<p> Weaving together influences from philosophy, visual and sonic aesthetics, and radical political thought, this project argues that individual and collective imagination should be understood as important sites of politics&mdash;in cultural, discursive, institutional, and collectivist registers. Rather than proposing dogmatic adherence to any particular ideology, we find that imagining new possibilities, as well as the possibilities for more possibilities, is centrally important to the endeavor of seeking radical change in the contemporary capitalist/state system. By turning to the examples of two politico-aesthetic movements, the Handicraft movement of William Morris and the Hammersmith Socialist League of the 19th century and the 20^th/21^st century cultures of punk rock, we witness the successes and failures of attempts to intervene in political imaginaries. I focus on the anachronistic, non-capitalist mode of production of so-called &lsquo;do-it-yourself&rsquo; (or D.I.Y.), I argue that such productive processes could represent such an inter-temporal rupture point of radical anachronism that I have theorized, and can therefore demonstrate the potentiality of wellsprings for the creation of new forms of politics, paradoxically contributing to the progress of inclusivity and egalitarian politics through the introduction of anachronistic performances, visuals, and music. </p><p> Specifically, they reveal the surprising ways in which inter-temporal rupture through anachronistic aesthetic forms and modes of productions can not only disrupt hegemonic notions of progressive linear time, but also question the radical imperative towards production of the new. These movements hence illuminate important implications for the tactics, tensions, and most of all thought&mdash;and preconditions for thought&mdash;that underpin contemporary progressive politics (e.g. Anti-globalization, Occupy, Black Lives Matter, revolutionaries in Rojava and especially, and most contentiously and controversially the contemporary Antifa movements) by demonstrating the radical potentialities of aesthetics, space, and anachronism for the introduction of historical rupture contained within politico-aesthetic shock. These movements are deeply concerned with democratic participation and social justice, and so we can use Morris and punk as a window in to deep analysis of tactics as utilized by the aforementioned anti-capitalist and anti-fascist movements.</p><p>

<p> In the dissertation I analyze and interpret Ernst Gombrich's book <i> Art and Illusion,</i> focusing on his view that illusion is involved in pictorial representation. Since Gombrich never gave a concise, systematic account of illusion, my goal will be to fill this void by using the text of <i> Art and Illusion</i> as well as Gombrich's subsequent writings in order to present a coherent account of how illusion might play a role in a picture's representing an object.</p><p> My goal is not to present an unassailable account of pictorial representation. Instead, I offer a version of Gombrich's theory that pushes readers towards a better comprehension of what a Gombrichian theory of illusion involves. In the process I introduce and defend a number of terms and concepts in the service of filling in those places where Gombrich is silent. Among other things, in response to Gombrich's notion of visual substitution I elaborate upon the claims that representational pictures function as relational models and afford recognition of the objects they represent; I reply to Richard Wollheim's "twofoldness" objection to Gombrich; and I contend that Gombrich's use of the notion of illusion is not open to the objections commonly made against it (e.g., that normal picture perception does not involve illusion because "illusion" is synonymous with "delusion").</p>

<p> While the American composer John Cage is often classified as an influential figure in the realm of modernist music, the controversial nature of Cage's work has proven to be more far-reaching than many had initially contended. Through a process of re-examining the work of Cage through a postmodern lens, this thesis rejects the notion that Cage was confined to the realm of modernism, and demonstrates that the composer not only exhibited postmodern tendencies through his ideas and concepts, but also aesthetically in his compositions. By illuminating these postmodern compositional practices and postmodern-influenced belief systems expressed by Cage as an artist, a reinterpretation of the composer and his work is carried out, while also addressing criticisms leveled toward Cage as a postmodernist. Through this contemporary reanalysis, the thesis demonstrates that Cage was a composer that transcended genres and classifications to ultimately resonate as a viable figure of postmodern music.</p>

<p>A central question in aesthetics is whether aesthetic judgment is subjective or objective. Existing approaches to answering this question have been unsatisfying because they begin with the assumption of an individual observer that must then be communalized through the introduction of a transcendent object or the transcendental reason of the subject. </p><p> Rather than introduce a vertical transcendence to account for the ideal observer, I propose an alternative account based on the anthropology of the Japanese philosopher W<p style="font-variant: small-caps">ATSUJI</p> Tetsur&omacr;. According to Watsuji, human existence is a movement of double negation whereby we negate our emptiness in order to individuate ourselves and we negate our individuality in order to form communal wholes. Human beings are empty of independent existence, and thus open to create ideal aesthetic subjects in historically and regionally situated communal contexts. </p><p> I propose an account of aesthetic experience as a double negation in which we negate our surroundings in order to create a sense of psychical distance and negate our ordinary selves in order to dissolve into the background of primordial unity. I examine aesthetic normativity and find that the subject of aesthetics is active and plural rather than passive and individual. Aesthetic judgment and taste are, respectively, individual and communal moments in the process of double negation. Artistic evolution is a process by which the context of artist, artwork, and audience develop into a meaningful historical milieu. Genius is the ability to make public one&rsquo;s private values through the creation of objects that can travel beyond their original contexts and create new contexts around them. Such an ability is the result of a double negation played out between the genius and critical receptivity. </p><p> Extended examples taken from Noh theater, Japanese linked verse, tea ceremony, and <i>The Tale of Genji</i> are also used to illustrate my arguments. </p>

