The present dissertation is a multi-disciplinary project that examines the relationship between human rights and development in Africa, with specific focus on Ghana. The proposition, which is expressed in a theory of community emancipation, is that human rights hold the key to the attainment of sustainable holistic development. The theory of community emancipation represents the Akan notion of rights which speak to the lived experiences (traditional, colonial and post-colonial) of Akan peoples. It is offered as a contribution to the evolution of distinct African notions of rights. The Akan perspective on rights aims at making human rights a more accessible concept that people can relate to and to use as an effective tool to attain development. The theory is used in a general context to analyse Western development foreign policies implemented in post-colonial Africa with the active collaboration of African leaders. It concludes that these policies "failed" due to the lack of attention to human rights. Consequent to this is the creation of a culture of rights abuse in Africa and the unfounded claim propagated by African leaders that human rights does not matter for Africans, and is not part of the African culture. The work also examines Western development policies in the post-Cold War era and concludes that in general the development NGO concept is not conducive to the promotion of sustainable holistic development in Africa. The solution, among others, lies in local human rights NGOs collaborating in a new relationship with their foreign counterparts; and both given a more prominent role to play in the political, as well as the economic liberalisation processes. / The significant contribution of the work, inter alia, is linking the discourses in African philosophy and African notions of rights, which had hitherto gone their separate ways, through the theory of community emancipation. This results in the construction of new paradigm for examining rights in Africa from a developmental context. It is expected that this contribution could help enrich the international human rights discourse, contribute to plugging the loopholes and make the implementation of human rights more relevant and effective in Africa.

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This dissertation is a philosophical examination of the concept of reincarnation from an African point of view. It does so, largely, from the cultural perspective of the Akan people of Ghana. In this work, reincarnation is distinguished from such related concepts as metempsychosis and transmigration with which it is conflated by many authors on the subject. In terms of definition, therefore, the belief that a deceased person can be reborn is advanced in this dissertation as referring to only reincarnation, but not to either metempsychosis or transmigration. Many scholars would agree that reincarnation is a pristine concept, yet it is so present in the beliefs and worldviews of several cultures today (including those of Africa). A good appreciation of the concept, it can be seen, will not be possible without some reference to the past. That is why some attempt is first made at the early stages of the dissertation to show how reincarnation was understood in the religious philosophies of ancient Egyptians, Greeks, Indians, Chinese and the Incas. Secondly, some link is then established between the past and present, especially between ancient Egyptian philosophy and those of contemporary sub-Saharan Africa. In modern African thought, the doctrine of reincarnation has not been thoroughly researched into. Even so, some of the few who have written on the subject have denied its existence in African thought. The dissertation rejects this denial, and seeks to show nonetheless that reincarnation is generally an irrational concept. In spite of its irrationality, it is acknowledged that the concept, as especially presented in African thought, raises our understanding of the constitution of a person as understood in the African culture. It is also observed that the philosophical problem of personal identity is central to the discussion of reincarnation because that which constitutes a person is presumed to be known whenever a claim of return of a survived person is made. For this reason, the dissertation also pays significant attention to the concept of personal identity in connection, especially, with the African philosophical belief in the return of persons. / Philosophy & Systematic Theology / D. Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy)

This dissertation is a philosophical examination of the concept of reincarnation from an African point of view. It does so, largely, from the cultural perspective of the Akan people of Ghana. In this work, reincarnation is distinguished from such related concepts as metempsychosis and transmigration with which it is conflated by many authors on the subject. In terms of definition, therefore, the belief that a deceased person can be reborn is advanced in this dissertation as referring to only reincarnation, but not to either metempsychosis or transmigration. Many scholars would agree that reincarnation is a pristine concept, yet it is so present in the beliefs and worldviews of several cultures today (including those of Africa). A good appreciation of the concept, it can be seen, will not be possible without some reference to the past. That is why some attempt is first made at the early stages of the dissertation to show how reincarnation was understood in the religious philosophies of ancient Egyptians, Greeks, Indians, Chinese and the Incas. Secondly, some link is then established between the past and present, especially between ancient Egyptian philosophy and those of contemporary sub-Saharan Africa. In modern African thought, the doctrine of reincarnation has not been thoroughly researched into. Even so, some of the few who have written on the subject have denied its existence in African thought. The dissertation rejects this denial, and seeks to show nonetheless that reincarnation is generally an irrational concept. In spite of its irrationality, it is acknowledged that the concept, as especially presented in African thought, raises our understanding of the constitution of a person as understood in the African culture. It is also observed that the philosophical problem of personal identity is central to the discussion of reincarnation because that which constitutes a person is presumed to be known whenever a claim of return of a survived person is made. For this reason, the dissertation also pays significant attention to the concept of personal identity in connection, especially, with the African philosophical belief in the return of persons. / Philosophy and Systematic Theology / D. Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy)