This thesis investigates a specific kind of criticism of the token-token identity-theory. This criticism is based on recent theories of reference. In the Introduction I argue that more than Davidson's three premisses is needed to establish that mental events are identical to physical events. One needs to invoke principles about what constitutes event-identity. In Part 1 I discuss event-identities. I lay down the constraints an adequate theory of event-identity must satisfy, and criticise the major theories in the literature. I suggest an alternative view, which I defend against some recent proposals. I end Part 1 by exploring a view which takes seriously the possibility of constitution-relations between events. In Parts 2 and 3 I discuss whether the identity-theory can be defended. Part 2 discusses sensations, and I concentrate on S. Kripke's arguments against the identity-view. I distinguish two versions of Kripke's argument, one epistemic, and one metaphysical. The epistemic version of the argument presupposes Kripke's views on content, but fails by its own standards. The metaphysical version is shown to be weak and implausible. Part 3 discusses cognitive events, and concentrates on de re beliefs. I produce an argument which apparently defeats the identity-view. I elaborate two main strategies in defence of the identity-theory. I argue that given a theory of de re beliefs or singular thoughts like G. Evans's, the theory of event-identities I have developed, and some plausible further premisses, the identity-theory seems to be defeated. A reasonable interpretation of this result is to view it as an argument for constitution-relations between mental and physical events. I return to the view I introduced in part 1, and conclude that the token-token identity-theory should probably be replaced by this constitution-view if theories of de re beliefs are accepted.

In this thesis I present a critical explication of Barth’s doctrine of providence in Church Dogmatics III.3. I argue that Karl Barth’s doctrine of providence developed throughout CD III.3 represents a ‘personalist’ revision of Reformed orthodoxy which can only be understood through his ad hoc use of philosophical resources. I claim that critics and supporters alike have missed the depth of Barth’s revision of Reformed providence by failing to perceive his ad hoc use of contemporaneous philosophical tools of the personal. Barth’s doctrine of providence remains theology proper, and not philosophy, but cannot be understood without philosophy. By setting Barth in conversation with three philosophical theologians, Vincent Brümmer, John Macmurray and Austin Farrer, I attempt to show how far Barth is from pre-modern understandings in his articulation of the doctrine of providence. These conversations equip the reader to discern continuities and discontinuities of Barth’s thought with 20th century personal, relational philosophy, thereby making sense of many of Barth’s counterintuitive claims. For Barth, human life is the continual double-agency of human self-determination and divine determination. This life in covenant before God (coram Deo) constitutes the Godgiven opportunity of human personhood. Seen in dialogue with personalist philosophical thinkers, Barth’s doctrine of providence overcomes problematic aspects of traditional Reformed views and grants limited time and space for personal development. Providence sheds light on Barth’s ‘eternalizing’ eschatology in that election establishes the objective reality of salvation for all creatures, while providence explicates God’s active lordship in the human’s self-determination of personal identity in history (the subjective formation of the person who is objectively saved). Election describes God’s salvific work on behalf of creation solely in the work of Jesus Christ. Providence determines the identity of those creatures in relation with the personal God. The conversations I propose with philosophical theologians enable the reader to discern a greater philosophical coherence in Barth’s doctrine of providence. Through contrast with the philosophical theologians, Barth’s christocentric and Trinitarian articulation gains clarity and significance. Building on these philosophical comparisons, I attempt to assess Barth’s elaborations on entrenched debates concerning history as determined by divine action, human freedom under divine providence, and the problem of evil in world-occurrence. I argue that Barth’s ‘personalist’ post-Enlightenment providence as seen in the whole of III.3 points to absolute confidence in God’s determination of all world-occurrence, limited human autonomy of action under God’s universal providence, and an explication of evil that strengthens the Christian in the face of suffering and injustice.

