Inom bedömningen av skadeståndsansvar för bolagsledningen och aktieägare enligt 29:1 och 29:3 Aktiebolagslagen, genomförs en oaktsamhetsprövning. Utan oaktsamhet eller uppsåt kan inte ansvar göras gällande. Vad som utgör oaktsamhet saknar direkt definition i lag, utan har bedömts av domstolarna i varje enskilt fall. Då oaktsamhet liksom lagöverträdelser, och åsidosättande av uppdrag, väger tungt vid en ansvarsbedömning, behöver bolagsledningen utöver allmän kunskap om aktuella regler även veta vilken aktsamhet som krävs för att undvika ansvar. I Skatteförfarandelagen 59:12-14 finns liknande ansvarsbestämmelser. Bestämmelserna anger att en företrädare för bolaget kan bli personligt ansvarig för den juridiska personens skatter och avgifter. En ansvarsförutsättning är att det föreligger grov oaktsamhet. Företrädaransvaret inom skatteförfarandelagen, och skadeståndsansvaret utifrån aktiebolagslagen, förutsätter således båda ett oaktsamt handlande i varierande grad. Eftersom två bestämmelser i skiljda regelverk kan medföra ett ingripande ansvar för någon i bolagsledningen, borde en viss kontinuitet fordras i hur oaktsamheten bedöms. Företrädaransvar har enligt praxis visat sig utgå endast genom överträdelsen i sig, d.v.s. de faktiska omständigheterna, i vissa fall har en subjektiv faktor spelat in, och det är insikten. Insikten i bedömningen motsvarar den grova oaktsamheten som förutsätts. Vid skadeståndsansvar bedöms fler faktorer än en insikt för att vanlig oaktsamhet ska föreligga, och utöver oaktsamheten, även andra faktorer för att ansvar sedan ska utgå. Risken för diskrepens inom tillämpningen av dessa ansvarsregler är inget bolagsledningens kan förutspå, och borde därför inte ligga på bolagsledningens axlar. Även om det kan vara svårt att skapa ett fullt ut förenligt system för oaktsamhetsprövning. Borde det kunna förhindras att oförenligheten blir på någons bekostnad. / In assessing the liability of the company management and shareholders of 29:1 and 29:3 in the Swedish Companies Act, a negligent appraisal is required. Without negligence or intent, no one can be held responsible. What constitutes negligence are not directly defined by statute but has been deemed by the courts in each case. When negligence, violations of law, and breaches of mission weighs heavily in a responsible assessment, the senior management needs beyond the general knowledge of current rules also know what prudence required to avoid liability. The tax procedure law 59:12-14 contains similar liability rules. The rules state that a representative of the company may be personally liable for taxes and fees associated with the company. The standard of liability in the Tax procedure law requires gross negligence. The liability regarding taxes and liability on the basis of the Companies Act, therefore both requires negligence is in varying degrees. Since the two provisions in separate regulations may result in an intervening responsibility for any of the senior management, a degree of continuity is needed as to how the negligence is assessed. The liability for taxes has by convention been shown to activate only by the infringement itself, i.e. the facts. In some cases, a subjective factor has played a role, and it is the recognition of the deficient tax payment. This recognition is in the tax-liability assessment equal to the gross negligence required. Liability in accordance with the Swedish Companies Act on the other hand, requires more than recognition to constitute ordinary negligence. In addition to this negligence, other factors are also assessed before actual liability is activated. The risk of discrepancy in the application of liability in two regulations can’t be predicted by the management, and shouldn’t lie on the management's shoulders. While it may be difficult to create a fully compatible system for negligence trial, it should be prevented that the incompatibility is at someone's expense.

