This thesis aims to provide a new definition for philosophy rooted in MacIntyre’s account of a “practice”. In the first chapter, I explain MacIntyre’s concept of a practice as it appears in After Virtue—including its critical components, namely, internal goods, standards of excellence, and the historical dimension of practices—through a consideration of the practice of guitar lutherie. I then use this account to build up an initial definition of philosophy as a practice, and briefly clarify two minor confusions that could easily arise regarding such an account. In my second chapter, I take up MacIntyre’s view that practices are always spatiotemporally situated in order to question whether or not my definition from Chapter One could include non-Western philosophy within it. I argue that this is possible within the peculiar epistemic conditions of modernity, based on a reading of MacIntyre’s paper “Relativism, Power and Philosophy”. In Chapter Three, I consider another key component of MacIntyre’s account—namely, that of institutions—and arrive at some extra qualifications regarding the concepts of both “external goods” and “corruption” to deepen the account, and then introduce my own concept of “institutional hegemony” to account for academia’s present status with regards to the practice of philosophy, which I use to explain a discordance between the present reality of philosophy as a discipline and the conclusions I draw in Chapter Two. I then extend this line of thought in the fourth chapter to look at some objections that could be made against a MacIntyrean view of philosophy-as-a-practice from a feminist and postcolonial lens. These objections are then addressed in the fifth chapter, where I show that the MacIntyrean ought to be in agreement with the feminist and postcolonial projects, and that the MacIntyrean framework can indeed accommodate them.

Knowledge of the responsibilities of engineers is key to answering ethical questions about the work of engineers, because the decisions made by engineers often have ethical dimensions and implications. Engineers develop and implement technologies that influence and shape the way we live, at times in manners unanticipated by those who develop such technologies. To be able to answer important ethical questions, it is essential first to define what the responsibilities of engineers are. This paper defines the responsibilities of engineers by considering what constitutes the nature of engineering as a particular form of activity. Specifically, this paper focuses on the responsibilities of engineers qua engineers, where that refers to the duties acquired in virtue of being a member of a group. In order to answer this question, this paper examines the practice of engineering, drawing on the idea of practices developed by philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre and showing how the elements of a practice are important for finding and justifying the responsibilities of engineers. To demonstrate the contribution that knowledge of the responsibilities of engineers makes to engineering ethics, a case study is discussed at the end of the paper which deals with ethical questions in the discipline of structural engineering. The circumstances surrounding the failure of the Sleipner A platform off the coast of Norway in 1991 will be discussed to demonstrate how the responsibilities of engineers can be derived from knowledge of the nature of engineering and its context.

The calling orientation to work represents the seed that has germinated into the exponentially growing ‘work as a calling’ literature. It was first articulated by Robert Bellah, Richard Madsen, William Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven Tipton within Habits of the Heart in the 1980s. The following critical analysis of the ‘work as a calling’ literature, and of the moral foundation of the calling orientation more specifically, is intended for two particular audiences. The first audience broadly includes an interdisciplinary group of scholars working within business ethics, management, organizational psychology, and vocational psychology, among other fields of study. Amidst these scholars’ exponentially increasing interest in the idea of ‘work as a calling,’ the anatomical structure of their research remains remarkably similar. Their notions of ‘work as a calling’ stress that work should provide individuals with a deep sense of personal fulfillment. In particular, they suggest that work should be a therapeutic source of individual meaning. To secure this meaning, they exhibit an apparent centeredness on the self and an emphasis on the unconstrained pursuit of personal preferences. In most cases, scholars within the ‘work as a calling’ literature tend to proffer notions of ‘meaningful work’ that are divorced from moral considerations about ‘good work.’ While this broad group of scholars copiously references the calling orientation within their research on ‘work as a calling,’ a deep-seated misunderstanding pervades the literature to the extent that notions of ‘meaningful work’ have been divorced from notions of ‘good work.’ To this broader audience, I demonstrate herein that they do not realize how antithetical their scholarly literature on ‘work as a calling’ is to the moral foundation of Bellah et al.’s calling orientation. Namely, I argue that the construal of calling as an orientation to work would not exist within the literature if Bellah et al. had not first articulated the calling orientation as a buffer against the unregulated pursuit of personal preferences. Therefore, I claim that this broader group of scholars either needs to abandon the notion of ‘work as a calling’ or engage with the appropriate virtue framework that undergirds the calling orientation. I suspect, however, that several of these scholars will be hesitant to take up the virtue framework that is inextricably linked to the calling orientation. For this reason, much of the work following chapter 2 is devoted to a narrower audience of MacIntyrean business ethicists. It is also dedicated to a few scholars from the broader ‘work as a calling’ group whom I trust will not wish to remain accidental contributors to the language of individualism that pervades the literature once I have unmasked it. Perhaps, in time, they will even become MacIntyrean business ethicists. Indeed, the appropriate moral framework that undergirds the ‘work as a calling’ literature is actively being worked out by a narrower group of MacIntyrean business ethicists, all of whom represent my primary audience for the research herein. To the MacIntyrean community, I hope not only to provide a complete list of tendencies within the ‘work as a calling’ literature that must be resisted, but also a picture of all of the ways that Bellah et al.’s calling orientation is wholly bound up with MacIntyre’s moral philosophy – particularly his theory of the virtues and the common goods that the virtues sustain. Bellah et al.’s calling orientation rests upon a vision of ‘good work,’ and this vision of ‘good work’ hinges on a MacIntyrean account of the virtues that is directed toward the achievement of three distinct types of common goods: (a) the good and worthy ends of workplace practices, (b) the goods of an individual life, and (c) the goods of communities – or, more broadly, the interests of a good society. Furthermore, it will be shown to the MacIntyrean community that visions of ‘good work,’ which are sustained by the calling orientation, are accompanied by a nuanced vision of pluralistic collaboration that MacIntyre and Bellah et al. share. (I anticipate that this will be surprising to many readers who are familiar with the typical and misleading characterization of MacIntyre as a sectarian). Bellah et al. as well as MacIntyre’s vision of pluralism matters for research on the calling orientation because these figures demonstrate that individuals within the late modern workplace are informed by a plurality of religious and humanistic traditions, all of which account for ultimate meaning and goodness in different ways that ought to be recognized. Distinctive religious and humanistic visions of ultimate meaning indeed impact the perceived goodness of one’s calling. Hence, we must attend to the polysemic and multivocal nature of accounting for the goodness of any one particular calling (i.e., a Buddhist doctor within the Western medical tradition is likely to articulate the goodness of his calling differently than a Jewish doctor working within the Western medical tradition). Still, however, Bellah et al. and MacIntyre’s account entails a hopefulness in the possibility of pluralistic, (or, what I shall call inter-traditional) striving for the achievement of common goods that are practical enough to agree upon.

Authoritarianism is on the rise across the world and intriguingly in the United States, known as the democratic laboratory. Political theorists and activists inquire into this contradictory political phenomenon in the United States, but their inquiries are fruitless. This dissertation finds that they uncritically conceive democracy as a mechanism of governance. As such, this narrow conception hampers their intelligence for political inquiries into the surge of authoritarianism in America. This dissertation discusses why and how the current political phenomenon occurs and suggests a moral method to pursue the quest for democratic values. This method allows inquirers to successfully address the crisis of democracy. This dissertation appeals to John Dewey’s vision of deliberative democracy, comparing and contrasting it with Alasdair MacIntyre’s communitarianism-oriented political theory. It finds that just as the Deweyan democratic vision does, MacIntyre’s political vision of democracy, too, emphasizes citizens’ participation in the political activities of decision-making and policy formulation. For MacIntyre, deliberative and participatory citizens are engaged in small group meetings to resolve their social and political issues. However, his communitarian method falls short of inspiring inquirers who wish to establish meaningful hypotheses to overcome the crisis of democracy: the idea of value plurality that is deemed essential for the political hypotheses is negated to a substantial degree by Thomist humanism held in his later works. MacIntyre’s skeptical attitude toward the methodology of democracy fundamentally based on liberalism and empirical naturalism inhibits political inquiries to discover and apply methods required to resolve the existing political situation in the U.S. By contrast, Dewey provides an appropriate array of philosophical ideas concerning deliberative democracy based on cooperative intelligence for political inquirers. With Dewey’s thought-provoking philosophical ideas, they are prepared to address their recently revived interest in authoritarianism in politics. They open a path towards a way of life that promotes authentic participation and deliberation in public affairs to tackle complex policy issues and bring out human flourishing. On this moral and social path, people demolish authoritarianism. Democratic hope is no longer an unattainable dream.

