Fiqh, literally 'deep understanding', is the science of religious law in Islam. What does it mean for an Islamic jurist to 'do fiqh'? And how does an engagement with fiqh guide a jurist to produce statements of law for particular social contexts? These are perennial questions in the field of Islamic legal studies. The current thesis offers an answer to these questions from the viewpoint of jurists from the early classical Ḥanafī tradition of Central Asia. The thesis starts with an examination of Central-Asian Ḥanafī works of legal theory to extract the underlying epistemological foundations of this legal tradition. The remainder of the thesis presents a series of investigations into a leading work of legal commentary - the Hidāyah of Burhān al-Dīn 'Alī ibn Abī Bakr al-Marghīnānī (d. 593/1197) - to assess how these epistemological foundations inform the work. These investigations range from a study of the processes by which the legal cases commented on in the work were seen to be authoritative, to a study of the use of rational arguments, dialectical sequences and juristic disagreement in exploring and expositing cases of the law. The thesis also studies points of theory employed in the commentary that reveal how social context was seen to impact on the production of law. The study concludes by suggesting a general theory of Ḥanafī jurisprudence, explaining what it means to 'do fiqh' - presented as a particular form of engagement with the legal cases transmitted from the teaching circle of Abū Ḥanīfah (d. 150/767), the school's eponym - and how this fiqh engagement with Ḥanafī precedent informed the production of legal statements tailored to specific contexts - by the application of a particular filter of legal mechanisms, each of which reflects an understanding of the overarching principle of 'necessity' (ḍarūrah). The study presents a uniquely Ḥanafī legal epistemology which is underpinned by particular notions of authority, rationality and tradition.

Submitted by Fabio Sobreira Campos da Costa (fabio.sobreira@ufpe.br) on 2017-06-22T14:19:26Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 811 bytes, checksum: e39d27027a6cc9cb039ad269a5db8e34 (MD5) DISSERTAÇÃO COMPLETA.pdf: 1175952 bytes, checksum: a828e1732995b6bfc8de572793aba76d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-06-22T14:19:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 811 bytes, checksum: e39d27027a6cc9cb039ad269a5db8e34 (MD5) DISSERTAÇÃO COMPLETA.pdf: 1175952 bytes, checksum: a828e1732995b6bfc8de572793aba76d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-02-16 / CAPES / O problema da definição do conceito do direito ou ao menos da caracterização do fenômeno jurídico apresenta variações quanto às implicações de sua solução e às preocupações em torno dele. As variedades do problema que interessam a este trabalho estão ligadas à ontologia e à epistemologia na filosofia do direito: ‘O que é o direito?’ enquanto (1) uma pergunta sobre a definição da essência do direito e (2) sobre a definição de um objeto de investigação específico para ciências sobre o suposto fenômeno jurídico – a filosofia do direito, a teoria do direito, a e a ciência do direito, por exemplo. Desafiando suas premissas e buscando evitar tanto o problema ontológico quanto o epistemológico, proponho uma mudança de perspectiva a partir de preocupações pragmáticas que chamo de “ponto de vista do gestor”: a visão de quem deve administrar os recursos econômicos finitos destinados a financiar a atividade científica na área de direito. Defendo que, partindo daí, o problema da definição do conceito do direito enquanto um problema ontológico e enquanto um problema epistemológico é desnecessário, cuja solução é inútil para fazer avançar as pesquisas na área de direito. Proponho uma reorientação da controvérsia que tem implicações sobre como ver a pesquisa e a educação nesse campo. / The problem of definition of the concept of law or at least the description of features of legal phenomenon presents variation about the implications of its solution and about the worries around it. The forms of this problem I am interested in are related to ontology and epistemology in legal philosophy: ‘What is the law?’ as (1) a question about the definition of the essence of law and (2) about the definition of a specific object of investigation for sciences about the supposed legal phenomenon – philosophy of law, legal theory, and science of law, for instance. Challenging its premises and trying to avoid both the ontological problem and epistemological problem, I propose a change of perspective from pragmatic concerns what I call the “manager's point of view”: a vision of who should manage the finite economic resources to finance scientific activity in the area of law. I argue that, starting from there, the problem of defining the concept of law as an ontological problem and as a epistemological problem is an unnecessary problem whose solution is useless to advance research in the field of law. I propose a reorientation of the controversy that has implications on how to see the researches and the education in this field.