This project explains one person developing an instrument that was stripped from a young age, yet voyaged a pathway of determination to become a teacher of many things. Only nine years ago I went through something no female should ever endure in a lifetime, in a time of darkness, trying to find something to live for something was presented to me out of love, knowing it would be a challenge to achieve, there was a sense of understanding and hope of clarity. This opportunity to create and deliver an understanding for students, staff, faculty, and community members of all ages, a supportive reaction and a positive interpretation, that this can really work out in various favors throughout life. Even if there is much doubt. A chance to develop a sense of effective thinking patterns and be able to examine life as a whole, to pursue those underdeveloped questions about an academic's career to only conclude for one's self.

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Thesis advisor: John Sallis / This dissertation attempts to give an account of philosophical language in Hegel, with particular emphasis on his claim that a philosophical exposition must be living and self-moving. Since Hegel did not provide an extended, thematized account of philosophical language, my primary approach is to take the resources of his thought in general and attempt to construct an account which is consistent with his philosophy as a whole. Thus, a large portion of this dissertation is not directly about philosophical language, but about other determinations such as becoming, indifference, contradiction, life, the understanding, reason, etc., which lay the groundwork for discussing philosophical language in the final chapter. As a preface to all of this, however, I devote Part I of the dissertation to an investigation of Hegel's view of how one should go about comprehending philosophical determinations, i.e., those things which are the subject matter of philosophy (e.g., the determination 'plant' but not 'poison ivy'; the determination 'art' but not 'Flemish Baroque painting'). Chapter 1 deals with his critique of the formalistic approach which attempts to comprehend things by 'applying' categories to them (e.g., applying 'thinking' and 'animal' to comprehend 'human being'). In Chapter 2 I discuss Hegel's alternate view of comprehension, describing this view in terms of the idea of 'expression': later categories in his encyclopedia are comprehended not by applying earlier ones to them, but by grasping the later ones as developmental expressions of the earlier ones. Thus, expression is not only a linguistic but also an ontological category, a point which is investigated in more concrete detail in Chapter 3 through a close reading of the statement "being and nothing are one and the same." As it turns out, this linguistic expression of being plays an essential role in being's ontological expression and development. In Part II, I explore the logical determinations of 'mechanism' and 'life' in the Science of Logic. To set the stage for this, Chapter 4 gives an account of the relation of 'indifference' (present between the 'parts' of a whole) and the relation of 'reciprocity' (present between the 'moments' of a whole). These two kinds of relations allow us in Chapter 5 to see more clearly why Hegel views the logical determination of mechanism as involving a movement of thought whose source is external to it, and the logical determination of life as involving self-movement and self-determination. To further clarify what Hegel means by calling philosophical thought 'living,' I discuss what he might mean by the word 'movement' in the Logic, along with his view of the relation between becoming, contradiction, and self-movement. In Part III I argue that, regarding the logical determinations of mechanism and life, the former finds particularly vivid expression in the operations of the understanding and its 'ordinary language' (Chapter 6), while the latter finds such expression in the operations of reason and its 'philosophical language' (Chapter 7). The faculty of the understanding, whose nature it is to have objects standing over against it (Gegenstände) and to operate according to the category of formal identity, is characterized by finitude and abstract thinking. As such, the ordinary language which it produces is characterized by these same qualities. This entails a.) that this language is incapable of expressing the interdependence of identity and difference, b.) that it thus views the copula ('is') as containing merely formal identity, and c.) that it tends to define its words in abstraction from each other. Another result of ordinary language being produced by the understanding is that it is incapable of providing a genuinely philosophical account of anything, insofar as such an account requires a level of self-reflexivity which the faculty of the understanding, in isolation, renders impossible. The faculty of reason, on the other hand, both includes the understanding (with its abstracting powers) and goes beyond it, particularly in its rejection of identity as merely formal (i.e., identity as independent of difference). Crucially, it is this