The general goal of this dissertation is to clarify and discuss several topics that are, in some way or other, related to the language of thought hypothesis, put forward most forcefully by Jerry Fodor. The language of thought hypothesis is a hypothesis about the nature of mental representations. It says that mental representations have a linguistic structure. This is the same as saying that, just like sentences in a natural language, mental representations have primitive constituents (with syntactic and semantic properties), which combine to form syntactically and semantically complex symbols. The language of thought hypothesis is closely related to the representational and computational theories of mind. I discuss them and compare them to some opposing philosophical views of the mind. I then discuss the productivity and the systematicity arguments for the language of thought. Finally, we will see different ways to conceive the relation between the language of thought and the natural languages. / O objetivo geral desta tese é esclarecer e discutir diversos tópicos relacionados, de um modo ou de outro, à hipótese da linguagem do pensamento, formulada de maneira mais elaborada por Jerry Fodor. A hipótese da linguagem do pensamento é uma hipótese sobre a natureza das representações mentais. Ela diz que representações mentais têm uma estrutura linguística. Isso é o mesmo que dizer que, tal como sentenças em uma língua natural, representações mentais têm constituintes primitivos (com propriedades sintáticas e semânticas), que se combinam para formar símbolos sintática e semanticamente complexos. A hipótese da linguagem do pensamento está profundamente relacionada à teoria representacional e à teoria computacional da mente. Discutirei essas teorias e as compararei com algumas visões filosóficas opostas da mente. Em seguida, discutirei os argumentos da produtividade e da sistematicidade, em favor da linguagem do pensamento. Finalmente, veremos diferentes modos de conceber a relação entre a linguagem do pensamento e as línguas naturais.

The general goal of this dissertation is to clarify and discuss several topics that are, in some way or other, related to the language of thought hypothesis, put forward most forcefully by Jerry Fodor. The language of thought hypothesis is a hypothesis about the nature of mental representations. It says that mental representations have a linguistic structure. This is the same as saying that, just like sentences in a natural language, mental representations have primitive constituents (with syntactic and semantic properties), which combine to form syntactically and semantically complex symbols. The language of thought hypothesis is closely related to the representational and computational theories of mind. I discuss them and compare them to some opposing philosophical views of the mind. I then discuss the productivity and the systematicity arguments for the language of thought. Finally, we will see different ways to conceive the relation between the language of thought and the natural languages. / O objetivo geral desta tese é esclarecer e discutir diversos tópicos relacionados, de um modo ou de outro, à hipótese da linguagem do pensamento, formulada de maneira mais elaborada por Jerry Fodor. A hipótese da linguagem do pensamento é uma hipótese sobre a natureza das representações mentais. Ela diz que representações mentais têm uma estrutura linguística. Isso é o mesmo que dizer que, tal como sentenças em uma língua natural, representações mentais têm constituintes primitivos (com propriedades sintáticas e semânticas), que se combinam para formar símbolos sintática e semanticamente complexos. A hipótese da linguagem do pensamento está profundamente relacionada à teoria representacional e à teoria computacional da mente. Discutirei essas teorias e as compararei com algumas visões filosóficas opostas da mente. Em seguida, discutirei os argumentos da produtividade e da sistematicidade, em favor da linguagem do pensamento. Finalmente, veremos diferentes modos de conceber a relação entre a linguagem do pensamento e as línguas naturais.

This thesis investigates an understanding of the relationship between mind and world which avoids defining the former as a naturalizable entity and the latter as identifiable with the world described by the natural sciences. I recommend paying closer attention to the notion of person and to our practical encounter with the world. I reject the idea of the world's having a given structure which is independent of our knowledge of it and, consequently, any conception of knowledge as a search for free-standing essences. I start by criticizing the project of naturalizing intentionality in general, and the content of mental states in particular. I focus on Fodor's language of thought and his explication of semantic relations as relations between individual mental representations and isolated features of the world. I argue that this sort of account leads to scepticism or to postulating pre-established harmony. An alternative, Davidsonian framework which highlights the interdependence of meaning and knowledge is explored. Following the Kantian line opened by McDowell, I propose pursuing Davidson's philosophy to its ultimate consequences and defend a non-foundationalist role for experience, oppose Davidson's inconsistent deferentialist attitude to physical processes, and suggest retaining the idea of mental causation by defining causation in terms of explanatory practices rather than laws. From this perspective minds cease to be bundles of mysterious internal states of organisms which need relating to tangible matter. Instead, sense is made of people's dealings with the world in terms of their interaction with each other, their ability to communicate, and the rationality and normativity which regulates their lives. I argue that it is only from this perspective that claims of knowledge can be made, and that attempts at reducing normativity to the supposedly descriptive stance of science eliminate the grounds for maintaining that such attempts should be taken as true or correct.