Short term assignments to other countries are increasing and it is important to take note of the associated potential tax compliance requirements. South Africa is part of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) whose main objective is to advance the development and economic growth of the member countries through regional integration. It is difficult for persons with limited or no international tax background to identify potential taxes when going on short term assignments to other SADC countries as very little has been published with regard to the procedure to follow. The procedure to follow and the main tax concepts (corporate tax, personal tax, VAT and withholding tax) have not been published in a user friendly, holistic format to enable such persons to identify potential tax implications. In this research a conceptual tax-compliance framework was created and tested to enable persons to follow the procedure to identify potential taxes that could be triggered when going on short term assignments. It also enables them to have an understanding of the concepts of the main tax principles applicable in SADC countries that have double tax agreements in place with South Africa. / Dissertation (MCom)--University of Pretoria, 2013. / lmchunu2014 / Taxation / unrestricted

庫藏股制度於國外已經行之有年，特別是美國，早在1960年代即有庫藏股交易。我國上市上櫃股票可合法買回自己公司股票制度始於2000年所通過的上市上櫃公司買回本公司股份辦法，除了希望藉以提振東南亞金融危機中不振的股市表現，也賦予企業多一種能向投資人傳遞訊息的管道。本研究基於股票買回的各項假說，希望探究公司股票買回宣告的動機還有事件宣告後對於公司股價的影響效果，最後並檢視公司的宣告決策是否會受到前次購回宣告的表現所影響。 在假說驗證方面，以2000至2004年上市公司832家、上櫃公司236家曾經宣告買回自家股票的公司為研究樣本，輔以選出與買回樣本同時間的相同數量「未買回樣本」，透過1-way ANOVA測試與鑑別分析探討影響公司宣告股票買回的因素符合哪些假說的推論結果。此外，依據各項假說，進ㄧ步利用1-way ANOVA測試和複迴歸分析找出與公司事件宣告後股價異常報酬率之間的關係，接著以1-way ANOVA檢視最後一部份研究主題。經由上述的實證分析，本研究獲得以下主要結論： 1.公司買回自家的股票平均而言對於股價有正面的影響效果。 2.以上市公司而言，影響公司宣告股票買回的假說包括了：自由現金流量假說、個人所得稅節稅假說與財務槓桿假說。以上櫃公司而言則包括：自由現金流量假說、個人所得稅節稅假說與資訊信號假說。 3.以上市公司而言，股票買回宣告後，股價的正向異常報酬與：自由現金流量假說、管理者的誘因假說呈現相關關係。上櫃公司則包括：自由現金流量假說。 4.本次是否再度宣告股票買回會受前次買回的正向累積異常報酬率所影響。 / Stock price reactions on stock repurchase announcements among publicly traded corporations have been widely studied over 40 years in United States. Several hypothesizes were established and provide logical reasons for why corporations buy back their own stocks. References show large proportion of positive effect on post-announcement stock price after stock repurchase announcements from empirical researches. It is since 2000 that corporations are allowed to repurchase their own stocks legally in Taiwan. Although many efforts were put in surveying the post-announcement stock price reactions, few focused on examining how corporations’ repurchase decision would be influenced by different hypothesizes. Moreover, whether or not previous repurchase outcome may affect future repurchase judgments met contradict conclusion from recent studies. This research aims on exploring the two main topics which form 7 hypothesize. Data collecting from Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database, Commercial Times and Economic Daily News contains publicly traded corporations had ever made stock repurchase announcement except financial and government institutions. The period of the study was from Aug. 6, 2000 to Jul. 31, 2004 and total number of announced corporations included was 832 listed on the Taiwan Security Exchange with 236 listed on the OTC separately. Hypothesis 1 to 6 were tested both from individual model using 1-way ANOVA Analysis and integrated model using Discriminate Analysis on Hypothesis 1 to 5, Event Study Analysis on Hypothesis 6. Hypothesis 7 was also verified with 1-way ANOVA Analysis. The empirical results show supports in several hypothesize which reflect corporations did concern free cash flow amount, leverage level, stock underpriced and dividend payout level issues when making repurchase announcement. The stock price after announcement has certain degree of moving correlation toward the same direction as free cash flow level and managerial stockholding level. Finally, previous repurchase outcome was found holding opposite relation with future repurchase judgments.