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Consequences of fallibilismShand, J. A. January 1986 (has links)
The overall aim of this thesis is to trace the consequences of fallibilism in certain important areas of human intellectual activity. An awareness of the absence of immutable beliefs has profound consequences for many areas; it might be seen as undermining our concepts of knowledge, justification, values, freedom, and indeed rationality and philosophy. The first problem considered is the relation between our theories and the world. General coherence and convergence epistemologies provide no answer. The solution whereby experience is subject to necessary, transcendental, conditions is also rejected, following detailed examination of an area where the expectation of such conditions being found is high- the nature of space. Further standard attempts to impose certain kinds of limits on our choice of concepts, from which metaphysical conclusions can be drawn are seen to fail. Then the function of presuppositions and concepts is examined in detail, and it is concluded that the logic of our talk concerning them is fundamentally muddled. Anti-realism is rejected as an unsatisfactory reaction to fallibilism. Further, it is shown that transcendentalism is an unavailing attempt to save anti-realism from vacuity. In the presence of general fallibilism the notions of knowledge, rationality and justification have to be re-thought. The question of whether we can countenance the possibility of intelligence quite unlike our own is affirmatively answered- a question the anti-realist and transcendentalist should answer negatively. A distinction between subsystems and the global system is introduced and the basis of rationality for the fallibilist is derived from a distinction between questions and answers which make sense within subsystems of concepts and inquiry, but which are senseless at a global level. A need for a fallibilist form of realism is given content through the subsystem and the eroding of a world/concepts dualism at the global level. The existence of knowledge as traditionally thought of is seen to fade under the impact of fallibilism; knowledge is, however, replaced by rational belief which does not require the satisfaction of truth-conditions. This intellectual perspectivism is supported by considering natural man, while the sceptic's position is seen to be as senseless as the assertion of absolutism. Philosophy is also deeply affected by fallibilism and perspectivism and the inevitable natural limits of our minds and language. To this extent we may be deceived in our formulation of problems, and we cannot assume that we are so formed as to be cognitively competent to comprehend all aspects of the world. Once we weaken the grip of an overarching singular rationality, which does not however accept that 'anything goes', philosophical discussion ceases to be stultified by its subjection to inappropriate standards; philosophy can again tackle the problems of value and meaning. This leads on to an examination of fallibilism on our concept of the free society; epistemic theories have real consequences.
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Epistemic Contextualism and Its Problems: A Philosophical CritiqueLi, Qilin 04 1900 (has links)
<p>The purpose of this dissertation is to argue that epistemic contextualism, which proposes that the word ‘know’ is a context-sensitive term, is seriously deficient and therefore indefensible. Since epistemic contextualists claim that their semantic theory of ‘know’ contributes not only to a linguistic model of knowledge ascription but also to a unified solution to some important puzzles in epistemology, I divide my thesis into two basic parts. In the first part (i.e., Chapters 2 and 3), I argue that the proponents of both binary and ternary accounts of the supposed context-sensitivity of ‘know’ fail to provide a reasonable linguistic model of knowledge ascription. My argument in Chapter 1 indicates that ‘know’ cannot be treated as a binary context-sensitive term that is similar to paradigmatic indexical terms or gradable adjectives. Chapter 2 takes contrastivism as a representation of the ternary account of the supposed context-sensitivity of ‘know’ and argues that this theory is in an even worse position because it even fails to capture the supposed phenomena of the context-sensitivity of knowledge ascription. The second part (i.e., Chapters 4, 5, and 6) argues that epistemic contextualism does not provide us with a really satisfactory solution to the puzzles of skepticism, the epistemic closure principle and fallibilism. On the contrary, its rival, invariantism, with some support from pragmatics, psychology of belief and experimental philosophy, is able to solve the above puzzles in a quite nice way. At the end of my thesis (i.e., Chapter 7), I systematize the observations, the evaluations and the critiques of epistemic contextualism from the previous chapters and indicate that epistemic contextualists even fail to establish their supposed phenomena of the context-sensitivity of ‘know.’</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
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Pragmatism's Promise, Naturalism's Prospects: Fallibilism and the "Frieghtage of Eternity"Main, Robert January 2010 (has links)