Jerry Fodor has argued that virtually all lexical concepts are innate. I argue against this position, but not, as other have done, on the grounds that the arguments against lexical decomposition upon which Fodor relies are flawed. Rather, I argue that even if lexical concepts cannot be decomposed, the possession conditions for having lexical concepts are nonetheless not innately satisfied.

No description available.

In this thesis I address certain key issues in contemporary philosophy of mind and psychology via a study of Jerry Fodor's hugely important contributions to the discussion of those issues. The issues in question are: (i) the nature of scientific psychology; (ii) the individuation of psychological states for the purposes of scientific psychological explanation; and (iii) the project of naturalising mental content. I criticise many of Fodor's most significant and provocative claims but from within a framework of shared assumptions. I attempt to motivate and justify many of these shared assumptions. Chapter 1 constitutes an overview of the key themes in Fodor's philosophy of mind. In Chapter 2 an account of scientific psychology within the orthodox computationalist tradition is developed according to which that discipline is concerned with explaining intentionally characterised cognitive capacities. Such explanations attribute both semantic and syntactic properties to subpersonal representational states and processes. In Chapters 3 and 5 Fodor's various arguments for the conclusion that scientific psychology does (or should) individuate psychological states individualistically are criticised. I argue that there are pragmatic reasons why scientific psychology should sometimes attribute contents that are not locally supervenient. In Chapter 4 I consider Marr's theory of vision and conclude that the contents that Marr attributes to the states of the visual module are locally supervenient. Inconsistency is avoided by stressing the continuity of scientific psychological content with folk psychological content. In Chapter 6 I develop an account of the project of naturalising mental content that vindicates that project. In Chapter 7 I address the question of whether Fodor's theory of content constitutes a successful engagement in that project. I argue for a negative answer before drawing some morals as to how we should proceed in the light of the failure of Fodor's theory.

No description available.

Cette thèse aborde un sujet très débattu dans la philosophie de l’esprit et les sciences cognitives contemporaines : la naturalisation de l’intentionnalité en vue d’une théorie générale de la signification exprimable dans les prédicats des sciences naturelles. La première partie expose comment, à partir des années 1960 a évolué le programme collectif de naturalisation, depuis le fonctionnalisme jusqu’à ce qu’on peut appeler le « tournant naturaliste » du début des années 1970 dû à l’essor des sciences cognitives et à une forte remise en cause du fonctionnalisme, notamment en ce qui concerne la prise en compte de l’indexicalité des significations (cf. Kripke 1971, Putnam 1975). La deuxième partie expose les deux types de stratégies qui s’esquissent alors au début des années 1980 : d’une part la voie de la « sémantique informationnelle » (SI) (initiée par Fred Dretske et poursuivie aussi par Jerry Fodor, ce dernier défendant un symbolisme cérébral) où il s’agit de fonder l’intentionnalité sur des rapports nomologiques informatifs. D’autre part la voie de la « téléosémantique » (TS) (initiée par Ruth G. Millikan, suivie notamment par David Papineau) qui consiste à expliquer le développement de l’intentionnalité jusqu’à la cognition conceptuelle à partir de contraintes évolutionnistes. La troisième partie opère un « tournant sémiotique » en examinant la théorie logique et métaphysique des signes chez Charles S. Peirce (1845-1914), dont Millikan déclare s’être initialement inspirée. Il s’agit de montrer que la conception peircienne de l’intentionnalité, qui conçoit celle-ci comme un processus inférentiel réalisé dans des signes fonctionnant de manière iconique, est effectivement la voie permettant de fonder une nouvelle conception de la représentation symbolique qui évite d’avoir à assumer les présupposés métaphysiques du cognitivisme computationnel propres à la SI ; cela en développant une notion de signe naturel qui rend compte des faits découverts par les sciences cognitives sans tomber pour autant dans le psychologisme. La quatrième partie constitue alors l’ébauche de ce que pourrait être une philosophie de l’esprit élaborée à partir du concept écologique de signe cognitif, celui-ci comportant une dimension logique (une relation triadique, au sens où l’entend la logique des relatifs de Peirce) et une dimension proprement comportementale (également triadique, mais dépourvue d’auto-contrôle : ce pour quoi on crée le concept d’Image comportementale). Un examen sur la question de l’indexicalité montre que la bonne appréhension du problème consiste en effet à bien penser l’articulation entre les fonctions indexicales et iconiques du signe, qui ne prend la forme d’un rapport contrôlé d’intentionnalité seconde que dans le cadre d’un système symbolique régi par des conventions syntaxiques / The subject of this thesis is the naturalizing project of intentionality, i.e. a theory of meaning expressible in natural sciences predicates. Part I expose the functionalist program in the 1960’ and its calling into question during the 1970’ by the development of cognitive sciences and indexicality problem (Kripke 1971, Putnam 1975). Part II is devoted to the alternative strategies developed since the beginning of the 1980’. In one hand : the “information semantics”, i.e. a nomic grounded semantics initiated by Fred Dretske (followed by Jerry Fodor). On the other hand: the “teleosemantics” of Ruth G. Millikan (followed by David Papineau) which seeks to found the theory of cognition on evolutionary constraints. Part III proceeds to a “semeiotic turn” by analyzing the logical and metaphysical theory of signs of Charles S. Peirce (1845-1914), one of the most prominent sources of Millikan’s thesis. Indeed, Peirce’s conception of cognition as an inferential process grounded in iconic signs is the very way of a naturalistic theory of symbols which symmetrically avoids the metaphysical prejudices of computational cognitivism and psychologism. Then Part IV try to sketch out the project of an ecological theory of mind based on the concept of a multi-functional intentional sign (a sign of which the inferential function of self-control is not reducible to the simpler behavioural functions). In this part we argue in favour of a new behavioural concept : the “Image”. A last development concerning the indexicality problem tends to prove that the matter consists in an adequate description of the relations between iconic and indexical functions in the sign, by which it is possible to understand the specificity of syntactical and conventional systems of expression