Cette thèse interroge l’idée, fondamentale dans la philosophie juridique française, qui consiste à opposer formellement le droit et la science du droit. Cette opposition est l'application à la recherche en droit du dualisme sujet/objet, importée de la philosophie scientifique. Elle a conduit l'épistémologie juridique positiviste à déterminer des règles strictes en vue d'accéder à une véritable recherche scientifique sur le droit. Cependant, les théories sémantiques qui poursuivent les lignes de l'opposition du droit et de la science du droit reposent sur des bases fragiles et contestables. En particulier, la dissociation entre le langage juridique et le langage de la science du droit semble avoir été forcée par l'épistémologie juridique en vue d’entretenir l'idée d'une science du droit. Il semble toutefois possible de concevoir la recherche en droit autrement qu'en ayant recours aux fondamentaux de la philosophie scientifique. La philosophie herméneutique, fondée sur le rapport sujet/sujet, a été approfondie pour concevoir l'idée que le droit, pour les chercheurs en droit, consiste en une discussion à laquelle il leur importe de participer. Dans ce cadre, les prétentions à la scientificité par les chercheurs en droit doivent être interrogées, ainsi que les règles épistémologiques qui encouragent à la dissimulation d'un engagement dans la discussion juridique. Il importe au contraire de reconnaître la liberté des chercheurs en droit dans leur participation à la résolution de problèmes juridiques, ainsi que de saisir l’éclectisme de la recherche en droit au sein d’une épistémologie juridique démocratique. L’idée de science du droit est un obstacle à ces interrogations / The broad questions this work is addressing focus on the stringent opposition between law and legal science. Such a distinguishing is crucial for french philosophy. It assume the application to legal research of a subject/object dualism imported from scientific philosophy. It has led legal positivist epistemology to determine strict rules in order to access a genuine scientific legal scholarship. But the semantic theories which justifie the opposition of law and the science of law are based on tenuous and questionable bases. The dissociation between legal language and the language of legal science seems to have been forced by legal epistemology in order to preserve and maintain the idea of a legal science. It seems possible, however, to conceive of legal scholarship without any help from the fundamentals of scientific philosophy. The hermeneutic philosophy, based on the subject/subject relationship, has been helpful to conceive that the legal scholars’ law is a discussion, and not an object, and that they participate in. In this context, claims to scientificity from legal scholars must be questioned, as well as epistemological rules that encourage the concealment of commitment in legal discussion. On the contrary, it is important to recognize the freedom of legal scholars to participate in the resolution of legal issues, as well as to conceive this participation through a democratic legal epistemology. It seems that the idea of the science of law is an obstacle to these questions

One common approach to managing the inevitable erroneous convictions and erroneous acquittals produced by criminal justice systems is to employ various means (rules and procedures) to decrease the number of erroneous convictions at the expense of increasing, even many more times, the number of erroneous acquittals. Blackstone’s famous dictum (1765) that “[i]t is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer” (“the Blackstone ratio”), and others like it, have inspired this error distributing approach to error management. A mathematical analysis is provided demonstrating that, under certain conditions (“the R-conditions”), error distributing approaches result in criminal justice systems that function worse, by all quantitative measures (including the number of innocents convicted), than similar systems in which defendants are randomly acquitted. These results follow from one of a pair of derived fundamental equations applicable to all criminal justice systems, regardless of circumstance. Thus, the results hold irrespective of the means used to avoid convicting the guilty and challenge those who wish to engage in a particular error distributing approach to show that the R-conditions do not obtain for that approach (with reasonably convincing accuracy). Further, the results presented herein identify an upper bound to the Blackstone ratio, according to one conception of that ratio. / text