Yes / This paper explores whether MacIntyrean virtue ethics concepts are applicable in non-Western business contexts, specifically in SMEs in Taiwan a country strongly influenced by the Confucian tradition. It also explores what differences exist between different polities in this respect, and specifically interprets observed differences between the Taiwanese study and previous studies conducted in Europe and Asia. Based on case study research, the findings support the generalizability of the MacIntyrean framework. Drawing on the institutional logics perspective and synthesizing this with MacIntyrean concepts, the paper explains the differences between the studies largely by reference to the Confucian tradition operating at both the micro-level within firms and at the macro-level as a means of harmonizing the potentially competing institutional logics to which firms are subject. The recent weakening of this tradition, however, suggests that increased conflict may characterize the future.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-14T12:11:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Arquivototal.pdf: 869660 bytes, checksum: 6c78194f2526633dc3754d9685889226 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-09-06 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This present research aims to understand and stimulate the debate around virtue ethics in philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre. To this Scottish philosopher, the contemporary society has been facing a serious morality crisis, which reflects majorly in social and psychological conflicts of the contemporary human being .The existence of such moral crisis is justified by an absence of a teleological character which can substantiate these subject s actions. Without a telos , human beings start substantiating their actions in personal emotions and desires, letting themselves be driven by emotionalism. Thus, considering the argumentative process of MacIntyre in major writings as: After virtue (2001), Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1991), Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry (1999), the work claims to present the moral presuppositions of his thoughts, contrasting the concepts of practical, life narrative and tradition, offering the necessary basis not only to understand the existence of such moral crisis, but, also able to recover the teleological character consistent with social context of contemporary society. Therewith, it s expected to conclude that the liberal culture cannot provide a last end to human act and virtue ethics of Alasdair MacIntyre can be a satisfying proposal to solve the moral conflicts of this society. / A presente pesquisa visa compreender e estimular o debate em torno da ética das virtudes na filosofia de Alasdair MacIntyre. Para o filósofo escocês, as sociedades contemporâneas têm vivido uma séria crise da moralidade, que reflete em grande parte nos conflitos sociais e psicológicos do sujeito contemporâneo. A existência dessa crise moral é justificada pela ausência de um caráter teleológico que possa fundamentar as ações morais desses sujeitos. Sem um telos, o sujeito passa a fundamentar suas ações morais nas emoções e nos desejos pessoais, deixando-se guiar pelo emotivismo. Assim, considerando o processo argumentativo de MacIntyre em obras centrais como: Depois da virtude(2001), Justiça de Quem? Qual Racionalidade?(1991) e Tres versiones rivales de la etica(1999), o trabalho tem como pretensão apresentar os pressupostos morais do seu pensamento, destacando os conceitos de práticas, narrativa de vida e tradição, de forma a oferecer os fundamentos necessários não só para compreender a existência dessa crise moral, mas, capaz de recuperar o caráter teleológico condizente com o contexto social das sociedades contemporâneas. Com isso, se espera concluir que a cultural liberal não é capaz de fornecer um fim último ao agir humano e que a ética das virtudes de Alasdair MacIntyre pode ser uma proposta satisfatória para resolver os conflitos morais dessa sociedade.