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Contra o conceito do direito: ontologia e epistemologia no problema da definição do direitoOLIVEIRA, Ítalo José da Silva 29 February 2016 (has links)
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Previous issue date: 2016-02-16 / CAPES / O problema da definição do conceito do direito ou ao menos da caracterização do
fenômeno jurídico apresenta variações quanto às implicações de sua solução e às
preocupações em torno dele. As variedades do problema que interessam a este trabalho
estão ligadas à ontologia e à epistemologia na filosofia do direito: ‘O que é o direito?’
enquanto (1) uma pergunta sobre a definição da essência do direito e (2) sobre a definição
de um objeto de investigação específico para ciências sobre o suposto fenômeno jurídico
– a filosofia do direito, a teoria do direito, a e a ciência do direito, por exemplo.
Desafiando suas premissas e buscando evitar tanto o problema ontológico quanto o
epistemológico, proponho uma mudança de perspectiva a partir de preocupações
pragmáticas que chamo de “ponto de vista do gestor”: a visão de quem deve administrar
os recursos econômicos finitos destinados a financiar a atividade científica na área de
direito. Defendo que, partindo daí, o problema da definição do conceito do direito
enquanto um problema ontológico e enquanto um problema epistemológico é
desnecessário, cuja solução é inútil para fazer avançar as pesquisas na área de direito.
Proponho uma reorientação da controvérsia que tem implicações sobre como ver a
pesquisa e a educação nesse campo. / The problem of definition of the concept of law or at least the description of features of
legal phenomenon presents variation about the implications of its solution and about the
worries around it. The forms of this problem I am interested in are related to ontology and
epistemology in legal philosophy: ‘What is the law?’ as (1) a question about the definition
of the essence of law and (2) about the definition of a specific object of investigation for
sciences about the supposed legal phenomenon – philosophy of law, legal theory, and
science of law, for instance. Challenging its premises and trying to avoid both the
ontological problem and epistemological problem, I propose a change of perspective from
pragmatic concerns what I call the “manager's point of view”: a vision of who should
manage the finite economic resources to finance scientific activity in the area of law. I
argue that, starting from there, the problem of defining the concept of law as an
ontological problem and as a epistemological problem is an unnecessary problem whose
solution is useless to advance research in the field of law. I propose a reorientation of the
controversy that has implications on how to see the researches and the education in this
field.
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L'argument jusnaturaliste en droit privé patrimonial français / The natural law argument in french private lawDupend, Aurélien 20 June 2014 (has links)
Les conceptions jusnaturalistes peuvent paraître mineures dans la philosophie etla théorie du droit françaises à la différence de leur présence massive dans un enseignementdu droit à l’étranger mais elles n’en ressortent pas moins directement ou indirectement dudroit privé en France si l’on en analyse de près certains aspects de la doctrine, de la loi et dela jurisprudence notamment dans le domaine patrimonial des biens et des contrats. Lesdialogues de nature philosophique éclairent la polysémie qui s’attache au « jusnaturalisme »,au mot « nature » ou à ses équivalents, dénonçant une sorte de structure commune(d’invariant), dans des débats juridiques impliquant les situations les plus pratiques àcommencer par le droit de propriété. Il s’agit de montrer dans ce travail qu’il existe donc unargument de type jusnaturaliste sous-jacent à un droit qui n’en a pas toujours conscience.Cette thèse entend par là ne pas séparer l’étude de la doctrine et du droit positif, ensélectionnant les aspects les plus représentatifs et l’ensemble le plus pluraliste desconceptions jusnaturalistes et de leurs antithèses positivistes contemporaines qui serventhabituellement à discréditer toute référence à la notion de « nature », comme à sessubstituts. Il existe différents modes d’émergence des arguments jusnaturalistes. Unenouvelle lecture du droit positif peut être proposée si l’on veut assumer toutes les exigences,dans leurs dimensions critiques, qui conduisent parfois à des reclassements et qui éclairentsur des relations insoupçonnées à propos d’éléments éloignés. / The concept of “natural law” may seem minor in French philosophy and Frenchtheory of law, unlike their massive presence in legal studies abroad, but they do not standdirectly or indirectly under private law in France if analysed in certain aspects of the doctrineof the law and jurisprudence, in particular in the field of heritage property and contracts. Inlight of the philosophical dialogues which have illuminated the polisemy attached to the term“natural law” or the word “nature” in legal proceedings involving the most practical situationsstarting with the right to property, it is shown in this work that there is a natural law argumentof this type underlying a right that is not always conscious. This thesis does not separate thestudy of the theory of positive law taken in its most representative aspects and the morepluralistic theories of natural law and the rival views of contemporary positivists which usuallytend to reject any reference to or notion of natural law. There are different forms of apparitionof natural law arguments. By means of arguments, jurists look at law studies in a new light.
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Automatisation du raisonnement et décision juridiques basés sur les ontologies / Automation of legal reasoning and decision based on ontologiesEl Ghosh, Mirna 24 September 2018 (has links)
Le but essentiel de la thèse est de développer une ontologie juridique bien fondée pour l'utiliser dans le raisonnement à base des règles. Pour cela, une approche middle-out, collaborative et modulaire est proposée ou des ontologies fondationnelles et core ont été réutilisées pour simplifier le développement de l'ontologie. L’ontologie résultante est adoptée dans une approche homogène a base des ontologies pour formaliser la liste des règles juridiques du code pénal en utilisant le langage logique SWRL. / This thesis analyses the problem of building well-founded domain ontologies for reasoning and decision support purposes. Specifically, it discusses the building of legal ontologies for rule-based reasoning. In fact, building well-founded legal domain ontologies is considered as a difficult and complex process due to the complexity of the legal domain and the lack of methodologies. For this purpose, a novel middle-out approach called MIROCL is proposed. MIROCL tends to enhance the building process of well-founded domain ontologies by incorporating several support processes such as reuse, modularization, integration and learning. MIROCL is a novel modular middle-out approach for building well-founded domain ontologies. By applying the modularization process, a multi-layered modular architecture of the ontology is outlined. Thus, the intended ontology will be composed of four modules located at different abstraction levels. These modules are, from the most abstract to the most specific, UOM(Upper Ontology Module), COM(Core Ontology Module), DOM(Domain Ontology Module) and DSOM(Domain-Specific Ontology Module). The middle-out strategy is composed of two complementary strategies: top-down and bottom-up. The top-down tends to apply ODCM (Ontology-Driven Conceptual Modeling) and ontology reuse starting from the most abstract categories for building UOM and COM. Meanwhile, the bottom-up starts from textual resources, by applying ontology learning process, in order to extract the most specific categories for building DOM and DSOM. After building the different modules, an integration process is performed for composing the whole ontology. The MIROCL approach is applied in the criminal domain for modeling legal norms. A well-founded legal domain ontology called CriMOnto (Criminal Modular Ontology) is obtained. Therefore, CriMOnto has been used for modeling the procedural aspect of the legal norms by the integration with a logic rule language (SWRL). Finally, an hybrid approach is applied for building a rule-based system called CORBS. This system is grounded on CriMOnto and the set of formalized rules.
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