Thesis (DPhil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / Bibliography. Also available via the Internet.

This dissertation is a set of three essays connected by the common theme of our epistemic fragility: the way in which our knowledge – of our own minds, of whether we are in violation of the epistemic and ethical norms, and of the philosophical truths themselves – is hostage to forces outside our control. The first essay, “Are We Luminous?”, is a recasting and defence of Timothy Williamson’s argument that there are no non-trivial conditions such that we are in a position to know we are in them whenever we are in them. Crucial to seeing why Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument succeeds, pace various critics, is recognising that the issue is largely an empirical one. It is in part because of the kind of creatures we are – specifically, creatures with coarse-grained doxastic dispositions – that nothing of interest, for us, is luminous. In the second essay, “What’s in a Norm?”, I argue that such an Anti-Cartesian view in turn demands that epistemologists and ethicists accept the ubiquity of normative luck, the phenomenon whereby agents fail to do what they ought because of non-culpable ignorance. Those who find such a view intolerable – many epistemic internalists and ethical subjectivists – have the option of cleaving to the Cartesian orthodoxy by endorsing an anti-realist metanormativity. The third essay, “The Archimedean Urge”, is a critical discussion of genealogical scepticism about philosophical judgment, including evolutionary debunking arguments and experimentally-motivated attacks. Although such genealogical scepticism often purports to stand outside philosophy – in the neutral terrains of science or common sense – it tacitly relies on various first-order epistemic judgments. The upshot is two-fold. First, genealogical scepticism risks self-defeat, impugning commitment to its own premises. Second, philosophers have at their disposal epistemological resources to fend off genealogical scepticism: namely, an epistemology that takes seriously the role that luck plays in the acquisition of philosophical knowledge.

From the late 1950s to about 1970, philosophers of education began to adopt a mode of philosophizing characterized as "the linguistic turn," after a similar change in general philosophy. This involved a move away from the older "isms" approach rooted in metaphysics towards linguistic and conceptual analysis. The linguistic turn has been attributed to intellectual history--the influence of ideas on a field. The central argument of this study, however, is that during the 1950s, factors external to academia, but acting upon it, interacted with concerns by educational philosophers themselves to create the conditions for the linguistic turn. These factors included the attacks on public schooling and "educationists," the teacher education reform movement, the Ford Foundation funding of liberal arts oriented teacher preparation, and, within the academy, the concern on the part of educational philosophers for the academic legitimacy of their discipline. These factors led philosophers of education to model their discourse more closely on the reigning paradigm in general philosophy, linguistic analysis. The attacks on public schooling were centered on progressivism for its alleged anti-intellectualism and subversive character. Philosophers of education were the particular targets of these critics. Teacher preparation in education schools also came under scrutiny during this period. The Ford Foundation's Fund for the Advancement of Education underwrote major programs that centered teacher preparation in a liberal arts curriculum, with only minimal coursework devoted to professional training. In addition, the National Commission for the Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE) supported such a reorientation, with a concomitant weakening of educational philosophy's place in teacher education programs. Philosophers of education responded by lobbying for the inclusion of their courses in certification requirements, forging an alliance with the American Philosophical Association, reducing the social activism that had characterized earlier educational philosophers' efforts, and adopting the more academically legitimate methods of general philosophy. In the short term these actions assured educational philosophy a place in teacher education programs. In the long run, however, the linguistic turn may have jeopardized the survival of educational philosophy as an academic field by creating a chasm between philosopher and practitioner.

This thesis explores three of Nietzsche in terms of his conception of nihilism and his attempt to overcome it. It is argued that Nietzsche views modernity as being characterized by nihilism and in a state of crisis. Nietzsche responds to this crisis by offering both an aetiology of it, and a vision of a future beyond nihilism. It is Nietzsche's vision which is the primary concern of this work. Nietzsche's first attempt to overcome nihilism is found in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. In this book Nietzsche offers a solution of individual salvation which is elucidated in terms of a trio of ideas - the Superman, the will to power and eternal recurrence. Since nihilism is a social problem, however, this individual overcoming of it is insufficient. In Beyond Good arid Evil Nietzsche, realizing this, offers a more inclusive solution which centres on a political vision of an aristocracy which lies beyond, and outside of, social morality. In On the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche attempts to show that the creation of such a future does not involve any ahistorical leaps, that the potential for it is already present, though repressed, in Western culture. In sUbjecting Nietzsche' s vision of the future to critical evaluation it is argued that his visions of individual and society are both unattractive and unfeasible. The Nietzschean individual is argued to be less a model of psychological health and well-being than a case study in alienation. The aristocratic society which Nietzsche envisages seems sure to lead to a new crisis. It is further argued that this lack of a workable and attractive vision of the future is based in a misinterpretation of the present, which, I suggest, is not characterized by a crisis. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Natal, Durban, 1994.

Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Western Sydney, Nepean, 2000. / Bibliography : leaves 267-287.

Univ., Habil.-Schr.--Bielefeld, 2003. / Literaturvereichnis S. [349]-356.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Stockholm University, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 209-221).

Habilitationsschrift--Düsseldorf. / Bibliography: p. 231-234.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Stockholm University, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 209-221).

Habilitationsschrift--Düsseldorf. / Bibliography: p. 231-234.