nÃo hà / FundaÃÃo Cearense de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Cientifico e TecnolÃgico / Trata-se aqui de esclarecer a apropriaÃÃo do pensamento epistemolÃgico de Ernst Mach (1838-1916) por Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) e Burrhus Frederic Skinner (1904-1990). SemelhanÃas e diferenÃas foram encontradas a este respeito, mediante o que Abib chamou de prÃ-texto em seu mÃtodo epistemolÃgico. As categorias machianas que serviram de anÃlise foram: (1) o monismo das sensaÃÃes; (2) o papel da subjetividade na ciÃncia; (3) delimitaÃÃo da ciÃncia e o modelo explicativo de Mach. Considerando o fundamento agnosticista que Freud conferiu à Metapsicologia, constatou-se que a apropriaÃÃo realizada por ele compreende como referentes, ora as relaÃÃes entre a ciÃncia e a filosofia, ora os limites da ciÃncia enquanto saber aberto e dinÃmico. Os referentes machianos em Skinner foram: a identificaÃÃo de relaÃÃes funcionais como modelo explicativo; a crÃtica ao mecanicismo; a adoÃÃo do monismo; objeto, objetivos e validade em ciÃncia e da mÃxima machiana descrever à explicar. A respeito da apropriaÃÃo aludida, foram encontradas as seguintes semelhanÃas entre Freud e Skinner: a concepÃÃo machiana de que a ciÃncia à uma atividade humana na busca pelo estabelecimento de relaÃÃes funcionais; o carÃter transitÃrio da explicaÃÃo cientÃfica; nenhuma relaÃÃo com o fenomenismo das sensaÃÃes. Quanto Ãs diferenÃas nas apropriaÃÃes, constatou-se que Skinner aderiu mais amplamente Ãs propostas de ciÃncia de Mach, enquanto Freud, considerando para alÃm desta, os modelos do fisicalismo e energetismo implicou o que Assoun chamou de realismo racionalista que aliava o fenomenismo machiano a um racionalismo operacional. Skinner manteve os princÃpios machianos da adequaÃÃo dos pensamentos aos fatos e o papel das hipÃteses, mas foi alÃm destes referentes; concebeu tambÃm a interpretaÃÃo como uma via de produÃÃo do conhecimento cientÃfico. Eis outra diferenÃa encontrada: Skinner estruturou sua lÃgica funcional e anti-metafÃsica referindo-se à crÃtica machiana ao mecanicismo; Freud considerou os argumentos do energetismo em detrimento da crÃtica machiana aludida. Constatou-se, finalmente, que, apesar de suas apropriaÃÃes quanto ao pensamento epistemolÃgico de Mach, Freud e Skinner tambÃm criaram concepÃÃes inÃditas em suas ciÃncias. / This attends to clarify the appropriation of epistemological thinking of Ernst Mach (1838-1916) by Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) and Burrhus Frederic Skinner (1904-1990). Similarities and distinctions were found in this respect, by which Abib called pre-text in its epistemological method. The categories that served to machians analysis were: (1) monism of sensations, (2) the role of subjectivity in science, (3) definition of science and scientific explanation by Mach. Wheras the agnosticist foundation that Freud gave to Metapsychology, it was found the appropriation perteins sometimes to relationship between science and philosophy, sometimes to the boundaries of science as an dynamic and open knowledge. The Machâs referees in Skinner were: the functional relations in his scientific explanation, the criticism of the mechanical explanations, the adoption of a monism; and, the object, objectives and validity in science, beyond the adoption of Machâs descriptivism as an explanation in science. Regarding the appropriations alluded to, the following similarities were found between Freud and Skinner: Machianâs conception that science is a human activity in pursuit of functional relations, the transient character of scientific explanation, and no relation to the sensational phenomenism. Regarding differences in the appropriations, it was found that the Skinner alluded more widely to the Machâs proposes to science, while Freud, beyond this, considered models of physicalism and energetismo, what Assoun called rational realism; what combined a Machianâs phenomenalism and an operational rationalism. Skinner maintained the principles of adequacy of thoughts to facts and the role of hypotheses according to Mach, but were beyond; also conceived interpretation as a means of production of scientific knowledge. Hereâs another distinction founded: Skinner structured its theory on the functional relations model and the anti-metaphysical critique adopted by Mach, while Freud considers the arguments of the energestismâs critics. It was found, finally, that despite its appropriations on the Machâs epistemological view, both Freud and Skinner created novel concepts in their science.

<p>Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Ernst Mach expressed his worries about obscurities and metaphysical elements in scientific knowledge, and consequently contributed to the development of a Viennese tradition. Later on, Vienna Circle further extended Mach's ideas and led to the development of the logical positivist movement. Among the main tenets of this movement is the view that scientific theories are to be reduced to an empirical base capable of conclusive verification. But scientific theories are usually based on unverified and occasionally unverifiable hypotheses and principles. Thus, once this is realized, positivism in spite of itself will contribute to the development of scepticism about scientific knowledge.</p> <p>In reaction to the verificationism, however, Karl Popper developed his thesis of falsificationism or fallibilism; but this principle also leads to scepticism at least about certainty claims, with far reaching consequences. This chain of events leads to the development of Paul Feyerabend's epistemological anarchisma a rejection of all rules and methods in science in an attempt to reduce science to the level of irrationality and mythology.</p> <p>Against the negativist conclusions of these positions about science, the integrity of scientific knowledge is defended in this thesis. It is shown how scientific knowledge can be defended against scepticism of the type to which verificationism tends: this is done by examining one recent and rigorous sceptical position which undermines not only certainty and rationality of knowledge claims, but the very possibility of knowledge. By examining Popper's fallibilism, it is shown that science can also be defended against the negativist conclusions of fallibilism. Similarly, it is shown that Feyerabend's epistemological anarchism cannot either undermine scientific knowledge.</p> <p>These negativist positions, though they have received strong criticisms in some quarters, yet have not been examined all together, from the standpoint of their impact on the integrity of scientific knowledge. This task is undertaken in this thesis; we thus arrive at a positive and correct evaluation of scientific knowledge in the context of contemporary negativist epistemological trends. It has been shown that in spite of all the negativist arguments of the above positions, we can obtain certainty, justification, and truth in science, and thus we can obtain knowledge. But my rejection of negativism in science does not entail, and should not be construed as an advocacy of a return to, positivism.</p> / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

The thesis deals with significant moments in the relationship between methodology of economics and implications of the financial crisis culminating in 2008 and 2009. Its key insight rests upon the claim that some theoretical concepts developed within mainstream economics do not tackle the reality adequately and contributed in a significant way to the sequence of events leading to the financial crisis. Most of those concepts were introduced in the second half of the 20th century, during a "high tide" of positivistic ideas in the domain of methodology of mainstream economics. Though the same ideas had been already discredited to a large extent by the philosophy of science at the time, mainstream economists did not reflect it satisfactorily. Aside from a historical expose the thesis consists also of an outline of a possible future development of the prevailing form of economic theory; four scenarios of future potential development are presented. In the final parts of the thesis, which are focused more specifically, the author appraises negatively options of the Austrian School as well as post-Keynesianism to influence in a more significant manner the mainstream economics during the post-crisis era.