de uma sentença indicativa é uma asserção. Por exemplo, quando dissemos vou voltar amanhã, poderíamos estar fazendo uma promessa. O que é fazer uma asserção? C.S. Peirce argumentou que \"asseverar uma proposição é fazer-se responsável pela sua verdade\" (CP 5.543). O propósito do presente texto é interpretar a visão de Peirce sobre a asserção assim como examinar as razões que a suportam. Para cumprir esse propósito, primeiro reconstruo e examino o argumento que, em defesa da sua visão, Peirce propôs em (EP 2.140, 1903), (EP 2.312-313, 1904), e (CP 5.546, 1908). A continuação aponto para três aspetos constitutivos dessa visão, a saber, a asserção como um ato que envolve certa responsabilidade, a proposição como o que é asseverado, e a responsabilidade pela verdade como a responsabilidade de dar razões. Tendo em consideração esses três aspetos, passo a defender as seguintes teses: (1) Peirce concebeu a responsabilidade envolvida na asserção como uma responsabilidade moral. (2) Peirce pensou que as proposições são types. (3) Peirce interpretou responsabilidade de dar razões de modo dialógico. Para finalizar, apresento duas objeções à visão de Peirce sobre a asserção e as réplicas respetivas. Concluo que a visão de Peirce sobre a asserção é uma contribuição valiosa ao debate filosófico sobre a asserção.

One usually makes assertions by means of uttering indicative sentences like It is raining. However, not every utterance of an indicative sentence is an assertion. For example, in uttering I will be back tomorrow, one might be making a promise. What is to make an assertion? C.S. Peirce held the view that to assert a proposition is to make oneself responsible for its truth (CP 5.543). In this thesis, I interpret Peirces view of assertion and I evaluate Peirces reasons for holding it. I begin by reconstructing and assessing Peirces case for such view as it appears in (EP 2.140, 1903), (EP 2.312-313, 1904), and (CP 5.546, 1908). Then, I continue by elaborating on three aspects of Peirces view of assertion, namely, assertion as an act involving a certain kind of responsibility, the proposition as what is asserted, and responsibility for truth as a responsibility to give reasons. With respect to these three aspects, I argue for the following claims: (1) Peirce construed the responsibility involved in asserting as a moral responsibility; (2) Peirce held that propositions are types; and (3) Peirce was committed to a dialogical interpretation of responsibility to give reasons. Finally, I end by presenting two objections to Peirces view of assertion and its corresponding replies. I conclude that Peirces account of assertion is a valuable contribution to the philosophical debate on assertion. / Costumamos fazer asserções quando proferimos sentenças indicativas como \"Está chovendo\". Mas, não toda proferição de uma sentença indicativa é uma asserção. Por exemplo, quando dissemos vou voltar amanhã, poderíamos estar fazendo uma promessa. O que é fazer uma asserção? C.S. Peirce argumentou que \"asseverar uma proposição é fazer-se responsável pela sua verdade\" (CP 5.543). O propósito do presente texto é interpretar a visão de Peirce sobre a asserção assim como examinar as razões que a suportam. Para cumprir esse propósito, primeiro reconstruo e examino o argumento que, em defesa da sua visão, Peirce propôs em (EP 2.140, 1903), (EP 2.312-313, 1904), e (CP 5.546, 1908). A continuação aponto para três aspetos constitutivos dessa visão, a saber, a asserção como um ato que envolve certa responsabilidade, a proposição como o que é asseverado, e a responsabilidade pela verdade como a responsabilidade de dar razões. Tendo em consideração esses três aspetos, passo a defender as seguintes teses: (1) Peirce concebeu a responsabilidade envolvida na asserção como uma responsabilidade moral. (2) Peirce pensou que as proposições são types. (3) Peirce interpretou responsabilidade de dar razões de modo dialógico. Para finalizar, apresento duas objeções à visão de Peirce sobre a asserção e as réplicas respetivas. Concluo que a visão de Peirce sobre a asserção é uma contribuição valiosa ao debate filosófico sobre a asserção.