This dissertation traces the development of classical American pragmatism in the work of C.S. Peirce and Josiah Royce, and its convergence with the naturalist project that currently dominates anglophone philosophy. I argue that naturalism, as it is typically construed, either neglects or underestimates the importance of a rich and nuanced model of selfhood, one that captures not only the biological, but also the cultural features of human persons; what is needed is an account that shows how culture and human selves are themselves "natural." John McDowell has recently offered a promising line of thought which pursues this intuition, but his model has faced heavy criticism and its viability remains questionable. My project, then, is an alternative account that incorporates the best of McDowell's intuitions, but which is immune to the most common objections brought against his model. I proceed by focusing on one aspect of what it means to be a human person that has enormous significance for all areas of philosophical inquiry and which has a rich, if often overlooked, philosophical history. This is the inherent finitude or ignorance which characterizes human knowledge and practice, what Peirce referred to as "fallibilism." Peirce's notion of fallibilism, which today remains his greatest legacy, tempers philosophical discussions of universal concepts such as truth and "the good" by way of considerations of scope and context, forcing such abstractions to find their place within the practical environments of actual lived existence. I offer that Peirce is perhaps a unique figure in the Western philosophical tradition with respect to the importance he gives to fallibilism and in his understanding the doctrine not only in terms of its negative consequences, but also a positive theory that generates a practical response to the sort of existential crisis introduced by the recognition of human fallibility and finitude. Ultimately, Pierce offers a naturalized model of the self which is both a semiotic artifact and communal in nature. The self is a sign that emerges within an interpretive community and which manifests itself as an individual primarily through its fallibility. As such, the self is a cultural artifact, but Peirce's metaphysics makes this a natural process continuous with those processes studied by natural sciences. As a scientist, he was committed to naturalism but not reductionism; his account, therefore, embraces the work of culture and the importance of cultural idioms which are often left out of modern naturalist projects. In this, Peirce offers a promising way to fulfill McDowell's project of "naturalizing" culture and "re-enchanting" nature, thereby eliminating the gap between "mind and the world." However, despite its importance to his philosophical system, Peirce's explicit treatment of selfhood is notably unfocused. It is therefore necessary to couple his philosophical system with that of another of the classical pragmatists who was deeply influenced by Peirce's philosophy but who extended its development into detailed discussions of selfhood and community. The figure I have in mind is Josiah Royce. Royce's philosophy hinges on two central notions, loyalty and community. Loyalty is, for Royce, the means by which individual selves are connected with communities and moral concerns. For Royce, loyalty is given first and foremost to an individual community. However his development of this concept comes to include loyalty to loyalty itself, thus making an individual's loyalty to a particular community continuous with a loyalty to a global community. Moreover, his account of community picks up on Peirce's semiotic theory of interpretation, and connects his account of the individual with Peirce's metaphysical and epistemological concerns. I read the theory of selfhood Royce develops as providing the crucial element that Peirce's philosophical system requires but does not explicitly provide. Throughout this discussion, I show how this model is a promising direction for the future course of contemporary philosophical naturalism. / Philosophy
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Teoria e explicação na filosofia de David Hume: uma abordagem falibilista? / Theory and explanation in the philosophy of David Hume: an approach fallibility?Santos, Erickson Cristiano dos 28 February 2011 (has links)
Este trabalho tem o objetivo de apresentar uma interpretação da filosofia de Hume com ênfase na sua epistemologia. Após uma exposição sobre diversos tópicos que estão presentes na sua teoria do conhecimento, aborda-se o ceticismo moderado, mitigado, e as influências filosóficas sobre Hume. A construção do conceito de natureza humana deve-se, em parte, ao método que ele herdou da filosofia natural, uma influência decisiva na sua metodologia. Essa direção da pesquisa permite ler o ceticismo humeano aplicado ao conhecimento com uma preocupação menos dogmática do que, geralmente, se atribui a ele. Pode-se admitir, se houver uma compreensão clara dos conceitos de experiência, teoria, explicação e razão, uma possibilidade falibilista da epistemologia de Hume. Essa abordagem permite aproximar a teoria do conhecimento humeana do falibilismo de Peirce, em certa medida. Assim, ao apresentar o que é uma teoria em Hume, chega-se ao resultado de que ele fez uma teoria que não tão cética, mas deve ser aceita como a única e, portanto, a melhor teoria. / This paper aims to present an interpretation of Hume\'s philosophy with its emphasis on epistemology. After a presentation on various topics that are present in his theory of knowledge, addresses the moderate skepticism, mitigated, and the philosophical influences on Hume. The construction of the concept of human nature is due, in part, he inherited the method of natural philosophy, a decisive influence on his methodology. This direction of research enables read Humean skepticism applied to knowledge with a concern less dogmatic than it usually is attributed to him. You can assume if there is a clear understanding of the concepts of experience, theory, explanation and reason, a possibility fallibility of Hume\'s epistemology. This approach allows us to approach the Humean theory of knowledge of Peirce\'s fallibilism to some extent. Thus, in presenting what is a theory in Hume, one arrives at the result that a theory that he did not so skeptical, but must be accepted as the only and therefore a better theory.