Submitted by Maicon Juliano Schmidt (maicons) on 2015-04-01T15:50:11Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Rafael Tomaz de Oliveira.pdf: 1249853 bytes, checksum: 2118f3f943026ccb69acf5e2334dd9c7 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-01T15:50:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rafael Tomaz de Oliveira.pdf: 1249853 bytes, checksum: 2118f3f943026ccb69acf5e2334dd9c7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-03-19 / CNPQ – Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / As presentes reflexões têm como objeto a decisão judicial e pretendem investigar as condições sob as quais se assenta uma decisão judicial. Vale dizer, pretende-se aqui dar conta daquilo que acontece e está implicado no momento em que uma questão jurídica é decidida. Pretende-se tomar o fenômeno da decisão judicial como objeto da análise para perguntar por aquilo que o sustenta e que está pressuposto na atividade do agente decisor. Quer-se saber se é possível afirmar a existência de um tecido básico que indique como os conceitos que são articulados e operacionalizados pelo autor de uma decisão jurídica podem produzir sentido. Essas questões colocam, no primeiro plano da análise, o problema da recuperação do sentido histórico e as possibilidades teóricas que nisso estão implicadas. As respostas a essas questões demandam a construção de ferramentas teóricas que permitam investigar o elemento da historicidade do sentido. Essa investigação se vale da hermenêutica produzida no século XX complementada pelo elemento epistemológico da história dos conceitos e da metaforologia para construir o seu quadro teórico de análise. Valendo-se desses instrumentos, a pesquisa procura apontar para o fato de que as abordagens que incorporam as bipolaridades tradicionais para retratar o problema da decisão, tais quais: universal-particular; direito-fato; lei-caso etc., acabam por eclipsar o verdadeiro elemento basal que sustenta a experiência jurídica e que emerge das configurações culturais e morais que compõem o horizonte de sentido da comunidade política. / These reflections have as object the judicial decision and intend to investigate the conditions under which a court decides. That is, we intend to give an account here of what happens and what is implicated when a legal issue is decided. It is intended to take the phenomenon of judicial decision as an object of analysis to ask for what sustains it and it is presupposed on the agent decider activity. We want to know if it is possible to affirm a basic fabric showing how the concepts that are articulated and operationalized by the author of a legal decision may make sense. These issues place in the foreground of the analysis, the problem of recovering the historical sense and the theoretical possibilities that are involved in it. The answers to these questions require the construction of theoretical tools that allow investigating the element of the historicity of meaning. This research makes use of hermeneutics in the twentieth century produced complemented by the element of epistemological history of concepts and metaforology. Making use of these instruments, the research tries to point out that the traditional approaches that incorporate traditional bipolarities to portray the decision problem, such as: universal-particular; law-fact, statute-case etc., end up eclipsing the true basal element that sustains the legal experience and that emerge from cultural and moral settings that makes up the horizon of sense of political community.

Submitted by Silvana Teresinha Dornelles Studzinski (sstudzinski) on 2017-05-09T15:53:59Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Henrique Abel_.pdf: 2647759 bytes, checksum: 793734e9474f67ad24a25c767c4a99c2 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-05-09T15:53:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Henrique Abel_.pdf: 2647759 bytes, checksum: 793734e9474f67ad24a25c767c4a99c2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-12-16 / Nenhuma / O presente trabalho busca sustentar a tese de que o Estado Democrático de Direito, oriundo do Constitucionalismo Contemporâneo, representa um novo paradigma político-jurídico que se mostra radicalmente transformador na comparação com as encarnações anteriores do Estado Moderno. Sustenta, todavia, que este novo paradigma político-jurídico não veio acompanhado de um novo paradigma epistemológico (apesar de o chamado “neoconstitucionalismo” ter representado uma tentativa - frustrada e insuficiente - neste sentido). Na medida em que a última grande epistemologia jurídica de influência universal, a Teoria Pura do Direito própria do normativismo positivista kelseniano, se mostra absolutamente inadequada e insuficiente para explicar o Direito dentro daquele novo paradigma político-jurídico, se faz necessária uma (re)construção epistemológica do Direito no contexto do Constitucionalismo Contemporâneo. Uma epistemologia jurídica efetivamente