The ‘Demarcation Problem’ is to mark the boundary between things that are scientific and things that are not. Philosophers have worked on this problem for a long time, and yet there is still no consensus solution. Should we continue to hope, or must we draw a more sceptical conclusion? In his paper, ‘The Demise of the Demarcation Problem’, Larry Laudan (1983) does the latter. In this thesis, I address the three arguments he gives for this conclusion. / The Pessimistic Induction: From the failure of many specific past attempts at demarcation, Laudan infers that all future attempts at demarcation will fail. For his argument to be fully convincing, Laudan needs to show that each attempt has been a complete failure, and that these failures have never led to progress in the theory of demarcation. I argue that many past attempts at demarcation have only resulted in partial failure, and many of these failures have led to some cumulative progress. So I think we can draw a more optimistic conclusion: future attempts at demarcation may be even more successful than past attempts. / The Pseudo-Problem: Laudan argues that the demarcation problem presupposes an ‘epistemic invariant’: something common to all and only the sciences, which makes them epistemically special. But, says Laudan, this presumption is false – so, by definition, the issue is merely a pseudo-problem. I find Laudan’s argument unconvincing. I present reasons for thinking that the demarcation problem does not, in fact, presuppose an extremely simple epistemic invariant. Furthermore, there may still be a satisfactory, moderately complex epistemic invariant to be found. So I do not think any false assumption is presupposed. / The New Problem: Laudan argues that we should replace the original demarcation problem with a new demarcation problem. I take this to be the problem of demarcating between well-confirmed and ill-confirmed theories. I argue that scientific status is relevant to the confirmation of theories, so the two problems are closely related. I also argue that science has other purposes; so scientific status indicates other virtues besides well-confirmedness. Thus we do want to know which theories and activities are scientific, because this will help us to decide which theories and activities to pursue. So this new demarcation problem is not a suitable replacement for the original problem. / My central question is ‘Has Laudan killed the demarcation problem?’, and my answer is ‘No!’.

A investigação aqui realizada examina o papel que os valores cognitivos e nãocognitivos desempenham nas práticas científicas. Essa análise fundamenta-se em uma comparação entre os modelos propostos por Hugh Lacey e por Larry Laudan para explicar a dinâmica da atividade científica. Veremos que, no modelo desenvolvido por Lacey, cuja idéia central reside nas estratégias de pesquisa, ambos os tipos de valor possuem papéis legítimos na atividade científica. Já no modelo reticulado, proposto por Laudan, o autor admite apenas os valores cognitivos como constituintes da racionalidade científica. A partir de uma comparação entre ambos os modelos, pretendemos mostrar que o modelo de Lacey parece ser mais abrangente do que o modelo reticulado, na medida em que este último poderia ser considerado como uma parte do primeiro. / The present investigation examines the role of cognitive and non-cognitive values in scientific practices. This analysis is based on a comparison between the models proposed by Hugh Lacey and Larry Laudan to explain the dynamics of scientific activity. We will see that in Laceys model, whose main idea are the strategies of investigation, both kinds of values have legitimate roles in scientific activity. In the reticulated model, proposed by Laudan, the author admits only cognitive values as constitutive of scientific rationality. Based on a comparison between both models, we will try to show that Laceys model seems broader than the reticulated model, in the sense that the reticulated one could be considered as a part of Laceys model.

A investigação aqui realizada examina o papel que os valores cognitivos e nãocognitivos desempenham nas práticas científicas. Essa análise fundamenta-se em uma comparação entre os modelos propostos por Hugh Lacey e por Larry Laudan para explicar a dinâmica da atividade científica. Veremos que, no modelo desenvolvido por Lacey, cuja idéia central reside nas estratégias de pesquisa, ambos os tipos de valor possuem papéis legítimos na atividade científica. Já no modelo reticulado, proposto por Laudan, o autor admite apenas os valores cognitivos como constituintes da racionalidade científica. A partir de uma comparação entre ambos os modelos, pretendemos mostrar que o modelo de Lacey parece ser mais abrangente do que o modelo reticulado, na medida em que este último poderia ser considerado como uma parte do primeiro. / The present investigation examines the role of cognitive and non-cognitive values in scientific practices. This analysis is based on a comparison between the models proposed by Hugh Lacey and Larry Laudan to explain the dynamics of scientific activity. We will see that in Laceys model, whose main idea are the strategies of investigation, both kinds of values have legitimate roles in scientific activity. In the reticulated model, proposed by Laudan, the author admits only cognitive values as constitutive of scientific rationality. Based on a comparison between both models, we will try to show that Laceys model seems broader than the reticulated model, in the sense that the reticulated one could be considered as a part of Laceys model.

