Traditionally, the central threat to the defensibility of the range of practices and attitudes constitutive of moral criticism has been seen to be posed by the Causal Thesis, the view that all actions have antecedent causes to which they are linked by causal laws of the kind that govern other events in the universe. In such a world, agents lack the sort of underived origination and agency required for the appropriateness of moral criticism. However, Peter Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” marks a move away from a metaphysical conception of agency and conditions of the appropriateness of moral criticism. On Strawson’s account, the problem of moral responsibility is centrally a normative problem, a problem about the moral norms that govern interpersonal relationships, and the conditions of appropriateness of the range of attitudes and sentiments occasioned by the agents’ fulfillment or non-fulfillment of these norms. In this dissertation I argue that the success of normative conceptions of conditions of appropriateness of moral criticism is contingent of the amelioration of the tension between two strategies in “Freedom and Resentment.” Naturalist interpretations hold that sentiments and practices constitutive of moral criticism are natural features of human psychological constitution, and therefore neither allow nor require justification. Rationalist interpretation, by contrast, are based on an analysis of conditions under which moral criticism can be justifiably modified or suspended. Both of these strategies, I argue, are false. The naturalistic interpretation is false not because of its inability to offer a plausible account of the conditions of justifiability of reactive attitudes, but rather because of its inability to offer a principled account of the way moral norms are grounded. The rationalistic interpretation, in turn, not only relies on an implausible psychological account of conditions of responsible agency, but puts an unacceptable emphasis on the agent’s intention. A plausible interpretation of the normative strategy requires emphasizing not only the significance of attitudes and feelings, but also the role reasons play in constituting moral norms and justifying moral criticism / Thesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2010-07-05 16:42:43.601

Analisa-se na presente dissertação a teoria das descrições de Bertrand Russell, bem como a crítica que é feita por Peter Strawson a essa teoria. A fim de contextualizar a teoria das descrições, analisa-se primeiramente a teoria do atomismo platônico de George Moore, teoria que configura o primeiro momento da revolta contra o idealismo de cunho hegeliano que dominava a filosofia inglesa no final do século XIX. A seguir, expõe-se em linhas gerais a filosofia de Bertrand Russell dos primeiros anos do século XX, a qual poderia ser chamada de “logicismo”, na medida em que tinha como preocupação teórica central demonstrar a redutibilidade de toda a matemática pura a algumas poucas noções lógicas fundamentais e indefiníveis. Após isso, analisa-se então a inovação filosófica consubstanciada pela teoria das descrições de Russell, mostrando como ela lida com importantes problemas lógicos e filosóficos. Sem dúvida, a teoria das descrições de Russell foi uma das teorias filosóficas mais significativas do século XX. Posteriormente, apresenta-se a crítica de Peter Strawson à teoria das descrições, bem como a réplica de Russell. Conclui-se a dissertação com uma breve avaliação a respeito de três pontos fundamentais de divergência entre Russell e Strawson: o papel da linguagem ordinária na análise filosófica, o valor de verdade de proposições expressas por sentenças do tipo “O atual Rei da França é calvo”, e a questão dos nomes próprios. / In the present dissertation, Bertrand Russell’s theory of descriptions is analyzed, as well as Peter Strawson’s criticism of this theory. In order to better contextualize the theory of descriptions, George Moore’s theory of Platonic Atomism is firstly analyzed. This theory represents the first step of the revolt against the Hegelian influenced idealism that dominated English philosophy at the end of the 19th century. After that, Bertrand Russell’s early philosophy is outlined in its main features, that is, his philosophy from the first years of the 20th century, which may be called “logicism”, since it had, as its main theoretical purpose, the demonstration that all pure mathematics could be reduced to a few fundamental and indefinable logical notions. Subsequently, the philosophical innovation represented by Russell’s theory of descriptions is analyzed, and the manner in which it deals with important logical and philosophical problems is exhibited. One can say that Russell’s theory of descriptions is one of the most significant philosophical theories of the 20th century. After that, Peter Strawson’s criticism of the theory of descriptions is presented, as well as Russell’s rebuttal of it. The dissertation ends with a brief assessment of three fundamental points of contention between Russell and Strawson: the role of ordinary language in philosophical analysis, the truth value of propositions expressed by sentences such as “The present King of France is bald”, and the question regarding proper names.