This dissertation traces the development of classical American pragmatism in the work of C.S. Peirce and Josiah Royce, and its convergence with the naturalist project that currently dominates anglophone philosophy. I argue that naturalism, as it is typically construed, either neglects or underestimates the importance of a rich and nuanced model of selfhood, one that captures not only the biological, but also the cultural features of human persons; what is needed is an account that shows how culture and human selves are themselves "natural." John McDowell has recently offered a promising line of thought which pursues this intuition, but his model has faced heavy criticism and its viability remains questionable. My project, then, is an alternative account that incorporates the best of McDowell's intuitions, but which is immune to the most common objections brought against his model. I proceed by focusing on one aspect of what it means to be a human person that has enormous significance for all areas of philosophical inquiry and which has a rich, if often overlooked, philosophical history. This is the inherent finitude or ignorance which characterizes human knowledge and practice, what Peirce referred to as "fallibilism." Peirce's notion of fallibilism, which today remains his greatest legacy, tempers philosophical discussions of universal concepts such as truth and "the good" by way of considerations of scope and context, forcing such abstractions to find their place within the practical environments of actual lived existence. I offer that Peirce is perhaps a unique figure in the Western philosophical tradition with respect to the importance he gives to fallibilism and in his understanding the doctrine not only in terms of its negative consequences, but also a positive theory that generates a practical response to the sort of existential crisis introduced by the recognition of human fallibility and finitude. Ultimately, Pierce offers a naturalized model of the self which is both a semiotic artifact and communal in nature. The self is a sign that emerges within an interpretive community and which manifests itself as an individual primarily through its fallibility. As such, the self is a cultural artifact, but Peirce's metaphysics makes this a natural process continuous with those processes studied by natural sciences. As a scientist, he was committed to naturalism but not reductionism; his account, therefore, embraces the work of culture and the importance of cultural idioms which are often left out of modern naturalist projects. In this, Peirce offers a promising way to fulfill McDowell's project of "naturalizing" culture and "re-enchanting" nature, thereby eliminating the gap between "mind and the world." However, despite its importance to his philosophical system, Peirce's explicit treatment of selfhood is notably unfocused. It is therefore necessary to couple his philosophical system with that of another of the classical pragmatists who was deeply influenced by Peirce's philosophy but who extended its development into detailed discussions of selfhood and community. The figure I have in mind is Josiah Royce. Royce's philosophy hinges on two central notions, loyalty and community. Loyalty is, for Royce, the means by which individual selves are connected with communities and moral concerns. For Royce, loyalty is given first and foremost to an individual community. However his development of this concept comes to include loyalty to loyalty itself, thus making an individual's loyalty to a particular community continuous with a loyalty to a global community. Moreover, his account of community picks up on Peirce's semiotic theory of interpretation, and connects his account of the individual with Peirce's metaphysical and epistemological concerns. I read the theory of selfhood Royce develops as providing the crucial element that Peirce's philosophical system requires but does not explicitly provide. Throughout this discussion, I show how this model is a promising direction for the future course of contemporary philosophical naturalism. / Philosophy