The aim of this dissertation is to explore the nature of scientific progress and to broaden existing theories of what constitutes progress in science. I do this by means of a close analysis of the main post-Kuhnian philosophical accounts of scientific progress, namely those put forward by Imre Lakatos, Larry Laudan and Philip Kitcher. I test these three accounts by reconstructing a series of scientific episodes in evolutionary ecology in terms of each account and then assessing the degree to which each account incorporates what is progressive. The episodes I have selected concern the resource competition research of Dolph Schluter on Galapagos finches and related work leading up to it. After distinguishing between macroscopic and microscopic levels in science, I attend carefully to the microscopic level of each episode as it relates to epistemic progress. This investigation demonstrates that some important aspects of scientific progress have been overlooked. I conclude that there are three main ways in which the philosophies of science surveyed do not adequately represent instances of scientific progress. First, the accumulation of factual knowledge is not well accommodated. Second, the role of evidence and argument in scientific theories is not adequately captured. Third, the fine-grained level at which much important epistemic progress in science occurs is often not accounted for. These criticisms relate to a more general tendency of contemporary philosophical accounts to emphasize the macroscopic level of entire research programmes and traditions while failing to attend to the microscopic level of progress inherent in a detailed case study. I end by offering a positive account of scientific progress in light of these criticisms.

The aim of this dissertation is to explore the nature of scientific progress and to broaden existing theories of what constitutes progress in science. I do this by means of a close analysis of the main post-Kuhnian philosophical accounts of scientific progress, namely those put forward by Imre Lakatos, Larry Laudan and Philip Kitcher. I test these three accounts by reconstructing a series of scientific episodes in evolutionary ecology in terms of each account and then assessing the degree to which each account incorporates what is progressive. The episodes I have selected concern the resource competition research of Dolph Schluter on Galapagos finches and related work leading up to it. After distinguishing between macroscopic and microscopic levels in science, I attend carefully to the microscopic level of each episode as it relates to epistemic progress. This investigation demonstrates that some important aspects of scientific progress have been overlooked. I conclude that there are three main ways in which the philosophies of science surveyed do not adequately represent instances of scientific progress. First, the accumulation of factual knowledge is not well accommodated. Second, the role of evidence and argument in scientific theories is not adequately captured. Third, the fine-grained level at which much important epistemic progress in science occurs is often not accounted for. These criticisms relate to a more general tendency of contemporary philosophical accounts to emphasize the macroscopic level of entire research programmes and traditions while failing to attend to the microscopic level of progress inherent in a detailed case study. I end by offering a positive account of scientific progress in light of these criticisms. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

The problem of demarcation continues to attract attention, in part because solutions are perceived to have enormous social significance. The civic motivation, however, I argue is in tension with the heterogeneity of the sciences. Philosophers of science would be better employed reflecting on the features, causes, and consequences, of created, scientific controversies. These arise when relevant experts are in broad agreement about what conclusions can sensibly be drawn from available evidence, but the public perceives an expert community deeply divided and conclusions that are plagued by profound and systemic uncertainty. In the second part of the paper I explore this concept further.

The topic of this study is to what extent standards of rational inquiry can be rationally criticized and revised. It is argued that it is rational to treat all such standards as open to criticism and revision. Arguments to the effect that we are fallible with regard to all standards of rational inquiry are presented. Standards cannot be ultimately justified and with certainty established either as adequate or as inescapable presuppositions. Apel's attempt to give ultimate justifications of certain moral and logical rules is examined and criticized. Special attention is given to our fallibility with regard to logical inference rules. The idea that certain logical rules cannot be put into question because any critical argument presupposes them is criticized. It has been claimed that there must be some basic standards which are such that they cannot be rationally evaluated and hence are rationally unrevisable. This is called "the unrevisability thesis". Related to this thesis is the normative policy according to which rationality requires that some standards be treated as unrevisable, the unrevisability policy. Two arguments that have been used to defend the unrevisability thesis and policy are examined and criticized. The conclusion is that we are not forced to accept either the thesis or the policy. The negation of the unrevisability policy is the revisability policy, according to which it is rational to treat all standards as open to rational criticism and revision. Objections that have been directed against the revisability policy are discussed and criticized. According to the objections, the revisability policy leads to rationality relativism. These objections are refuted, and it is argued that it is, on the contrary, rational to adopt the revisability policy and treat all standards of rational inquiry as criticizable and revisable. It is proposed that the rational change of standards should be viewed as a bootstrap process. General features of a bootstrap view of rational change of standards are presented, and it is argued that it is impossible to formulate a real theory of bootstrapping. Two models of standard change are presented and discussed: Laudan's reticulated model of scientific rationality and Briskman's bootstrap theory. It is claimed that in spite of defects and limitations, these models contribute to a richer understanding of bootstrapping. The fallibility and revisability of standards of rational inquiry have consequences for how the normativity of rationality should be understood. The book ends with an account of how the rationality of cognitive actions is related to the idea of the adequacy of standards. A distinction between absolute and standard-relative rationality is made, and it is argued that what an inquiring agent rationally ought to do coincides with what it is standard-relatively rational for him to do. It is shown that this view of rationality of inquiry is nevertheless inconsistent with rationality relativism, and that it is compatible with an objectivistic view of rationality. / digitalisering@umu