Hamburg, Universiẗat, Diss., 2001. / Erscheinungsjahr an der Haupttitelstelle: 2000.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:12:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 1877.pdf: 2071518 bytes, checksum: e1b71056aa2ac63701bde1170ad621f9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-05-19 / The aim of this research is to present a discussion and an analysis of the epistemological statute of the main theories regarding the philosophy of mind. In order to do that, we have developed some basic notions of the scientific investigation theory to determine the degree of assurance, certainty and scientificity that go with some of the descriptions, metaphors, models and theories concerning the philosophy of mind. After that, we organized an itinerary of the main models and metaphors in mind research, from the birth of 19th century Psychology to the Cognitive Sciences of the last three decades. We have identified the alternance criteria regarding the metaphors and models that have been used in research about the mind. Then, we reached what we have called a triple dominion of models, which has been used along the 20th and in the beginning of the 21st centuries: the representational and information processing model, deriving from the Cognitive Sciences; the Cognitive Neuroscience, which resumes philosophical issues such as mind and intentionality; and the biological model, specifically the one concerning Evolutionist Psychology. We have tried to demonstrate the epistemological and methodological bases and the competences of this new dominion of models, as well as their limits and reach. In this way, we come to the thesis itself: the proposition that Jerry A. Fodor s representational and modular notion of the mind is a perspective that converges on such triple dominion. We understand that Fodor s contributions are basic for a research program in the philosophy of mind, considering that the program aims at defining methodological strategies and it also reviews essential epistemological issues. Regarding the discussions about the mind, Fodor emphasizes that psychology requires philosophical support and that there should be a flow of theses from psychology to philosophy as well; in this way, reductionist theories and conceptual illusions would be avoided. Fodor s epistemological contribution is a reference regarding the explanation of mental states, avoiding the proliferation of terms and notions. / A pesquisa é uma discussão e uma análise do estatuto epistemológico das principais elaborações teóricas em filosofia da mente. Para isso, desenvolvemos algumas noções fundamentais da teoria da investigação científica para determinar o grau de segurança, certeza e cientificidade que acompanham algumas das descrições, metáforas, modelos e teorias em filosofia da mente. Organizamos, em seguida, um itinerário dos principais modelos e metáforas nas pesquisas sobre a mente desde o nascimento da Psicologia do século XIX até as Ciências Cognitivas das três últimas décadas. Identificamos os critérios de alternâncias na ciranda de metáforas e modelos que se revezaram nas pesquisas sobre a mente. Então, alcançamos o que denominamos de um triplo domínio de modelos que se instaurou ao longo do final do século XX e início do século XXI: o representacional e de processamento de informação, advindo das ciências cognitivas; a neurociência cognitiva, que retoma questões filosóficas como mente, intencionalidade; e o biológico, especificamente da psicologia evolucionista. Procuramos demonstrar os fundamentos epistemológicos, metodológicos e as competências deste novo domínio de modelos, assim como seus limites e alcances. E assim chegamos à tese propriamente dita: a proposição de que a noção representacional e modular de mente de Jerry A. Fodor é uma perspectiva para a qual converge tal triplo domínio. Entendemos que as contribuições de Fodor são fundamentais para um programa de pesquisa em filosofia da mente, uma vez que procura definir estratégias metodológicas e, também, rever questões epistemológicas essenciais. Referente às discussões sobre a mente, Fodor ressalta a necessidade de um apoio filosófico para a psicologia assim como um trânsito de teses da psicologia para a filosofia, o que evitaria teorias reducionistas e ilusões conceituais. A contribuição epistemológica de Fodor é uma referência na busca de explicações sobre os estados mentais que evitam a proliferação de termos e de noções.