Leicht überarb. Diss. Univ. Halle-Wittenberg, 2003.

The current research used grounded theory methodology (GTM) to construct a conceptualization of personal knowledge within a knowledge management (KM) perspective. The need for the current research was based on the use of just two categories of knowledge, explicit and tacit, within KM literature to explain diverse characteristics of personal knowledge. The construct of tacit knowledge has often been explicated and debated in KM literature. The debate over tacit knowledge arose from the complex epistemological roots of tacit knowing and the construct of tacit knowledge popularized by organizational knowledge creation theory. The ongoing debate over tacit knowledge in KM literature has shed little light on personal knowledge within a KM perspective. The current research set aside the debate over tacit knowledge and pursued the construct of personal knowledge from the perspective of the knower using GTM. Thirty-seven interviews were conducted with fourteen participants. Interviews were audio recorded and coding was accomplished with the qualitative data analysis software MAXQDA. A total of eight categories were identified. These were organized into two groups. The core category being overwhelmed represented the absence of personal knowledge. The categories questioning self, seeking help, and microthinking fit under being overwhelmed. Together these categories were inverse indicators because they all decreased as knowledge acquisition progressed. The core category being confident represented the presence of personal knowledge. The categories remembering, multitasking, and speed fit under being overwhelmed. Together these categories were direct indicators because they all increased as knowledge acquisition progressed. Three significant conclusions were drawn from the current research. These conclusions led to the conceptualization of personal knowledge from a KM perspective. The first significant conclusion was the conceptualization of a process of knowing as Integrated Complexity: From Overwhelmed to Confident (ICOC). The second significant conclusion was personal knowing as first-person epistemology is a universally lived experience that includes commitments to internal and external requirements as well as a bias toward integration. The third significant conclusion was personal knowledge can be viewed as a complex adaptive system. Finally, the current research concluded that personal knowledge within a KM perspective is a complex adaptive system maintained through acts of first-person epistemology.

Tesis para optar al grado de Magíster en Filosofía mención Epistemología. / En la presente tesis se examina una posible relación entre el problema de la Abducción y el del Conocimiento tácito, tal como fueron expuestos por C.S. Peirce y M. Polanyi respectivamente. En el Capítulo I se estudia la idea de abducción basándose en las ideas de C.S. Peirce. La abducción consiste en una regla de inferencia que intenta dar cuenta de la creación de una hipótesis explicativa frente a un "hecho sorprendente" , es decir, un hecho que no es explicado o aparece en contradicción a las teorías existentes para analizar dicho fenómeno.

This inquiry examines the lived experience of a believing Christian seeking authentic space on a secular academic course. It has come about as a result of an experience of both angst and transformation leading to the focus of this inquiry which is looking to answer the question of: 'How does a committed Christian with a belief in foundational truth, authentically relate and integrate their faith and new found knowledge in counselling practice and research on a secular training course'? Research literature acknowledges a growing interest and demand for further debate and research in the domain of integration of faith and psychotherapy and practice, where evidence points to there being a gap in training. Integration is acknowledged as problematic but specific challenges are noted as not being so well researched. The study is written in the form of a paradigmatic case study where the researcher is also the researched. It embraces a pluralistic methodology incorporating aspects of personal narrative, interpretive phenomenological analysis and tacit understanding as advocated by Polanyi. This inquiry explores both the problem encountered and the solution found. The problem was epistemological, that of a personal belief in foundational truth, the central tenet of the Christian faith and the challenge of co-habiting a secular relativist space. The purpose and goal of this inquiry is to both show and tell the process of integration, which allowed authentic space to emerge both personally and theoretically. An exploration of a personal epiphany of 'heart and mind' integration is pivotal in this inquiry. The key finding which made integration possible was the discovery of and engagement with both Michael Polanyi and C.S. Lewis and their progressive theories of knowledge: theories which embrace both fundamental Christian belief and the fundamental values and theories taught in the dialogue of both person-centred and psychodynamic approaches. This study and reflexive analysis has created the basis of a body of work, which can be used as a means of support for Christian trainees who encounter similar challenges in academic spaces and in practice in this postmodern age. It can also be of benefit to trainers and course designers and counselling practitioners as they engage and dialogue with this re emerging phenomena. Finally this inquiry can be the catalyst for further research and development in order to begin to bridge the epistemological gap encountered in training.