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Raimunda Diva de Vasconcelos Ribeiro.pdf: 2566714 bytes, checksum: f64ff183208f288f0c57fed1cc1d1f9d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-12-10 / This thesis revisits the concept of technical in Hans Jonas by looking to expand its evaluation as the dominant telos of contemporary society, that is, that technique is no longer a mere instrument and has increasingly become a human end in a technological world. The aim is to think of technique as a practice, in light of the conceptual contributions of Alasdair MacIntyre, in which the ethical dimension is a key feature, since every practice as a socially developed and organized activity has a teleological structure, and consequently mobilizes concepts of virtue and also of a greater human good as excellence. Thus, it is possible to achieve a distinct perspective from Jonas s, with the contribution of MacIntyre, to overcome partial difficulties of the Jonasian thought regarding his understanding of technoscience, which it seems to be still connected to the instrumentalist vision. Therefore, it is necessary to identify, clarify, understand, and reflect on technoscience in all its complexity, the benefits that supply many human needs, while remembering the need of seeing it not as a neutral instrument, but as a practice in the MacIntyrian sense, which it means that carries on an inescapable ethical dimension. Theoretical elements were sought to provide evidence for understanding the evolution and conceptual transformations in the fields of technical until becoming technoscience, in order to provide conceptual elements to make a case for a critical interpretation of the main ethical problems and challenges posed by the emergence of technoscientific society in the XXI century. Besides the philosophers mentioned above, some other contributions are discussed from authors who study contemporary issues relevant concerning the use of technoscience and its power of saving and destroying / Esta tese faz uma releitura do conceito de técnica em Hans Jonas buscando expandir sua avaliação como o telos predominante da sociedade contemporânea, isto é, que a técnica deixou de ser instrumento e passou a ser entendida como finalidade humana em um mundo cada vez mais tecnológico. O objetivo é pensá-la como uma prática, à luz dos aportes conceituais de Alasdair MacIntyre, na qual a dimensão ética é uma característica fundamental, já que toda prática como atividade socialmente desenvolvida e organizada possui uma estrutura teleológica e, por conseguinte, conceitos de virtude e de um bem humano como excelência maior. Assim, pode-se atingir um plano de reflexão distinto de Jonas e, deste modo, com a contribuição de MacIntyre, superar as dificuldades parciais do pensamento jonasiano no tocante à compreensão da tecnociência, ainda vinculada a uma visão instrumentalista. Para tanto, acreditamos ser necessário identificar, aclarar, compreender e refletir sobre a tecnociência como ela se faz em toda sua complexidade, os benefícios que suprem as necessidades humanas, sem deixar de lembrar a necessidade de vê-la não mais como um instrumento neutro, mas como prática no sentido dado por MacIntyre, portadora de uma dimensão ética que lhe é iniludível. Procurou-se apresentar elementos teóricos para a compreensão da evolução e das transformações conceituais nos domínios da técnica até transformar-se em tecnociência, visando fornecer elementos conceituais para defender uma interpretação crítica dos principais problemas e desafios de ordem ética, colocados pela emergência da sociedade tecnocientífica do século XXI. Além dos filósofos citados, discute-se também algumas contribuições de autores contemporâneos que estudam questões pertinentes à nossa reflexão sobre o uso da tecnociência no tocante ao poder da salvar e destruir que esta possui

<p>This dissertation begins a conversation between "apocalyptic" interpretations of the Apostle Paul and the contemporary revival in "virtue ethics." It argues that the human actor's place in Pauline theology has long been captive to theological concerns foreign to Paul and that we can discern in Paul a classical account of human action that Alasdair MacIntyre's work helps to recover. Such an account of agency helps ground an apocalyptic reading of Paul by recovering the centrality of the church and its day-to-day Christic practices, specifically, but not exclusively, the Eucharist. To demonstrate this we first offer a critique of some contemporary accounts of agency in Paul in light of MacIntyre's work. Three exegetical chapters then establish a "MacIntyrian" re-reading of central parts of the letter to the Romans. A concluding chapter offers theological syntheses and prospects for future research.</p> / Dissertation