rejection which allows reason to comprehend the dissolutions of the contradictory logical determinations which move thinking forward. Directed not toward 'objects' but toward its own self, the goal of reason is self-knowledge via the concrete experience of thinking through its own thinking, a 'thinking through' which is necessary and self-moving insofar as its internal contradictions propel it down one (and only one) logical path. The language of reason - philosophical language - is an essential part of this process. Philosophical language, qua language, possesses a contingent dimension, e.g., the way the words sound and the letters are shaped. But this contingency, I argue, does not compromise philosophical language's ability to mediate the non-contingent nature of philosophical thought; for, the nature of logic is that it can reach its full expression only through the determinations of spirit, and all such determinations (with the exception of philosophy itself) necessarily contain contingencies. Philosophical language belongs not to the logical sphere (i.e., the sphere which is wholly 'within itself' and thus wholly necessary), but rather to the spiritual one (i.e., the human realm). As a result, this language must possess contingent dimensions, for it is precisely its 'not-being-within-itself' which allows it to be other to the realm of logic, and thus to be its expression. In contrast to ordinary language, philosophical language is able to give expression to the interdependence of identity and difference, and to create the meaning of its words not as isolated 'parts' but rather as 'moments' which depend on the meanings of all the other words which it has generated. Because of this, philosophical language engages in a continual diaeresis (division) and synagoge (collection) of its meanings, splitting the meaning of a term into an opposed meaning which contradicts the previous one and leads to a new word with a new meaning, containing the remnants of the previous ones. This dialectical process is a living one insofar as the oppositions and contradictions which move the exposition forward are immanent to the exposition itself. Operating throughout the entire encyclopedia (Science of Logic, Philosophy of Nature, Philosophy of Spirit), the self-moving linguistic diaeresis and synagoge reaches its conclusion in the final definition, that of the term 'philosophy,' thereby bringing together in one word the living remains of the meanings of all prior determinations. Because philosophy and philosophical language constitutively determine one another, neither can be, or be comprehended, apart from the other. In Hegel's view, although one is doing philosophy from the very first words of the Science of Logic, one can only account for philosophy at the 1,500-page encyclopedia's very end; my claim is that, in the same way, although one is using philosophical language from the very beginning, one can only account for this language at the very end. Philosophical language receives its determinateness from philosophy, and vice versa. As a result, only at the encyclopedia's end can one fully comprehend what one has been doing and saying for the last 1,500 pages. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2011. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Thesis advisor: Thomas Groome / Western culture idealizes the quest for authenticity as a significant life project. This culture of authenticity is characterized by the understanding that it is important for each person to search for their unique life expression and purpose, even as larger social, political, religious, and other such frameworks are generally suspected of being in conflict with or in opposition to the truly authentic. Further, the forces of secularism and pluralism have allowed for a wide dissemination of varied and often conflicting views about what constitutes an authentic way of being in the world. Within such a secular-pluralistic milieu, the prevalence of different and often competing views is particularly acute in regards to contemporary images and concepts of God, particularly as these relate to the (post)modern quest for authenticity. For instance, while our culture's widespread suspicion that larger religious frameworks inhibit authenticity has in part led to a significant rise in the numbers of those unaffiliated with any religious tradition, a majority of the unaffiliated still claim to believe in God. This somewhat paradoxical phenomenon can be traced back to the secular-pluralist profusion of various understandings and expressions regarding the meaning of "God." Within these circumstances, "authentic" relation to the divine is often seen as a highly individualized and even subjective concern; as something having to do with what best expresses a person's own feelings and inner personal world regarding the unique meaning of their life. This dissertation posits that Catholic religious and theological education needs to take seriously the importance our culture accords to the quest for authenticity and to actively work against its individualistic, expressivist, and subjectivist tendencies. Unmasking the illusion that authenticity requires dismissing