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A filosofia de Peirce enquanto fundamento da ética do discursoZanette, José Luiz 22 May 2012 (has links)
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Previous issue date: 2012-05-22 / Habermas, with the publication of essays Truth and Justification, revises his formal pragmatics related to philosophical questions of truth, justification, correctness and moral legitimacy. He adopts the fallibilism for his concept of truth in accordance with the Peirce's philosophy and indicates, for issues that require moral correctness, an epistemic realism without representation that arranges itself with a moral constructivism that is not, in turn, a mere contextualism when he claims a pretension of uncondicionality for moral legitimacy under the assumption of an independent world and more or less the same for everyone. To these ends, Habermas maintains, in his formal pragmatics, an "almost" ideal condition to speech, which keeps the tension between empiric and ideal. In addition, in adjusting his ethics, Habermas refutes the Peircean concept of final opinion of inquirers to ensure the fallible propositions taken as true, because he considers this request a priori, directive and transcendental, not applicable to the consensus of those involved in moral phenomena. It has been observed, however, that the solution of integrating all these philosophical questions given by Habermas, specially for the tension of ideality within his pragmatic bias embodies substantial elements from Peirce's philosophy, that allows to assert that in updating his moral philosophy, there is an extension and elaboration of what existed in suggestions and roots in classical pragmatism, which Peirce did not accomplish / Habermas, com a publicação dos ensaios de Verdade e Justificação, reelabora a sua
pragmática formal em relação às questões filosóficas de verdade, justificação, correção e
legitimidade moral. Adota o falibilismo para o conceito de verdade em conformidade com a
filosofia de Peirce e indica, para as questões requerentes de correção moral, um realismo
epistêmico sem representação que se concilie com um construtivismo moral que não seja, por
sua vez, mero contextualismo quando reivindica pretensão de incondicionalidade para a
legitimação moral na suposição de um mundo independente e mais ou menos igual para
todos. Para esses fins, Habermas conserva, na pragmática formal, uma condição "quase" ideal
de fala, o que mantém a tensão entre ideal e empírico. Em complemento, no ajuste de sua
ética, Habermas refuta o conceito peirciano da opinião final dos investigadores para assegurar
as falíveis proposições tidas como verdadeiras, pois considera essa requisição a priori,
diretiva e transcendental, não aplicável ao consenso dos envolvidos nos fenômenos morais.