pós-positivista, aliada ao paradigma metodológico-interpretativo da hermenêutica jurídica, deve ser capaz de dar as condições de legitimidade discursiva e científica para que o Direito evite ser instrumentalizado pela política ou pelo poder econômico e, sobretudo, para que desfrute da autonomia necessária para atuar como instrumento qualificado na concretização do Estado Democrático de Direito e na proteção de direitos e garantias fundamentais. / The present work seeks to support the thesis that the Democratic Rule of Law, coming from Contemporary Constitutionalism, represents a new political-legal paradigm that is radically transformative in comparison with the previous incarnations of the Modern State. It argues, however, that this new political-legal paradigm was not accompanied by a new legal epistemological paradigm (although the so-called "neo-constitutionalism" represented a failed and insufficient attempt in this sense). Given the fact that the last major legal epistemology of universal influence, Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law, is today absolutely inadequate and insufficient to explain the Law within that new political-legal framework, a legal epistemological (re)construction - adequate to Contemporary Constitutionalism - is much needed. An effectively post-positivist legal epistemology, coupled with the methodological-interpretative paradigm of legal hermeneutics, must be capable of giving the conditions of discursive and scientific legitimacy for the Law, in the sense of been capable to avoid being manipulated or distorted by political or economic power. Above all, it must assure the Law's discursive autonomy necessary for it to act as a qualified instrument of concretization of the Democratic Rule of Law, protecting fundamental rights and democracy.

Submitted by Silvana Teresinha Dornelles Studzinski (sstudzinski) on 2015-06-22T18:07:38Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Jader da Silveira Marques.pdf: 1850363 bytes, checksum: b25530edfdd02fd83e1143b8f2de8d9c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-06-22T18:07:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Jader da Silveira Marques.pdf: 1850363 bytes, checksum: b25530edfdd02fd83e1143b8f2de8d9c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-09-24 / Nenhuma / Esta tese de doutorado enfrenta a complicada tarefa de tratar da relação entre direito penal e filosofia desde o surgimento dos movimentos codificadores. Esses movimentos deram azo ao positivismo exegético, e o direito acabou criando um isolamento teórico em relação aos demais campos do saber. A preocupação de não se “filosofar o direito” e de não se “juridicizar a filosofia” resultou na negação, por parte dos juristas, da relação existente entre estes dois âmbitos. Mais adiante, a passagem para o positivismo normativista, especialmente com Kelsen e Hart, representa a admissão do papel da linguagem na interpretação do direito, surgindo, então, a questão da ambiguidade e da vagueza das palavras da lei. Para resolver a indeterminação linguística da tipicidade, a “solução” passa a ser a discricionariedade do aplicador e, assim, mais uma vez, a questão hermenêutica fica relegada a um segundo plano. É neste contexto de afastamento da filosofia e de vinculação ao método, no sentido cartesiano, que a teoria geral do delito trabalha o conceito de tipicidade, olvidando o caráter hermenêutico da legalidade penal. Neste contexto, a teoria geral do delito tem se mostrado resistente em admitir o caráter hermenêutico do direito, tratando da legalidade penal (e de tantas outras questões) como se nenhuma relação tivesse com os movimentos filosóficos, especialmente no campo da filosofia da linguagem. O intérprete ainda decide conforme a sua consciência. O contexto de expansão do direito penal, por exemplo, demonstra que a noção de tipicidade acaba sendo manipulada, para ser meio de tutela de bens jurídicos, de novos riscos, política de governo, assim como meio de controle da pobreza e do medo. A tese pretende, pois, desvelar as condições de possibilidade para a superação desta crise da tipicidade penal, desde uma imbricação entre a filosofia hermenêutica de Martin Heidegger, a hermenêutica filosófica de Hans-Georg Gadamer e, posteriormente, a teoria integrativa de Ronald Dworkin, seguindo o fio condutor apresentado por Lenio Streck na sua crítica hermenêutica do direito. Esse caminho é percorrido em busca de uma teoria da decisão preocupada com a resposta correta em matéria de tipicidade que considere o adequado papel dos princípios constitucionais no fechamento da interpretação, em observância às ideias de coerência e integridade do direito. / This doctoral thesis faces the tough task of approaching how Criminal Law and Philosophy relate to each other since the