Tesis para optar al grado de Magíster en Filosofía mención Epistemología. / En la presente tesis se examina una posible relación entre el problema de la Abducción y el del Conocimiento tácito, tal como fueron expuestos por C.S. Peirce y M. Polanyi respectivamente. En el Capítulo I se estudia la idea de abducción basándose en las ideas de C.S. Peirce. La abducción consiste en una regla de inferencia que intenta dar cuenta de la creación de una hipótesis explicativa frente a un "hecho sorprendente" , es decir, un hecho que no es explicado o aparece en contradicción a las teorías existentes para analizar dicho fenómeno.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T18:17:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Sonia Maria Moro do Nascimento.pdf: 2500275 bytes, checksum: 2cb82c4e9a7074a7faa61e51253aa1fc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-05-05 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The classical interpretation of Subliminal is that there is a powerful seduction and manipulation widened by the presence of some components placed below perception, which freely reach the subconscious level, to the point of affecting emotions. This happens because such messages go into the recipient s mind, beneath the threshold of his conscious alertness, without any filtering, so as to allow for the effects intended by the originating source to take the individual to act regardless of his own will and with no evaluation. Through the concepts of C. S. Peirce s semiotics, this study aims at understanding the functioning of the process of apprehension of subliminal materials in perception, and intends to contribute to the update of this concept by adding a semiotic direction and a treatment as a language study. Printed advertisements in nationwide magazines are analyzed to view the evidence they carry of the elements that are at stake in the articulation of visual and verbal elements, a play with signs which escape to the sight and perceptual judgment of the recipient. The concept of subliminal is discussed in the bases of the definitions of perception and perceptual judgment, with emphasis to the fact that the subliminal works as an apprehension underneath the perceptual judgment. The theoretical and methodological bases are enhanced by further definitions from Peirce s sign theory, covering the concepts of first, other phenomenological categories, triad sign structure, notion of consciousness, collateral experience, beyond the associations by similarity and contiguity as present in the various language approaches / A interpretação clássica de Subliminar é de que há um certo potencial de sedução e manipulação ampliado com a presença, nas mensagens, de componentes apresentados de forma sub-reptícia, velada, atingindo livremente o subconsciente a ponto de afetar as emoções. Isso ocorre porque tais mensagens penetram na mente do receptor, abaixo do limiar da consciência, sem que haja a ação de algum tipo de filtro. E, desse modo, são capazes de produzir os efeitos intencionados pela fonte codificadora - de levar o indivíduo a direcionar sua vontade sem um mínimo grau de avaliação. À luz da semiótica peirceana, este estudo busca compreender o funcionamento do processo de apreensão dos materiais subliminares na percepção e pretende oferecer abordagens de atualização desse conceito, no momento em que lhe é conferido um enfoque semiótico e um tratamento como linguagem. São analisados anúncios publicitários impressos, veiculados em revistas de circulação nacional, nos quais se pode evidenciar, na articulação entre os elementos visuais e verbais, um jogo na construção sígnica que escapa ao olhar e ao julgamento perceptivo do receptor. A noção de subliminar é discutida tendo, como foco, as definições de percepção e julgamento perceptivo, com destaque para o fato de que o subliminar se manifesta como uma apreensão situada abaixo do julgamento perceptivo. A base teórico-metodológica é reforçada com definições existentes na teoria dos signos enunciada pelo referido autor, englobando os conceitos de primeiridade, demais categorias fenomenológicas, relação triádica do signo, noção de consciência, de experiência colateral, além das associações por similaridade e contigüidade presentes nos enfoques de linguagem

This study contributes to the understanding of cultural forms, inspired by Cassirer’s notion of a general function manifesting in the many particular expressions of human culture. The special case of cybersemiotics (a newly established scientific discipline) is studied as a social system to make sense of how it operates as a viable cultural form. The study uses citation network analysis to map out the boundaries and communications of the cybersemiotic discipline, and then delves into its contents to qualitatively investigate selected parts of the network structure. A framework for studying and comparing cultural forms is developed.

“The Purloined Letter,” Edgar Allan Poe's third and final tale featuring the detective Dupin, has evoked a long history of critical response. Criticism has tended to read the text for its role in the development of detective fiction and as illustrative of various theoretical positions. However, the implications of the “The Purloined Letter,” as a tale of ratiocination, has largely been left unexplored. “The Purloined Letter” explores logical processes of value and exchange, particularly economic exchange, in a manner very similar to what Charles Sanders Peirce will call pragmatism several decades later. Dupin's deductive methods and Peirce's abductive logic express the nature of objects in terms of social systems of preference and perception rather metaphysics. Peirce's classification of signs as icon, index, or symbol provides a framework of signification which can be read in conjunction with “The Purloined Letter” to flesh out the role of materiality and value in the theory of economic criticism. Reading value and exchange as part of a social system of signs, perceptions, and representations of value will serve to expose a penchant for material fetishism in economic criticism and provide a theory of currency, value, and exchange that contextualizes representational and material notions of value within the social and economic system that provides the processes and mechanisms of value determination. The way that the Prefect, the Minister D___, and Dupin each conceptualize the purloined letter as having a different representational relationship with value can be used to demonstrate Poe's abductive framework for economy.