Observa-se, no entanto, que a solução de integração de todas essas questões filosóficas dadas
por Habermas, principalmente para a tensão da idealidade dentro de seu viés pragmático,
incorpora substanciais elementos da filosofia de Peirce e permite afirmar que, na atualização
de sua filosofia moral, há uma extensão e elaboração do que havia de sugestões e raízes no
pragmatismo clássico, o que Peirce não realizou
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Teoria e explicação na filosofia de David Hume: uma abordagem falibilista? / Theory and explanation in the philosophy of David Hume: an approach fallibility?Erickson Cristiano dos Santos 28 February 2011 (has links)
Este trabalho tem o objetivo de apresentar uma interpretação da filosofia de Hume com ênfase na sua epistemologia. Após uma exposição sobre diversos tópicos que estão presentes na sua teoria do conhecimento, aborda-se o ceticismo moderado, mitigado, e as influências filosóficas sobre Hume. A construção do conceito de natureza humana deve-se, em parte, ao método que ele herdou da filosofia natural, uma influência decisiva na sua metodologia. Essa direção da pesquisa permite ler o ceticismo humeano aplicado ao conhecimento com uma preocupação menos dogmática do que, geralmente, se atribui a ele. Pode-se admitir, se houver uma compreensão clara dos conceitos de experiência, teoria, explicação e razão, uma possibilidade falibilista da epistemologia de Hume. Essa abordagem permite aproximar a teoria do conhecimento humeana do falibilismo de Peirce, em certa medida. Assim, ao apresentar o que é uma teoria em Hume, chega-se ao resultado de que ele fez uma teoria que não tão cética, mas deve ser aceita como a única e, portanto, a melhor teoria. / This paper aims to present an interpretation of Hume\'s philosophy with its emphasis on epistemology. After a presentation on various topics that are present in his theory of knowledge, addresses the moderate skepticism, mitigated, and the philosophical influences on Hume. The construction of the concept of human nature is due, in part, he inherited the method of natural philosophy, a decisive influence on his methodology. This direction of research enables read Humean skepticism applied to knowledge with a concern less dogmatic than it usually is attributed to him. You can assume if there is a clear understanding of the concepts of experience, theory, explanation and reason, a possibility fallibility of Hume\'s epistemology. This approach allows us to approach the Humean theory of knowledge of Peirce\'s fallibilism to some extent. Thus, in presenting what is a theory in Hume, one arrives at the result that a theory that he did not so skeptical, but must be accepted as the only and therefore a better theory.
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Falibilismus a sémiotika Charlese Sanderse Peirce / Fallibilism and Semiotics of Charles Sanders PeirceMacháček, Martin January 2018 (has links)
This thesis consists of the analysis of Peirce's essays Questions Concering Certain Faculties Claimed for Man and Some Consequences of Four Incapacities focused on the genesis of fallibilism and its dependence on the theory of representation. Peirce's epistemological position here is articulated as a rejection of foundationalism and its conditions (e.g. intuition and introspection) that are understood to be unfounded hypotheses due the character of our knowledge of the outside world. The aim of this thesis is to find out how Peirce's epistemology can work without the certainty of foundationalism. Keywords: Peirce, fallibilism, representation, critique of foundationalism, inference, epistemology
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Vad digitala verktyg har att erbjuda : En analys av vilka synsätt på matematik som erbjuds i undervisning där digitala verktyg förekommer / What digital tools have to offer : An analysis of which views of mathematics are offered through education where digital resources are usedSollerman, Svante, Johansson, Hanna January 2022 (has links)
There are many ways to view mathematics, two of the most prominent ways are absolutism and fallibilism where you view mathematical concepts as something static or ever changing respectively. In school it has been shown that students with a fallibilistic view have an easier time solving problems than those who see mathematics absolutisticly. On pace with the digitization of the Swedish school where digital tools are becoming more common, we wonder what views of mathematics those platforms offer, and what views are expressed by the students in their interaction with them. To answer these questions we have analysed observations and interviews with three students. The observations have been done during a lesson where the students have used digital tools, such as NOKflex which is a learning platform while the interviews were qualitative and had the students answer questions about how they work with digital tools in different subjects. The result of this study shows that NOKflex primarily offers an absolutist view, but the students express both an absolutist and fallibilistic way of thinking during the lesson and the interview. A conclusion drawn from this is that these views are not mutually exclusive to each other and a primary factor to what view is expressed depends on the context of the situation. Due to the absolutist view NOKflex offers students problem solving and reasoning skills suffer.
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Epistemological Negativism and Scientific Knowledge.Khan, Galib A. 07 1900 (has links)
<p>Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Ernst Mach expressed his worries about obscurities and metaphysical elements in scientific knowledge, and consequently
contributed to the development of a Viennese tradition. Later on, Vienna Circle further extended Mach's ideas and led to the development of the logical positivist movement.