beginning of codification movements. These movements led to exegetical positivism, and Law ended up being isolated towards other knowledge areas. The concerning of not making Law overly philosophic and not making Philosophy overly juridical led jurists to deny the relationship between both disciplines. Further, the shift into normative positivism, especially with Kelsen and Hart, represents recognizing the role of language in interpreting Law, thus emerging the issue of ambiguity and vagueness of laws. To solve linguistic imprecision of vagueness doctrine, the “answer” is the discretion of the applier and, again, the hermeneutical issue tends to overshadow. In this context of separation from Philosophy and bonding to method, in a Cartesian way, the general theory of crime handles with the concept of vagueness doctrine, ignoring the hermeneutical characteristic of criminal legality. In this context, the general law theory seems to be unwilling to recognize the hermeneutical characteristic of Law, considering that criminal legality (and many other issues) does not relate with philosophical movements, especially language philosophy. The interpreter still decides according to his consciousness. For instance, the context of criminal law, shows that the idea of vagueness doctrine is manipulated in order to be a way of custody of juridical property and new risks, government policy, as well as a way of controlling poverty and fear. Thus this thesis aims at unfolding possibilities of overcoming this crisis in criminal vagueness doctrine, by combining hermeneutical Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, philosophical Hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer and, later, integration theory of Ronald Dworking, using as guiding principles the hermeneutic criticism of Law by Lenio Streck. This path is covered keeping in mind the goal of finding a theory of decision concerned with correct answers considering vagueness doctrine, which must consider adequate the role of constitutional principles in closure of interpretation, observing the ideas of coherence and honor of Law.

Les conceptions jusnaturalistes peuvent paraître mineures dans la philosophie etla théorie du droit françaises à la différence de leur présence massive dans un enseignementdu droit à l’étranger mais elles n’en ressortent pas moins directement ou indirectement dudroit privé en France si l’on en analyse de près certains aspects de la doctrine, de la loi et dela jurisprudence notamment dans le domaine patrimonial des biens et des contrats. Lesdialogues de nature philosophique éclairent la polysémie qui s’attache au « jusnaturalisme »,au mot « nature » ou à ses équivalents, dénonçant une sorte de structure commune(d’invariant), dans des débats juridiques impliquant les situations les plus pratiques àcommencer par le droit de propriété. Il s’agit de montrer dans ce travail qu’il existe donc unargument de type jusnaturaliste sous-jacent à un droit qui n’en a pas toujours conscience.Cette thèse entend par là ne pas séparer l’étude de la doctrine et du droit positif, ensélectionnant les aspects les plus représentatifs et l’ensemble le plus pluraliste desconceptions jusnaturalistes et de leurs antithèses positivistes contemporaines qui serventhabituellement à discréditer toute référence à la notion de « nature », comme à sessubstituts. Il existe différents modes d’émergence des arguments jusnaturalistes. Unenouvelle lecture du droit positif peut être proposée si l’on veut assumer toutes les exigences,dans leurs dimensions critiques, qui conduisent parfois à des reclassements et qui éclairentsur des relations insoupçonnées à propos d’éléments éloignés. / The concept of “natural law” may seem minor in French philosophy and Frenchtheory of law, unlike their massive presence in legal studies abroad, but they do not standdirectly or indirectly under private law in France if analysed in certain aspects of the doctrineof the law and jurisprudence, in particular in the field of heritage property and contracts. Inlight of the philosophical dialogues which have illuminated the polisemy attached to the term“natural law” or the word “nature” in legal proceedings involving the most practical situationsstarting with the right to property, it is shown in this work that there is a natural law argumentof this type underlying a right that is not always conscious. This thesis does not separate thestudy of the theory of positive law taken in its most representative aspects and the morepluralistic theories of natural law and the rival views of contemporary positivists which usuallytend to reject any reference to or notion of natural law. There are different forms of apparitionof natural law arguments. By means of arguments, jurists look at law studies in a new light.