larger frameworks, such as religious tradition, I posit that it is only within larger frameworks that we are able to discern the more from the less authentic. In terms of images and conceptions of God then, I argue that a Catholic education for today requires retrieving the Catholic Intellectual Tradition's discipline of philosophical theology so as to provide students with the resources necessary for discerning the true, living God from among the jumble of ideas and images on offer within secular-pluralism. Ch. 1 provides an historical overview of the culture of authenticity and in the process defines the latter and its relation to secular-pluralism and to the proliferation of images and conceptions of God. Philosophical theology is introduced as potentially necessary component of a Catholic education that seeks to help students discern the authentic, or true God. Ch. 2 takes up the question of authenticity as related to conflicting ideas about the truth of existence and in this light offers an understanding of truth as engaged, relational, and non-absolute. This understanding grounds the contemporary philosophical theological approach presented in chapters four and five. First, however, Ch. 3 looks at the thought of Thomas Aquinas as standard for the field of philosophical theology and therefore as necessary for (creatively) retrieving for its usefulness today. Chapter 4 begins the process of retrieval by outlining the ways in which W. Norris Clarke's Thomistically based "Inner" and "Outer" Paths to God provide elements for a contemporary philosophical theology. Ch. 5 continues in this vein as it turns to the work of Elizabeth Johnson to elucidate the socioeconomic, political, and cultural aspects that must be attended to by any contemporary philosophical theology. Ch. 6 proposes Thomas Groome's Shared Christian Praxis approach to Christian religious education as theoretically and practically compatible with a contemporary philosophical theology and therefore as the most suitable pedagogical approach to educating from and for faith. I conclude the dissertation with a brief reflection on what lessons philosophical theology has to offer to Catholic religious and theological education as a whole. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2014. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Religious Education and Pastoral Ministry.

This thesis, an anthropological dialogue with design, seeks to explore the formation of the material world beyond objects. The work is situated within the fields of design studies and social anthropology, and contributes to the emerging interdisciplinary field of design anthropology. It draws on my education and perspective as a designer and engineer, my field dialogues with contemporary practitioners and the writings of the media philosopher Vilém Flusser, the social anthropologist Tim Ingold and the architect Kengo Kuma. I begin with a consideration of the material world as all matter which forms the earth, its atmospheres and the dwellings and features of many organisms. Such a notion of the material world is abundant with life, energy and potential and recognises human perception as entwined with lineages of materials, making and transformation. However design has evolved, I argue, to become a practice that tends to obscure the energetic and entangled conditions of the world, by way of presenting materials in the form of objects; discrete and enclosed material entities. This results in an impoverishment of environmental perception and a clotting of the ecological currency of materials. To understand how materials come to be formed into objects, I attend to a site of contemporary engineering practice where designers work with materials, tools and computational media in the formation of a product: in this case the royal relay baton for the 2014 Commonwealth Games in Glasgow. Drawing on a period of sustained participant observation with one Glasgow-based company, I observe how lines of practice course through intention, gesture, conversation, writing, drawing, modelling and making, as materials are projected and presented in object form. I highlight the specific dispositions and activities of individual practitioners as they orient their perception towards different ways of knowing materials and specific practices of formation. Here, it becomes evident that design is, fundamentally, a social practice, constituted in an ongoing dialogue between people, matter and energy. Drawing the strands together, I argue that design is not so much a point-to-point procedural process, as an active matrix of social, material and energetic interchange, in which performance and form are intertwined in the transformation of people, materials and surrounds. Within this matrix of activity, the condition of the object is notably evident - and often dominating - but not absolute or inevitable, and there always exist possibilities for manifestations of form beyond objects. Following this prospect, the thesis rounds not to a closure, but to an opening: to the possibility of design as a practice of material performance led by the attentiveness, critique and imagination of an anthropological education.