Michaela Polányi's Theory of Personal Knowledge (1891-1976) attempts to cope with the objections of the critical period of philosophy in which the ideals of science are set to be objectively unbiased and empirically grounded knowledge. The reason for this is the distrust of the subjectivistly conceived influence of the tradition and authority of the major research ancestors. Polanyi, however, points out that such ideals disregard the important constitutions of the knowledge of personal character, without which knowledge would not be possible. That is why it responds to these objections by trying to rehabilitate them and putting them in proper contexts. It points out the role of personal judgment that makes an intuitive estimation of the fertility of a research project within the given competencies. It highlights the role of the expertise and knowledge, which operate thanks to capturing the researcher in the tradition of the branch. And last but not least, it emphasizes the role of intellectual enthusiasm that helps the creative and original way to solve the problem. However, according to Polanyi, these constituents can perform their role properly only if the researcher establishes close contact with reality within an act he describes as contemplative submersion into the problem. This cognitive act should protect the entire cognitive process from the risk of subjective distortion. Polanyi also discovers two dimensions of knowledge. The first dimension is called tacit (unspecific). This dimension affects all cognitive processes that take place outside the apparent focal awareness of the cognitive person, yet they essentially influence the understanding of the ability to integrate in the mind of the cognitive person not only the individual elements of knowledge but also their interrelations. It helps to estimate the limits and possibilities of research. The second dimension is fiduciary-programmed knowledge, which points out that all knowledge is based on the commitment of faith to the reality of the cognitive object, to personal abilities of the cognitive person, and to the research community, and the principles of its research. It turns out that faith is not an obstacle to scientific knowledge, but a prerequisite for discovery. That is why Polanyi's theory of human knowledge is also considered in the field of the defense of the relevance of religious epistemology. Polanyi does not make the distinction between secular and religious epistemology as critics of religion. Both types of knowledge, according to him, are constituted by the same cognitive abilities that are applied in the same reality. The difference lies more in a different perspective and in the subject of interest. This thesis focuses on selected chapters of religious epistemology, where the original objections and proposals for their resolving solutions are well evident. These are, above all, the possibilities and limits of God's experience of knowledge, the role of reason and belief, and the possibilities of personal realization of knowledge within the religious tradition and the Authority Church.

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El propòsit principal d'aquesta tesi és analitzar críticament l'antropologia filosòfica de Charles Taylor.A la primera part abordem qüestions preliminars: les fonts, els fonaments teòrics i els elements metodològics del seu pensament.A la segona part elaborem la seva teoria de la identitat. Això implica: (1) donar compte de la relació inextricable entre el jo de la persona i la seva orientació moral, i (2) per mitjà d'arguments transcendentals, articular una ontologia que determini els trets perennes de la naturalesa humana.Una ontologia de la identitat exigeix l'articulació de les continuïtats i discontinuïtats entre els animals humans i no humans. És a dir, una filosofia de la biologia que aporti les intuïcions de l'aristotelisme al post-darwinisme. En línia amb Adaslair MacIntyre, intentem completar les aportacions realitzades per Taylor en el context de la seva filosofia de l'acció.D'altra banda, identifiquem alguns dels trets distintius de l'agent humà (lingüisticitat, propòsit i dialogicitat), i abordem els desafiaments de (1) les versions que radicalitzen les conseqüències de la contingència del subjecte i (2) els reduccionisme que prosperen entre els filòsofs analítics. Per això hem confrontat a les interpretacions de Richard Rorty sobre Nietzsche i Freud, i a la posició quasi-budista de Parfit, l'hermenèutica forta de Charles Taylor i Paul Ricoeur.A la tercera part, estudiem la dimensió històrica de la identitat humana. Això implica assenyalar les peculiaritats del anthropos modern. Per això, a més de contraposar al jo modern la versió premoderna de la nostra comuna humanitat, hem hagut d'enfrontar a la interpretació de Taylor sobre el sentit de les mutacions cosmovisionales, antropològiques i ètiques de la modernitat, les interpretacions que a aquestes mutacions concedeixen autors com Michel Foucault, Alasdair MacIntyre i Jürgen Habermas. / El propósito principal de esta tesis es analizar críticamente la antropología filosófica de Charles Taylor. En la primera parte abordamos cuestiones preliminares: las fuentes, los fundamentos teóricos y los elementos metodológicos de su pensamiento. En la segunda parte elaboramos su teoría de la identidad. Eso implica: (1) dar cuenta de la relación inextricable entre el yo de la persona y su orientación moral; y (2) por medio de argumentos trascendentales, articular una ontología que determine los rasgos perennes de la naturaleza humana. Una ontología de la identidad exige la articulación de las continuidades y discontinuidades entre los animales humanos y no humanos. Es decir, una filosofía de la biología que aporte las intuiciones del aristotelismo al post-darwinismo. En línea con Adaslair MacIntyre, intentamos completar los aportes realizados por Taylor en el contexto de su filosofía de la acción. Por otro lado, identificamos algunos de los rasgos distintivos del agente humano (lingüisticidad, propósito y dialogicidad); y abordamos los desafíos de (1) las versiones que radicalizan las consecuencias de la contingencia del sujeto y (2) los reduccionismos que prosperan entre los filósofos analíticos. Para ello hemos confrontado a las interpretaciones de Richard Rorty sobre Nietzsche y Freud, y a la posición cuasi-budista de Parfit, con la hermenéutica fuerte de Charles Taylor y Paul Ricoeur.En la tercera parte, estudiamos la dimensión histórica de la identidad humana. Eso implica señalar las peculiaridades del anthropos moderno. Para ello, además de contraponer al yo moderno la versión premoderna de nuestra común humanidad, hemos tenido que enfrentar a la interpretación de Taylor sobre el sentido de las mutaciones cosmovisionales, antropológicas y éticas de la modernidad, las interpretaciones que a éstas mutaciones conceden autores como Michel Foucault, Alasdair MacIntyre y Jürgen Habermas. / The main purpose of this thesis is to critically analyze the philosophical anthropology of Charles Taylor.The first part deals with preliminary issues: the sources, the theoretical and methodological elements of his thought.In the second part we elaborate his theory of identity. This implies: (1) to account for the inextricable relationship between the self of the person and his moral orientation, and (2) by means of transcendental arguments, to articulate an ontology that determines the perennial features of human nature.An ontology of identity requires the articulation of the continuities and discontinuities between human and nonhuman animals. That is, a philosophy of biology which provides insights from Aristotelianism to post-Darwinism. In line with Adaslair MacIntyre, we try to complete the contributions made by Taylor in the context of his philosophy of action.On the other hand, we identify some of the distinctive features of human agency (language, purpose and dialogue) and tackle the challenges of (1) versions that radicalized the consequences of the contingency of the subject and (2) the reductionism that thrive among the analytical philosophers. So we confront the interpretations of Richard Rorty about Nietzsche and Freud, and the quasi-Buddhism of Parfit, with the strong hermeneutics of Charles Taylor and Paul Ricoeur.In the third part, we study the historical dimension of human identity. That means pointing out the peculiarities of the modern anthropos. Therefore, in addition to contrast the modern self with the premodern version of our common humanity, we confront Taylor's interpretation of the meaning of the cosmological, anthropological and ethical mutations of modernity, with the interpretations that authors as Michel Foucault, Jürgen Habermas and Alasdair MaIntyre offer about these mutations.