Analisa-se na presente dissertação a teoria das descrições de Bertrand Russell, bem como a crítica que é feita por Peter Strawson a essa teoria. A fim de contextualizar a teoria das descrições, analisa-se primeiramente a teoria do atomismo platônico de George Moore, teoria que configura o primeiro momento da revolta contra o idealismo de cunho hegeliano que dominava a filosofia inglesa no final do século XIX. A seguir, expõe-se em linhas gerais a filosofia de Bertrand Russell dos primeiros anos do século XX, a qual poderia ser chamada de “logicismo”, na medida em que tinha como preocupação teórica central demonstrar a redutibilidade de toda a matemática pura a algumas poucas noções lógicas fundamentais e indefiníveis. Após isso, analisa-se então a inovação filosófica consubstanciada pela teoria das descrições de Russell, mostrando como ela lida com importantes problemas lógicos e filosóficos. Sem dúvida, a teoria das descrições de Russell foi uma das teorias filosóficas mais significativas do século XX. Posteriormente, apresenta-se a crítica de Peter Strawson à teoria das descrições, bem como a réplica de Russell. Conclui-se a dissertação com uma breve avaliação a respeito de três pontos fundamentais de divergência entre Russell e Strawson: o papel da linguagem ordinária na análise filosófica, o valor de verdade de proposições expressas por sentenças do tipo “O atual Rei da França é calvo”, e a questão dos nomes próprios. / In the present dissertation, Bertrand Russell’s theory of descriptions is analyzed, as well as Peter Strawson’s criticism of this theory. In order to better contextualize the theory of descriptions, George Moore’s theory of Platonic Atomism is firstly analyzed. This theory represents the first step of the revolt against the Hegelian influenced idealism that dominated English philosophy at the end of the 19th century. After that, Bertrand Russell’s early philosophy is outlined in its main features, that is, his philosophy from the first years of the 20th century, which may be called “logicism”, since it had, as its main theoretical purpose, the demonstration that all pure mathematics could be reduced to a few fundamental and indefinable logical notions. Subsequently, the philosophical innovation represented by Russell’s theory of descriptions is analyzed, and the manner in which it deals with important logical and philosophical problems is exhibited. One can say that Russell’s theory of descriptions is one of the most significant philosophical theories of the 20th century. After that, Peter Strawson’s criticism of the theory of descriptions is presented, as well as Russell’s rebuttal of it. The dissertation ends with a brief assessment of three fundamental points of contention between Russell and Strawson: the role of ordinary language in philosophical analysis, the truth value of propositions expressed by sentences such as “The present King of France is bald”, and the question regarding proper names.

Analisa-se na presente dissertação a teoria das descrições de Bertrand Russell, bem como a crítica que é feita por Peter Strawson a essa teoria. A fim de contextualizar a teoria das descrições, analisa-se primeiramente a teoria do atomismo platônico de George Moore, teoria que configura o primeiro momento da revolta contra o idealismo de cunho hegeliano que dominava a filosofia inglesa no final do século XIX. A seguir, expõe-se em linhas gerais a filosofia de Bertrand Russell dos primeiros anos do século XX, a qual poderia ser chamada de “logicismo”, na medida em que tinha como preocupação teórica central demonstrar a redutibilidade de toda a matemática pura a algumas poucas noções lógicas fundamentais e indefiníveis. Após isso, analisa-se então a inovação filosófica consubstanciada pela teoria das descrições de Russell, mostrando como ela lida com importantes problemas lógicos e filosóficos. Sem dúvida, a teoria das descrições de Russell foi uma das teorias filosóficas mais significativas do século XX. Posteriormente, apresenta-se a crítica de Peter Strawson à teoria das descrições, bem como a réplica de Russell. Conclui-se a dissertação com uma breve avaliação a respeito de três pontos fundamentais de divergência entre Russell e Strawson: o papel da linguagem ordinária na análise filosófica, o valor de verdade de proposições expressas por sentenças do tipo “O atual Rei da França é calvo”, e a questão dos nomes próprios. / In the present dissertation, Bertrand Russell’s theory of descriptions is analyzed, as well as Peter Strawson’s criticism of this theory. In order to better contextualize the theory of descriptions, George Moore’s theory of Platonic Atomism is firstly analyzed. This theory represents the first step of the revolt against the Hegelian influenced idealism that dominated English philosophy at the end of the 19th century. After that, Bertrand Russell’s early philosophy is outlined in its main features, that is, his philosophy from the first years of the 20th century, which may be called “logicism”, since it had, as its main theoretical purpose, the demonstration that all pure mathematics could be reduced to a few fundamental and indefinable logical notions. Subsequently, the philosophical innovation represented by Russell’s theory of descriptions is analyzed, and the manner in which it deals with important logical and philosophical problems is exhibited. One can say that Russell’s theory of descriptions is one of the most significant philosophical theories of the 20th century. After that, Peter Strawson’s criticism of the theory of descriptions is presented, as well as Russell’s rebuttal of it. The dissertation ends with a brief assessment of three fundamental points of contention between Russell and Strawson: the role of ordinary language in philosophical analysis, the truth value of propositions expressed by sentences such as “The present King of France is bald”, and the question regarding proper names.