Cheung Ching-yuen. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 118-123). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter Chapter One --- Introduction --- p.5 / Chapter I --- The Study of Man --- p.8 / Chapter II --- Philosophical Anthropology and other Sciences of Man --- p.11 / Chapter III --- Max Scheler and Philosophical Anthropology --- p.17 / Chapter Chapter Two --- Scheler's Concept of Person --- p.29 / Chapter I --- The Concepts of Person --- p.30 / Chapter II --- Scheler's Ethical Personalism --- p.40 / Chapter III --- "Person, Community and World" --- p.48 / Chapter Chapter Three --- Scheler's Concept of Man --- p.54 / Chapter I --- The Concepts of Man --- p.55 / Chapter II --- Man as ens amans --- p.71 / Chapter III --- Spirit and Life --- p.90 / Chapter Chapter Four --- Conclusion --- p.102 / Note --- p.107 / Bibliography --- p.118

Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-01T23:31:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 tese_10811_merged.pdf: 2472312 bytes, checksum: bdca3996c82d22765e891b351784b51b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-12-13 / Esta pesquisa teve por objetivo analisar a práxis filosófica de estudantes e professores de uma turma do curso de Segurança do Trabalho em um dos Campi do Instituto Federal do Espírito Santo a partir do exercício do diálogo crítico como atitude filosófica que integra as dimensões técnica e humanística da formação humana no Proeja. Defende a tese de que a práxis filosófica na turma do curso pesquisado se evidencia como elemento integrador entre diferentes componentes curriculares pela prática do diálogo crítico em torno das relações sociais capitalistas e suas implicações na conformação e ou transformação da realidade pessoal e social. A investigação se orientou pela seguinte questão: qual tem sido a práxis filosófica em uma turma do curso de Segurança do Trabalho e quais as possibilidades dessa se configurar como espaço e tempo de desenvolvimento da formação humana integral de estudantes e professores do Proeja no Ifes-Vitória? O aporte teórico metodológico tem no materialismo histórico-dialético suas bases centrando-se na filosofia da práxis pelos diálogos entre Marx, Gramsci e Freire. Como pesquisa qualitativa, a opção metodológica assumida foi pela pesquisa participante que se realizou tomando por base o pertencimento à comunidade, a participação e o diálogo entre pesquisador, estudantes e professores durante as aulas e as entrevistas. Os sujeitos participantes da pesquisa foram 12 estudantes e sete professores de uma turma do curso de Segurança do Trabalho do Proeja em que nos inserimos atuando com a observação participante nos períodos de 2014/2 e 2015/1; participaram ainda duas estudantes do Proeja do último período do curso de Segurança de Trabalho, totalizando assim 14 estudantes e sete (7) professores, participantes. Os resultados revelaram que por meio da práxis filosófica estudantes e professores exercitaram o diálogo crítico acerca das desigualdades engendradas pelo sistema capitalista ao problematizarem nas aulas os temas do desemprego, da terceirização, da concentração da terra e do monopólio da mídia. Assim, os diálogos entre discentes e docentes sinalizaram para uma práxis filosófica que visa à transformação das relações sociais capitalistas tendo em vista a formação humana integral no Proeja.

The purpose of this study was to determine some of the bases of character education in United States public schools from 1607 to 1983. Research was conducted concerning persons, organizations, and movements to determine bases for character education. Teaching materials representing a variety of philosophies were also studied. The various bases of character education were grouped under four categories--religious, societal, specific traits, and individually determined. The history of each area was traced in a separate chapter. An attempt was made to include educators and materials representing various philosophies. The summary included some of the trends related to each base, major proponents, and materials. It was concluded that society-based character education has been the most prominent, even among educators who claim to have other bases for their character education. Bible-based character education has also been prevalent, but less so in recent years. Independent thinking as a base for character education has increased in popularity in recent years but is often, in reality, based on society. The trait approach is an approach used mainly in relation to other bases. It was also determined that character education in the United States has changed from mainly a biblical emphasis to more diversified bases. As society has become more pluralistic, a greater diversity of bases has become more acceptable. In addition, few educators adhere strictly to a single base. Most seem to combine bases in varying degrees to arrive at some sort of personalized base for their own philosophy of moral education. Some recommendations for further research and study were given.