<p> In his 1978 lectures at the College de France, <i>Security Territory Population</i>, Michel Foucault shifts his analysis of power by arguing for pastoral power as both the prelude to governmentality and as the decisive moment in the constitution of the Western subject. If the history of the Christian pastorate involves "the entire history of procedures of human individualization in the West (184)," then, Foucault argues, there has never been a revolt against pastoral power because such a revolt would be a revolt against the constitution of the self, that is to say against self-consciousness. If the revolt against pastoral power is a revolt against self-consciousness, then I argue that the psychagogic-spiritual, as opposed to rhetorical-theological, practices of religious conversion may be where counter-conducts (already understood to be subsumed within Christian pastoral power) may also overwhelm the Christian pastorate. In his conversion to Christianity Augustine employs techniques that are `overwhelming' to pastoral power, but are never actually an attempt to overcome pastoral power. In the specific experiences recalled by Augustine in his Confessions, through the various non-discrete phases of his conversion he takes up what Foucault calls counter-conducts. Through asceticism (especially in the author's struggle with conscupience); through the establishment of a new religious community (as a Manichean catechumen) through mysticism (in the doctrine of `inner illumination)'; through the exegesis of scripture (significantly in the voluntary reading of Romans 13:12-14 prior to becoming a catechumen of the Christian Church); and through eschatological belief (specifically in the a-millennial conception of the return of Christ), Augustine, author of the Confessions, emerges as a convert to Christianity. Towards Foucault's call for genealogies of pastoral power and towards the call of philosophy understood as ethico-poetic praxes of Eros captured in the phrase epimeleia heatou, this thesis will investigate Augustine of Hippo's conversion to Christianity as an enactment of Foucault's `counter-conducts.' I will argue, through exegesis of Augustine's Confessions, that this parrhesiatic document is simultaneously a narrative of psychagogic practices which reflects Augustine's profound ascesis towards Christian subjectivation as well as a document of the counter-conducts that overwhelm Christian pastoral power while never revolting against it. As a result of his pluralistic and deeply personal approach towards conversion, Augustine's recorded experiences exemplify how `new' technologies (or at least new modalities of old technologies) are established within the Christian pastorate. It is in and through the event of his conversion that Augustine also emerges as a leader of the orthodox Church and simultaneously as an instigator for later revolts against it--arguably, for example, as an inspiration for the leaders of the Protestant Reformation. If there can be no revolution against pastoral power because it is always instituting, circumscribing, and subsuming new forms of resistance on its own, then perhaps we can best understand where counter-conducts are most dangerous to the practices of power by understanding where some practices actually fail to resist power-effects, while simultaneously transforming power-relations.</p>

Thesis (Ph.D. 1973) from the Dept. of English Language and Literature, University of Adelaide.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Rutgers University, 2007. / "Graduate Program in Philosophy." Includes bibliographical references (p. 181-184).

This thesis examines the nature and value of art. It is primarily concerned to advance an argument which makes sense of the significance we ordinarily afford art, rather than rendering it merely aesthetic and thus cognitively trivial. Contrary to philosophical orthodoxy, it is argued that 'art' does not have two distinct senses. Rather, we should understand art as an inherently evaluative, evolving cultural practice. Thus, I argue, 'art' is essentially a cluster concept. I consider an account of art according to which it is in the pleasure art affords, that its value lies. However, though we derive pleasure even from apparently unpleasant artworks, the mark of art's value lies elsewhere. That is, the pleasure we derive from art is the result of an artwork's being of value in some other way. Through critically assessing the standard accounts of art's value, I argue that art's pleasures are primarily cognitive. Furthermore, I argue, the cognitive value of art arises primarily from the engagement of our imagination and interpretation of artworks. That is, we enjoy the imaginative activity of engaging with artworks and the promotion of particular imaginative understandings. Furthermore, as imaginative understanding is of fundamental importance in grasping the nature of our world and others, art may have a distinctive significance. That is, art may afford insights into and thus promote our imaginative understandings of our world and others. Thus, through the promotion of imaginative understanding, art may cultivate our moral understanding. Therefore, art is of profound significance and import.