One common approach to managing the inevitable erroneous convictions and erroneous acquittals produced by criminal justice systems is to employ various means (rules and procedures) to decrease the number of erroneous convictions at the expense of increasing, even many more times, the number of erroneous acquittals. Blackstone’s famous dictum (1765) that “[i]t is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer” (“the Blackstone ratio”), and others like it, have inspired this error distributing approach to error management. A mathematical analysis is provided demonstrating that, under certain conditions (“the R-conditions”), error distributing approaches result in criminal justice systems that function worse, by all quantitative measures (including the number of innocents convicted), than similar systems in which defendants are randomly acquitted. These results follow from one of a pair of derived fundamental equations applicable to all criminal justice systems, regardless of circumstance. Thus, the results hold irrespective of the means used to avoid convicting the guilty and challenge those who wish to engage in a particular error distributing approach to show that the R-conditions do not obtain for that approach (with reasonably convincing accuracy). Further, the results presented herein identify an upper bound to the Blackstone ratio, according to one conception of that ratio. / text

Ce mémoire propose une conception naturaliste et normative de l'axiologie scientifique contemporaine, c'est-à-dire des buts de la science et des scientifiques. Nous commençons par présenter le naturalisme en philosophie des sciences, en particulier ses dimensions scientifique, méthodologique et ontologique. Nous discutons le sophisme naturaliste et l'objection de la normativité souvent adressée aux approches naturalistes, principalement à travers le prisme de l'épistémologie naturalisée de Quine (1969). Nous illustrons ensuite ces thèmes - naturalisme, normativité, et axiologie scientifique - au moyen de la théorie de Laudan (1987), qui articule un début de théorie axiologique de la science qui se veut naturaliste et normative. Nous soulignons le caractère insatisfaisant de sa théorie, et proposons une conception plus riche et plus détaillée de l'axiologie scientifique. Nous analysons pour ce faire différents liens entre la science, l'industrie, le gouvernement et la société. Nous dégageons en particulier une tendance axiologique pragmatique de la science contemporaine. Finalement, nous ébauchons un cadre normatif instrumental inspiré de Laudan (1987)pour réfléchir sur l'axiologie scientifique. / This master proposes a naturalist and normative conception of contemporary scientific axiology, i.e., of science's and scientists' goals. We start off by discussing some naturalistic positions in philosophy of science, their scientific, methodological and ontological dimensions as well. We review the naturalistic fallacy and the normativity objection against naturalistic approaches, mostly in light of Quine's (1969) naturalized epistemology. We then illustrate these themes - naturalism, normativity, and scientific axiology - by discussing Laudan's (1987) naturalistic and normative theory of scientific axiology. We underscore the unsatisfying character of his theory, and propose instead a richer and more detailed one. In order to do that, we analyse some relations between science, industry, government and society. We identify and discuss a pragmatic axiological trend in particular. Finally, we sketch an instrumental normative framework for thinking about scientific axiology.

Ce mémoire propose une conception naturaliste et normative de l'axiologie scientifique contemporaine, c'est-à-dire des buts de la science et des scientifiques. Nous commençons par présenter le naturalisme en philosophie des sciences, en particulier ses dimensions scientifique, méthodologique et ontologique. Nous discutons le sophisme naturaliste et l'objection de la normativité souvent adressée aux approches naturalistes, principalement à travers le prisme de l'épistémologie naturalisée de Quine (1969). Nous illustrons ensuite ces thèmes - naturalisme, normativité, et axiologie scientifique - au moyen de la théorie de Laudan (1987), qui articule un début de théorie axiologique de la science qui se veut naturaliste et normative. Nous soulignons le caractère insatisfaisant de sa théorie, et proposons une conception plus riche et plus détaillée de l'axiologie scientifique. Nous analysons pour ce faire différents liens entre la science, l'industrie, le gouvernement et la société. Nous dégageons en particulier une tendance axiologique pragmatique de la science contemporaine. Finalement, nous ébauchons un cadre normatif instrumental inspiré de Laudan (1987)pour réfléchir sur l'axiologie scientifique. / This master proposes a naturalist and normative conception of contemporary scientific axiology, i.e., of science's and scientists' goals. We start off by discussing some naturalistic positions in philosophy of science, their scientific, methodological and ontological dimensions as well. We review the naturalistic fallacy and the normativity objection against naturalistic approaches, mostly in light of Quine's (1969) naturalized epistemology. We then illustrate these themes - naturalism, normativity, and scientific axiology - by discussing Laudan's (1987) naturalistic and normative theory of scientific axiology. We underscore the unsatisfying character of his theory, and propose instead a richer and more detailed one. In order to do that, we analyse some relations between science, industry, government and society. We identify and discuss a pragmatic axiological trend in particular. Finally, we sketch an instrumental normative framework for thinking about scientific axiology.