The dissertation concerns F. A. Hayek’s (1899–1992) critique of legislation. The purpose of the investigation is to clarify and assess that critique. I argue that there is in Hayek’s work a critique of legislation that is distinct from his well-known critique of social planning. Further that the main claim of this critique is what I refer to as Hayek’s legislation tenet, namely that legislation that aims to achieve specific aggregate results in complex orders of society will decrease the welfare level.           The legislation tenet gains support; (i) from the welfare claim – according to which there is a positive correlation between the utilization of knowledge and the welfare level in society; (ii) from the dispersal of knowledge thesis – according to which the total knowledge of society is dispersed and not available to any one agency; and (iii) from the cultural evolution thesis – according to which evolutionary rules are more favorable to the utilization of knowledge in social cooperation than are legislative rules. More specifically, I argue that these form two lines of argument in support of the legislation tenet. One line of argument is based on the conjunction of the welfare claim and the dispersal of knowledge thesis. I argue that this line of argument is true. The other line of argument is based on the conjunction of the welfare claim and the cultural evolution thesis. I argue that this line of argument is false, mainly because the empirical work of political scientist Elinor Ostrom refutes it. Because the two lines of argument support the legislation tenet independently of each other, I argue that Hayek’s critique of legislation is true. In this dissertation, I further develop a legislative policy tool as based on the welfare claim and Hayek’s conception of coercion. I also consider Hayek’s idea that rules and law are instrumental in forging rational individual action and rational social orders, and turn to review this idea in light of the work of experimental economist Vernon Smith and economic historian Avner Greif. I find that Smith and Greif support this idea of Hayek’s, and I conjecture that it contributes to our understanding of Adam Smith’s notion of the invisible hand: It is rules – not an invisible hand – that prompt subjects to align individual and aggregate rationality in social interaction. Finally, I argue that Hayek’s critique is essentially utilitarian, as it is concerned with the negative welfare consequences of certain forms of legislation. And although it may appear that the dispersal of knowledge thesis will undermine the possibility of carrying out the utilitarian calculus, due to the lack of knowledge of the consequences of one’s actions – and therefore undermine the legislation tenet itself – I argue that the distinction between utilitarianism conceived as a method of deliberation and utilitarianism conceived as a criterion of correctness may be used to save Hayek’s critique from this objection.