Among the main tenets of this movement is the view that scientific theories are to be reduced to an empirical base capable of conclusive verification. But scientific theories
are usually based on unverified and occasionally unverifiable hypotheses and principles. Thus, once this is realized, positivism in spite of itself will contribute to
the development of scepticism about scientific knowledge.</p>
<p>In reaction to the verificationism, however, Karl Popper developed his thesis of falsificationism or fallibilism; but this principle also leads to scepticism at least about certainty claims, with far reaching consequences. This chain of events leads to the development of Paul Feyerabend's epistemological anarchisma a rejection
of all rules and methods in science in an attempt to reduce science to the level of irrationality and mythology.</p>
<p>Against the negativist conclusions of these positions about science, the integrity of scientific knowledge is defended in this thesis. It is shown how scientific knowledge can be defended against scepticism of the type to which verificationism tends: this is done by examining one recent and rigorous sceptical position which undermines not only certainty and rationality of knowledge claims, but the very possibility of knowledge. By examining Popper's fallibilism, it is shown that science can also be defended against the negativist conclusions of fallibilism. Similarly, it is shown that
Feyerabend's epistemological anarchism cannot either undermine scientific knowledge.</p>
<p>These negativist positions, though they have received strong criticisms in some quarters, yet have not been examined all together, from the standpoint of their impact on the integrity of scientific knowledge. This task is undertaken in this thesis; we thus arrive at a positive and correct evaluation of scientific knowledge in the context of contemporary negativist epistemological trends. It has been shown that in spite of all the negativist arguments of the above positions, we can obtain certainty, justification, and truth in science, and thus we can obtain knowledge. But my rejection of negativism in science does not entail, and should not be construed as an advocacy of a return to, positivism.</p> / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
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Rationality in inquiry : on the revisability of cognitive standardsNilsson, Jonas January 2000 (has links)
The topic of this study is to what extent standards of rational inquiry can be rationally criticized and revised. It is argued that it is rational to treat all such standards as open to criticism and revision. Arguments to the effect that we are fallible with regard to all standards of rational inquiry are presented. Standards cannot be ultimately justified and with certainty established either as adequate or as inescapable presuppositions. Apel's attempt to give ultimate justifications of certain moral and logical rules is examined and criticized. Special attention is given to our fallibility with regard to logical inference rules. The idea that certain logical rules cannot be put into question because any critical argument presupposes them is criticized. It has been claimed that there must be some basic standards which are such that they cannot be rationally evaluated and hence are rationally unrevisable. This is called "the unrevisability thesis". Related to this thesis is the normative policy according to which rationality requires that some standards be treated as unrevisable, the unrevisability policy. Two arguments that have been used to defend the unrevisability thesis and policy are examined and criticized. The conclusion is that we are not forced to accept either the thesis or the policy. The negation of the unrevisability policy is the revisability policy, according to which it is rational to treat all standards as open to rational criticism and revision. Objections that have been directed against the revisability policy are discussed and criticized. According to the objections, the revisability policy leads to rationality relativism. These objections are refuted, and it is argued that it is, on the contrary, rational to adopt the revisability policy and treat all standards of rational inquiry as criticizable and revisable. It is proposed that the rational change of standards should be viewed as a bootstrap process. General features of a bootstrap view of rational change of standards are presented, and it is argued that it is impossible to formulate a real theory of bootstrapping. Two models of standard change are presented and discussed: Laudan's reticulated model of scientific rationality and Briskman's bootstrap theory. It is claimed that in spite of defects and limitations, these models contribute to a richer understanding of bootstrapping. The fallibility and revisability of standards of rational inquiry have consequences for how the normativity of rationality should be understood. The book ends with an account of how the rationality of cognitive actions is related to the idea of the adequacy of standards. A distinction between absolute and standard-relative rationality is made, and it is argued that what an inquiring agent rationally ought to do coincides with what it is standard-relatively rational for him to do. It is shown that this view of rationality of inquiry is nevertheless inconsistent with rationality relativism, and that it is compatible with an objectivistic view of rationality. / digitalisering@umu
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