Colombia's protracted civil war between Marxist insurgencies and the state has brought grave consequences for the civilian population and the prospects for constructing a viable political community in the country. With up to 5 million internally displaced people, rampant impunity for perpetrators of crimes against humanity and human rights and International Humanitarian Law violations, dozens of politicians and countless members of the armed forces linked to paramilitary organizations, along with increasing social injustices and inequalities, Colombia presents a troubling social-political panorama that has led to what is often referred to as a profound social and institutional 'moral crisis'. Much discussion has centred on the question of achieving some degree of minimal moral and political consensus and 'collective conscience' to humanize and slowly transform the conflict at local, regional and national levels. However, the philosophical and political parameters of this discussion have been and continue to be set firmly within variants of the liberal tradition which, it is argued, does not provide the necessary resources for adequately conceptualizing the problem and conceiving the task of addressing conflict, constructing moral consensus, and seeking social and political coexistence. The thesis argues that the philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre can provide such resources. MacIntyre provides a convincing account of the philosophical problems that underlie ongoing intractable disagreement and the conflicts it breeds, offering a philosophy that can inform and underpin efforts at social transformation, resistance, and coexistence as well as aiding the necessary task of social scientific research and analysis of the conflict. The thesis analyses the moral dimensions of the conflict in light of MacIntyre's philosophy but also critically explores the adequacy of his politics of local community for the Colombian context. MacIntyre argues that a rational political community can only be constructed through the praxis of local communities engaging in shared moral-political deliberation. Through an empirical case study of a Constituent Assembly process in a rural community that has suffered the impacts of armed conflict for decades, the thesis explores an attempt at constructing peaceful social and political coexistence in light of MacIntyre's moral-sociological framework.

This study explores the learning trajectories of four senior managers at the Royal Mail as they confronted new demands at work. These four managers worked at the Royal Mail during the years prior to, and during its privatisation, when it was also undergoing an intense modernisation. Theoretically, I took a sociocultural approach, drawing on Vygotsky (1998), Edwards (2010), Holland et al. (1998), and Sfard and Prusak (2005), among others. I was also provoked by Alasdair MacIntyre's characterisation of the manager and his understanding of practice, which emphasises human ourishing. Data was collected through iterative unstructured and semi-structured interviews, and by work shadowing the managers. Methodologically, I developed a useful interview protocol to capture stories about work and a more nuanced understanding of what mattered to participants. I also built a conceptual framework that draws theoretically from a sociocultural understanding of learning and development, as well as from MacIntyre (2013) and Taylor (1989). e model emerged from the dialectics of theory and empirical data. The research shows that as the Royal Mail underwent organisational change, the managers had to navigate situations of misalignment between what mattered to them and what mattered to other members of the organisation. Such situations of misalignment brought about new demands. As they confronted the demands, the managers realised the need to close a gap between who they were and who they were expected to become. Gap-closing efforts were characterised as a process of learning and development that involved intense identity work. In the process, the managers had to work through a series of contradictions, which can be expressed in the form of questions: Who am I really? Who should I no longer be? Who do I resist becoming? And, who do I struggle to become? Gap-closing was given by a dialectic between the managers' commitments and identi cations, and the stories of what was good in the gured world of managing at the Royal Mail. Contrary to some of MacIntyre's suggestions, I found that the four managers in the study, Linda, Eric, Margaret and Julian did question themselves about some of the ends they pursued. ey also exhibited varying degrees of agency, and did establish a distance with the impositions of their institutional realities. In the eld, I found instances of moral debate, the exercising of virtues and the managers' very human efforts to live a worthy life and to ourish. Yet, I also found empirical grounds for some of MacIntyre's claims. As the managers navigated misalignment, they used an array of strategies intended to persuade others in a manipulative way, sometimes treating ends as given, and sometimes eluding moral debate. The study contributes to the literature of learning and development through its original theoretical approach that draws from both sociocultural and MacIntyrean ideas.