Plato’s attitude on Art has always been hardly debated among scholars, and in recent times the interest on ancient Aesthetics in general and Plato’s attitude in particular has been even increased in the philosophical debate. The problem with Plato’s position is twofold. On the one hand he expresses hard criticism against poetry and he even banishes the poets from the ideal state he envisages in the Republic. That has been usually regarded as an illiberal, totalitarian position. On the other hand, the criticisms he makes of poetry seem to present inconsistencies among the Platonic corpus and they could prima facie appear to the modern reader odd, paternalistic or moralistic. Throughout my work I suggest to adopt a new approach, based both on historical and theoretical grounds, according to which it will be possible to resolve the problems that Plato’s objections to poetry give rise to. The historical and cultural context will be the focus of the first chapter. It consists of the following points. On the one hand I will first focus on different features that characterize Greek poetry, and on the other I will emphasize the pre-literacy of Plato’s contemporaries. I will also highlight how the ethical and political role, along with the educational function, made poetry the privileged source of information and education, and the ultimate reference for everyone in the Athens of the fifth B.C. In the second section of the first chapter I will analyze Plato’s teleologism, which I regard to be a fundamental entity in his stance on art. Such a notion, although not as much emphasized by scholars, plays a pivotal role in Plato’s arguments on poetry, I contend. This is especially evident in the Republic, where Plato’s criticism regards the flaws of poetry in teaching (Resp. II and III) first, and secondly as the main source of knowledge (X). In the third and last section of chapter one, I will face the complex issue of the alleged existence of the concept of beauty in antiquity. In this occasion I argue in favour of the existence of such an entity, both among average Greeks and for Plato, even though in different ways and degrees of awareness. After having provided the historical and theoretical frame of my approach, I will then move to textual examination of the Platonis Opera. In the second and third chapter I will analyse the so-called ‘early dialogues’, in order to single out the recurrent features of Plato’s stance on poetry. In fact, one of the main goals of my study is to retrace an overall, consistent view on art in general and poetry in particular among the Platonic corpus. While the second chapter is mainly focused on the Apology and the Protagoras, a special emphasis deserves the Ion, which is the object of the third chapter. I argue indeed that for the first time in this early dialogue we find a clear theoretical expression of a key-concept of Plato’s stance on art. In fact, Plato bases his criticism toward the eponymous rhapsode pointing out that the rhapsode on the one hand lacks the knowledge of the things he (demands to be able to) talk(s) about. On the other hand, the rhapsode lacks the knowledge of what poetry, as well as his trade, is. Such a ‘twofold ignorance’, as we will see, it is a recurring pattern in Socrates’ pupil. While the fourth chapter is mainly devoted to the analysis and comment of the Symposium, the fifth, sixth and seventh chapter present the detailed examination of the Book II, III and X of the Republic. They are respectively devoted to the analysis and criticism of the ‘middle dialogues’, the Republic and the ‘late dialogues’. Because of its capital importance for the purpose of my argument, I will analyze Plato’s criticism in the Republic in details and I will face different approaches to the subject. Afterwards I will confront them with my own theory in order to show that adopting my approach the apparent discrepancies regarding Plato’s aesthetics within the Republic itself as well as in others Platonic dialogues disappear. (And, on the contrary, this does not happen if the reader accepts the mainstream interpretation on the subject at issue). In essence: I propose to take Plato’s criticism of poetry not as an aesthetic attitude, but rather as a justified concern about the pursuit of truth through poetry, as if it were the main source of teaching, moral value, knowledge and information in the ancient Greek society. That is the core of my argument. The eighth chapter analyses the ‘late dialogues’, in particular The Laws, given the abundant of relevant passages on the matter. Finally, the ninth and last chapter faces Popper’s notorious judgement of Plato as totalitarian scholar. In this section of the study I will contend that Popper’s notorious reading of Plato’s political system is fallacious. Further, I will reveal that Plato and Popper’s stance on mass media essentially correspond. It is my understanding that such a fundamental passage will give the ultimate proof of the rightness of my revolutionary reading of the vexata quaestio of the ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry in Plato. Finally, the outcome of my investigations will show that Plato does not banish poetry because he is attacking it as a dangerous, free, “fine” Art. On the contrary, I propose to take his attack as the only way to release poetry from its educational and political context and to baptize it into the realm of Fine Art.

Conceptual Art (henceforth CA) has the peculiar status of being at once a neglected topic in philosophical aesthetics, and one on which a degree of philosophical weight disproportionate to the attention it has received is placed. On the one hand it is frequently mentioned by philosophers as a problematic case, one that general theories of art have difficulty dealing with, but on the other, there is a notable lack of philosophical research taking CA as its focus. It is largely taken as a given that CA is radically different from other art in various ways and thus poses problems for some of the general statements about art that philosophers tend to make. But it is striking that these claims are not, for the most part, grounded in a thorough investigation into the nature of CA. The purpose of my research is to conduct such an investigation; to address the question of what CA is, and what makes it different from other art, in order to come to a clearer view of what particular philosophical issues or difficulties CA raises for the philosophy of art. In existing literature on CA, it is standard to take CA’s distinctiveness to have something to do with the importance of ‘ideas’. I investigate what could be meant here by ‘idea’, and identify two broad schools of thought as to what form this emphasis on ideas in CA takes: Priority Accounts, which claim that in CA ideas are the most important aspect of the work and Constitution Accounts, which claim that works of CA are ideas. I identify serious problems for Constitution Accounts, in general, and for some kinds of Priority Account. I then put forward a new kind of Priority account which I think overcomes the problems faced by its rivals.