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1	Officersprofessionens uppfattning om fänrikens kompetens Engqvist, Adina January 2020 (has links) In the Swedish Armed Forces there is a discussion whether the officer education is teaching the right things. The right things are often considered to be practical skills. However, the Swedish Defense University mostly teaches theoretical analyzing and critical approach. This study focuses on how well this approach is received by the Armed Forces, with their view of the officer needing practical skills. It does so through a survey sent to the officers in the ground forces, asking how the newly graduated second lieutenants are perceived by the organization. The result in this survey shows that this focus on theoretical knowledge has been perceived by the second lieutenant and the officers in the organization have trust in the graduates, both in character and knowledge. However, the lack of practical knowledge is considered dire and the first time after graduation is primarily focused on becoming an instructor which is considered the NCOs specialty. Because of this discrepancy the second lieutenants may have a hard time translating the theoretical knowledge to practical. Gilbert Ryle Knowing How and Knowing That officersutbildning fänrik kompetens Gilbert Ryle Knowing How and Knowing That enkätstudie profession yrkeskunnande Övrig annan samhällsvetenskap
2	Savoir et savoir-faire : la connaissance pratique entre intellectualisme et anti-intellectualisme Duhamel, Vincent 08 1900 (has links) No description available. Savoir-faire Connaissance Épistémologie Intellectualisme Anti-intellectualisme Expertise Capacité Disposition Gilbert Ryle Jason Stanley Knowing how Knowledge Epistemology Intellectualism Anti-intellectualism Ability Philosophy / Philosophie (UMI : 0422)
3	F. A. Hayek's Critique of Legislation Holm, Cyril January 2014 (has links) The dissertation concerns F. A. Hayek’s (1899–1992) critique of legislation. The purpose of the investigation is to clarify and assess that critique. I argue that there is in Hayek’s work a critique of legislation that is distinct from his well-known critique of social planning. Further that the main claim of this critique is what I refer to as Hayek’s legislation tenet, namely that legislation that aims to achieve specific aggregate results in complex orders of society will decrease the welfare level. The legislation tenet gains support; (i) from the welfare claim – according to which there is a positive correlation between the utilization of knowledge and the welfare level in society; (ii) from the dispersal of knowledge thesis – according to which the total knowledge of society is dispersed and not available to any one agency; and (iii) from the cultural evolution thesis – according to which evolutionary rules are more favorable to the utilization of knowledge in social cooperation than are legislative rules. More specifically, I argue that these form two lines of argument in support of the legislation tenet. One line of argument is based on the conjunction of the welfare claim and the dispersal of knowledge thesis. I argue that this line of argument is true. The other line of argument is based on the conjunction of the welfare claim and the cultural evolution thesis. I argue that this line of argument is false, mainly because the empirical work of political scientist Elinor Ostrom refutes it. Because the two lines of argument support the legislation tenet independently of each other, I argue that Hayek’s critique of legislation is true. In this dissertation, I further develop a legislative policy tool as based on the welfare claim and Hayek’s conception of coercion. I also consider Hayek’s idea that rules and law are instrumental in forging rational individual action and rational social orders, and turn to review this idea in light of the work of experimental economist Vernon Smith and economic historian Avner Greif. I find that Smith and Greif support this idea of Hayek’s, and I conjecture that it contributes to our understanding of Adam Smith’s notion of the invisible hand: It is rules – not an invisible hand – that prompt subjects to align individual and aggregate rationality in social interaction. Finally, I argue that Hayek’s critique is essentially utilitarian, as it is concerned with the negative welfare consequences of certain forms of legislation. And although it may appear that the dispersal of knowledge thesis will undermine the possibility of carrying out the utilitarian calculus, due to the lack of knowledge of the consequences of one’s actions – and therefore undermine the legislation tenet itself – I argue that the distinction between utilitarianism conceived as a method of deliberation and utilitarianism conceived as a criterion of correctness may be used to save Hayek’s critique from this objection. Hayek legislation rules law rationality rational action rational social order equilibrium utilitarianism method of deliberation criterion of correctness Elinor Ostrom Avner Greif Vernon Smith Joshua Epstein complexity knowledge social cooperation information know-how the Hayek problem the invisible hand Adam Smith Mises Keynes Marx welfare state Gilbert Ryle Michael Polanyi theory of legislation legisprudence jurisprudence Neo-Kantianism historicism cognitive closure theory of prices competition syntax grammar game theory generative social science agent-based computational modeling institutional policy analysis normative primacy of economics primacy of politics Sheri Berman constructivist rationalism socialism social democracy Nozick Rawls distribution justice freedom Kant polycentric government process of experimentation speculative philosophy analytical philosophy freedom under the law liberty philosophy of mind consequentialist

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